The Luxury Goods Vote: Why the Left Loses from Asymmetric Electoral Accountability
The Luxury Goods Vote: Why the Left Loses from Asymmetric Electoral Accountability
Thursday, January 15, 201512:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Second Floor, Central, C231
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
Voters often punish incumbent parties for poor economic performance; whether they treat left and right governments differently is less clear. The literature hosts multiple disconnected and often contradictory theories of partisan accountability. We leverage both observational and survey experiment data to establish an empirical regularity: voters, on average, punish left-of-center incumbents more severely for economic downturns than their counterparts on the right. A luxury-goods model of voting best explains this regularity. When times get tough, voters prioritize social spending for basic economic security over spending on socially desirable but less necessary "luxury goods" policies (e.g., environmental protection). Parties associated with luxury goods policies, mostly left parties, are shunned in downturns. Thus, many incumbent parties of the left face double jeopardy: voters punish all incumbents for a weak economy; they punish many left incumbents additionally for their policies.