PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, NEUTRALITY, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS
ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN: INTRODUCTION

Wolfgang Mueller

In the history of the Cold War and détente, reference is seldom made to the international relations of the small states. If their fates in the Cold War are mentioned at all, they figure either as hot spots of East-West tension, sometimes using their “leverage of the weak” to extract the most backing possible from their superpower patrons, or as passive objects of great-power policy. With regard to détente, their role has also not yet been comprehensively analyzed. Ostpolitik is usually attributed to only France and West Germany, while among the East European states’ initiatives, little other than the Rapacki and the Gomułka Plans are remembered. Special attention is given to the neutrals above all in the context of the CSCE. But if we want to better understand what role détente took in the European international system as a whole, however, more research must be undertaken about the foreign relations of Europe’s smaller members on both sides of the Iron Curtain.¹

This volume undertakes the task of reassessing comparatively, on the basis of newly declassified sources from Western and formerly Eastern archives,² the preconditions and varying developments of bilateral relations across the Iron Curtain, between the USSR, Eastern Europe, and neutral but capitalist Austria, in the years of détente and the late Cold War. The first part of this volume provides the reader with information on Austria’s political system, its principles of foreign policy, its trade, and its culture. The second part delineates its bilateral relations with the “people’s democracies” and the Eastern superpower. Unless the chapter titles indicate otherwise, the analyses cover the period from Austria’s regaining of sovereignty and declaration of neutrality in 1955 to the breakdown of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, i.e. the period of Khrushchev’s “coexistence,” détente, Ostpolitik, and the final peak of the Cold War. How-

¹ I am greatly indebted to Michael Gehler and Arnold Suppan for their insightful comments.
³ While in most Central European states the access to archival documents of the period being dealt with can be described as satisfactory, not the same can be said with regard to Austria, where a significant amount of the Foreign Ministry’s records are not accessible for most of the 1970s and the 1980s in the Austrian State Archives.
ever, some of the articles go beyond this timeframe and include the post-
war decade or the post-Communist years into their narrative. By analyzing
these bilateral relations, it is the intention of this volume to provide a con-
tribution to the history of détente, neutrality, and the foreign policy of the
USSR and its satellites as well as that of Austria.

Choosing Austria as a case study has several reasons. In Thomas
Schlesinger’s study *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe*, published in 1972,
the American political scientist sketched the geographical position of Aus-
tria’s capital as follows:

Vienna lies nearly 150 miles east of Berlin and nearly 100 miles east of Prague. It is much
nearer to Warsaw than to Bonn; and even Sofia and Bucharest are not so far from Vienna
as Paris. Moscow lies no further east than the famous Land’s End, England, is to the west
[…] Austria has over 750 miles of common frontier with Communist-governed countries.3

Austria was thus, at least geographically, at the edge of the Eastern bloc,
and it was to become one of the first addressees of Soviet calls for “peace-
ful coexistence” and a forerunner for West European Ostpolitik. Particularly
when the early Cold War tore Europe’s international system apart, Austria’s
proximity to Communist dictatorships resulted in a number of problems,
but it also offered chances and challenges for the small country. After the
end of World War II and as a result of its economic needs, re-born Austria,
still under Allied control and occupation, started to revive its traditional
bonds with its Central European neighbor states and trading partners, in
particular with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but also with Bulgaria, Poland,
and Romania.4 In 1946-47, Austrian representations were (re-)established in
the capitals of all neighboring states in the East and barter agreements were
concluded.

However, the Communist takeovers of 1947-48 in Budapest and Prague,
the establishment of Stalinist regimes all over Eastern Europe and the
tightening of Soviet bloc discipline made an end to most of these efforts. 5

3  Thomas O. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe: The Domestic Roots of a For-
   eign Policy* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1972), 129.
4  In the 1920s, the East European share had made up some 40-45 percent of Austria’s
   foreign trade. Erich Bielka, “Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn,” in
   idem, Peter Jankowitsch, Hans Thalberg, (eds.), *Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte österreichischer
5  On postwar Austrian foreign policy before 1955, see Klaus Fiesinger, *Ballhausplatz-
   Diplomatie 1945-1949: Restauration der Nachbarstaatsbeziehungen und Reorganisation des
   Auswärtigen Dienstes als Formen außenpolitischer Emanzipierung Österreichs* (Munich: Tuduv,
   1993); on relations with Yugoslavia, ibid., 198-236; on Czechoslovakia, ibid., 237-299; on
   Hungary, ibid., 300-333. On Yugoslav-Austrian relations until 1955, cf. Petar Dragišić,
   “Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen 1945-1955” (PhD thesis, Vienna, 2007); and
   Arnold Suppan, “Jugoslawien und der österreichische Staatsvertrag,” in idem, Gerald
As the “people’s democracies” were forced by Stalin into isolating themselves from Western Europe, contacts became more and more restricted, and Austria began to be shut off from its Eastern neighbors and former trading partners. Beginning in 1948, an Iron Curtain was erected directly on Austria’s eastern border: a deadly wall of barbed wire, watchtowers, guards, and minefields that separated the Eastern bloc from the West and prohibiting undesired human movement.

The strengthening of Stalinist control over Central and Eastern Europe could not but have a deep impact on these countries’ perceptions of and relations to the West. From the Communist viewpoint, due to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the “bourgeois” regime in Austria as in all capitalist countries was doomed to be swept away in the near future by “the progressive forces of history.” Therefore East European diplomats and correspondents watched for signs of the awaited economic crisis of capitalism, popular dissatisfaction, and civil unrest, rather than realistically assessing their own countries’ and Austria’s interests in establishing mutually beneficial relations. Under such circumstances as well as Stalin’s distrustful eye, among East European Communist regimes, with the notable exception of Belgrade, no interest was shown in developing closer ties with Austria. After frustrating experiences as well as the reorientation of Austrian trade towards the West as a consequence of this development and the Marshall Plan, the Austrian side, too, turned away. Trade between the “people’s democracies” and Austria plunged, and the East European share in the Aus-


trian market, in 1947 still some 20 to 25 percent, decreased to less than half that.\textsuperscript{8}

However, since Austria was still occupied by the four Allies due to the Cold War, and since the Soviet Union repeatedly hinted at Vienna having to improve its relations to the East in order to be granted full sovereignty, the country was also interested not to burn all bridges. And given Austria’s geographic location, it tried to avoid placing itself at a dead end. Nonetheless, it took until Stalin’s death for relations with the Soviet Union to improve.\textsuperscript{9} Already in 1953, the new Kremlin leadership granted a number of relaxation measures to the occupation command, easing everyday life in the Soviet zone and thawing bilateral tensions. The mutual diplomatic representations in Vienna and Moscow were upgraded to embassies. The new Austrian chancellor Julius Raab publicly expressed his gratitude and his determination to advance Austria’s relations with the East further. He grasped that, given the reluctance hitherto shown by the Soviets to withdraw from Austria, the country’s path to full sovereignty was by way of Moscow; he was also ready to please the Soviets by being friendly to their East European satraps. His interest in developing trade and commerce, particularly Osthandel, (an interest originating in part in Raab’s roots in small business and his political activity as president of his party’s organization for entrepreneurs, the Wirtschaftsbund) seemed to be a further incentive for developing ties with Eastern Europe. Therefore he called on his fellow citizens not only to stop the “propaganda against the ‘people’s democracies,’” but also to refrain from, as he famously put it, “pinching the tail of the Russian bear who is standing right in the middle of [our] garden” too often.\textsuperscript{10} And from late 1954, the Soviet friendliness was echoed by certain East European states that also took initiatives to improve bilateral relations.

\textsuperscript{8} Cf. Gerhard Rosegger, “East-West Trade: The Austrian Example 1945-58,” in \textit{Journal of Central European Affairs} 22, no. 1 (1962), 79-95, 81. Another reason for this development was the change in the economic role of the East European states from exporters of agricultural goods towards producers of industrial products.


Although Lenin and later Stalin had on occasion spoken of the possibility and even necessity of peaceful relations between the Soviet state and the
capitalist world,\textsuperscript{15} the concept could be regarded a major sea change in postwar international politics. The new doctrine drew heavily on non-Soviet sources such as the \textit{Pancha Sila}, the principles of the relations between the People’s Republic of China and India solemnly affirmed by Nehru and Chou En-Lai in 1954, and the final declaration of the Third World countries’ conference in Bandung 1955.

The famous principle of “peaceful coexistence” comprised mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, coexistence and economic cooperation. Soviet leaders stressed, however, that the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism would not be given up, but rather be transferred to the field of cultural, political and economic competition. In their interpretation, “peaceful coexistence” would thus even promote the transition of the West to communism by demonstrating the superiority of the Socialist bloc. What was not openly declared was that at the same time economic cooperation with the West was to provide the ailing Soviet economy with much-needed imports and thus, reduce the burden on the overstretched Soviet industry as well as raise the mood of the exhausted East European workers.

It was within this framework of “peaceful coexistence” that Khru
dchev as the emerging Soviet leader took the opportunity of improving the international climate by various means. This included dismantling Soviet bases in Finland and China, reducing Soviet forces, and agreeing on the State Treaty, which ended the Allied control and occupation of Austria. By so doing he not only abandoned a political and increasingly economic liability, but by insisting on Austria’s becoming neutral he also achieved its not following West Germany into NATO.\textsuperscript{16} This actually seems to have been the main reason for the Soviet urgency in solving the Austrian problem. Furthermore, by creating a model for “sovereignty in neutrality,” Khrushchev, albeit unsuccessfully, renewed the Soviet attempts to keep the FRG out of the Atlantic alliance. However, even though this failed, Austria’s neutrality still had the potential of making life more difficult for NATO by driving a wedge between West Germany and Italy, and by possibly creating a model for other Western states. Last but not least, neutrality


would help to distance Austria from its traditional patron, the United States, and provide the Kremlin a lever over Austria’s policy.

The concept of neutrality was relatively new in postwar Soviet policy. Until then, the general Marxist-Leninist attitude towards neutrality had been defined by the character of the international environment. In the event of a war between two imperialistic powers, the neutrality of a Socialist state was considered possible. If a war was revolutionary, defensive, or a war of liberation and therefore just according to Lenin, neutrality was not justifiable. Each country had to decide whether to be friend or foe; in Soviet eyes, countries who had declared themselves neutral during World War II, such as Switzerland or Sweden, supported the enemy’s war effort. From the Soviet perspective, if neutrality was good or evil therefore depended on the side exercising it and the consequences it had for the motherland of socialism. The Cold War, the emergence of the two blocs, and their theoretical underpinning in Zhdanov’s doctrine of the “two camps,” made neutrality even more impossible.

However, as a reaction to the consolidation of the blocs but also their ending up in a “Cold War of positions,” after Stalin’s death neutrality began to be promoted by the Kremlin as a means of limiting the sphere of activity of NATO, of struggling against its expansion and of weakening its cohesion. Since the status of neutrality was defined as more progressive than capitalism but less advanced than socialism, it was designed to appeal to Western states and considered possible only there and, above all, in young nations of the Third World. According to Soviet understanding, the obligations of a neutral state comprised non-participation in alliances and the active promotion of (particularly Soviet) détente initiatives.

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17 Heinz Fiedler, Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Disengagements (Cologne: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959), 69-72, 95-103; Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, 229-237. For Soviet accounts, see B. V. Ganiushkin, Neutraleitet i neprijazdenie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1965); O.I. Tiunov, Neutraleitet v mezhdunarodnom prave (Perm: Gos. Universitet im. Gorkogo, 1969); A.A. Gromyko, S. A. Golunskii, and V.M. Khvostov, Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960-1964) 2, 392-397. A remarkable initiative of the late Stalin years was the dictator’s note in March 1952 offering the reunification of a neutralized Germany. However, there is consensus among most experts that the offer was not meant seriously. The doctrine of the “two camps,” one peaceful and led by the USSR, the other aggressive and led by the US, was declared by Soviet leadership member Andrei Zhadanov in 1947.


This interpretation of neutrality was not adopted by Austria from the beginning; it insisted on its status as a Western democracy and rejected any kind of ideological neutralism. Nonetheless, despite the diverging Soviet and Austrian interpretations of neutrality, it was the Soviet-Austrian agreement achieved in April 1955 on Austrian neutrality that paved the way to a bilateral and, subsequently, an Austrian-East European détente. The Moscow Memorandum was a classic \textit{quid pro quo}: The Soviet government expressed readiness to sign the State Treaty, the Austrian delegation agreed to launch an initiative for a declaration of Austrian neutrality.\textsuperscript{20} In order to make this more acceptable to the West (and to Austrian Social Democrats, who still considered neutrality some sort of Communist trap), it was declared that Austrian neutrality would follow the Swiss model. The State Treaty, signed on 15 May 1955 by Austria and the Allied powers Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR, reestablished Austria as a fully sovereign state and provided the end of the Allied control and military occupation of the country. An Anschluss with Germany, as had occurred in 1938, was forbidden. On 26 October 1955, the Austrian parliament passed the promised constitutional law on Austria’s permanent neutrality.

The State Treaty and the declaration of neutrality, which were unofficially linked in the Soviet-Austrian memorandum, together with the personal relations established during the bilateral negotiations, laid the groundwork not only for Austria’s international position, but also for bilateral relations with the East in general and the USSR in particular. Although Austrian-Soviet relations would be tested in the following years by many controversial issues, including the Soviet interventions in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 as well as Austrian ambitions to join the West European economic integration, they developed into a solid pillar of both countries’ foreign policies\textsuperscript{21} and, furthermore, provided the preconditions for the intensification of Austrian \textit{Ostpolitik} and a relaxation in the bilateral relations with the East European states.

While détente, “peaceful coexistence,” and Austrian neutrality created the external setting, within Austria, political stability constituted the important precondition for embarking on this course, which was not without risk.

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\textsuperscript{21} On Soviet-Austrian relations, see the chapter by Wolfgang Mueller in this volume.
for such a small and vulnerable country. Following the Communists’ leaving, in late 1947, the Viennese all-party government, whose formation had been pushed by Stalin due to his national-front policy in April 1945, a “grand coalition” between the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ) remained in power until 1966. However, even later, in the era of single-party governments from 1966 to 1983, Austrian politics remained for the most part consensual. Although this has not yet been analyzed sufficiently, it can be argued that this “hyper-stability” (A. Pelinka) of the anti-Communist political spectrum (the Communists never garnered more than five percent of the popular vote) can be understood not only as an attempt to overcome the bitter partisan struggle of the interwar years, but also an attempt to deal with the threats (real or perceived) the Cold War posed to a small country located between the blocs.

This Austrian consensus was even more remarkable if one considers that the country’s general course in foreign policy was not without inner contradictions and at times resembled an attempt at “squaring a circle” (H. Neuhold). Such contradictions existed for instance between (a) permanent neutrality and Austria’s striving for Western economic integration, and (b) the restrictions on Austrian armed forces as stipulated by the State Treaty and the declaration of armed neutrality. The Austrian manner of dealing with these challenges was never clear-cut. However, while it seemed possible for Austria’s economy “to have the best of both worlds” (D. Stiefel), not the same could be said with regard to the country’s international position. Thus, Austria in the late 1960s gave in to Soviet and East European pressure and – due also to Italian and French resistance – gave up its ambitions for closer relations with the EEC.

26 On Austria’s relations with the EEC, see the chapter in this volume by Michael Gehler, and idem, *Der lange Weg nach Europa: Österreich von Paneuropa bis zum EU-Beitritt: Darstellung* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002); and idem, *Vom Marshall-Plan zur EU*
Given the country’s location between the battle lines of the military blocs in Europe, the State Treaty, with its tight restrictions on Austrian armed forces and its ban on weapons such as ground-air missiles, could not but have an impact on the country’s policy. Confronted with the massive threat posed to the West by the Warsaw Pact and numerous rumors about its aggressive intentions, Austrian political leaders (but not those from the military) chose to ignore the threat. Under NATO’s expected protective umbrella and the impression of Soviet “peaceful coexistence,” as well as for various other reasons, armed neutrality thus soon turned into unarmed neutrality. The country’s security, however, was never a result of its policy of neutrality, as many Austrians still believe, but rather a by-product of the balance of power between the two major alliances.  

Nonetheless, it seems true that Austria, as a small neutral country, had high interests in reducing international tensions in order to strengthen its own security, stretch its own maneuvering space, and increase its own wealth by means of international trade. Therefore, it remained Austria’s foreign policy axiom from the early 1950s to actively promote a “neighborhood policy” (Nachbarschaftspolitik) towards the East European states, which should lead to détente and Osthandel and, thus, create more favorable conditions both for the international climate in general and for Austria in particular. Both architects of this early Austrian Ostpolitik, Chancellor Raab (1953-1961) and Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky (1959-1966), were, as political realists, well aware of the limits imposed on Western diplomacy in Eastern Europe and on East European regimes by the Soviet yoke. However, they and the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz were determined to use their maneuvering space, small as it was, for reaching across the Iron Curtain, improving their country’s position behind it, strengthening its security, representing Western democracy, and for fostering détente.  

To make Nachbarschaftspolitik a success it had to meet certain conditions. Analyzing “peaceful coexistence,” détente, and Ostpolitik, we must take into

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29 From the 18th century until 2005 the Foreign Ministry was on Vienna’s Ballhausplatz.

30 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 294-300.
account the Soviet attitude towards (a) East-West relations and (b) East European developments. The Soviet Union had, since the late 1940s, repeatedly underlined that it wanted Austria to develop closer ties with the East. From 1955 at the latest, these calls seem to have actually reflected Soviet wishes for détente, “peaceful coexistence,” and East-West trade. Furthermore, from the Soviet perspective, Austrian relations with the “people’s democracies” would not only break the Eastern bloc’s isolation but also distance Austria from the West and bring it closer to the East. In 1957 Soviet leadership member Mikoian explicitly welcomed the Austrian Ostpolitik. As a neutral, Austria was a natural addressee for such initiatives; the country’s leaders had gained some trust among their Soviet colleagues in 1955 by striking a deal with the Kremlin, negotiating the State Treaty, and declaring neutrality. This trust was strengthened by certain personal relations and the fact that Austria, as a result of this settlement, actually started its Ostpolitik and Osthandel directly with the Kremlin and not, for instance, with neighboring Hungary. Such a move would undoubtedly have provoked suspicions that Austria had intentions of undermining Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. Austrian Nachbarschaftspolitik was thus in line with Soviet interests and the country was a more or less trusted partner.

Secondly, Austria was not strong enough for the Kremlin to interpret its neighborhood policy as a threat to the stability of the Eastern bloc. East European regimes perceived Austria as a capitalist country, but a country that was nevertheless friendly and, due to its neutrality, more progressive than the rest of the West. This does not mean that the ideological preconceptions were put aside. They simply no longer played such a large role as they had in the Stalin years. Nonetheless, the Kremlin and the Communist regimes remained watchful: Whenever the attraction exerted upon East European populations by the Austrian model seemed too high, as during the Hungarian revolution 1956 and the “Prague Spring” 1968, Communist propaganda campaigns were launched all over Eastern Europe in order to systematically destroy Austria’s reputation in the East. The attraction of the growing wealth in Austria was also to be countered by propaganda. Similar all-East European campaigns were launched against Austria’s EEC ambitions in the 1960s. However, there were also positive campaigns honoring Austrian neutrality in 1955 and its hospitality towards Khrushchev in 1960. And as if to underpin the role of the Communist parties in the Eastern bloc, special attention was given in their media to their Austrian “fra-

31 See the chapter in this volume by Norman M. Naimark.
32 Bielka, “Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn,” 204.
33 On Hungary, see the chapter by Andreas Gémes; on Czechoslovakia, the chapter by David Schriffl; on the USSR, the chapter in this volume by Wolfgang Mueller.
ternal party.” In general Austria was not perceived as a threat to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, Austria, in contrast to Germany, was burdened neither by the existence of two states on its soil nor by the lingering question of lost eastern territories. All these characteristics were in striking contrast to the first steps of the FRG’s Ostpolitik in the late Adenauer and the Erhard years. The attempt of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (1961-1966) to reach reconciliation with East European countries while sticking to the Hallstein doctrine and ignoring both the GDR and the Soviet Union was seen in Moscow as an attempt to undermine the SED state and Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and, thus, doomed to failure.34 After the FRG had signed trade agreements with Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, its Ostpolitik began to have troubles, and similar negotiations with Czechoslovakia failed.

On the other hand the Austrian policy found numerous parallels in Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt’s efforts to actively foster détente, establish East-West contacts and to improve relations step by step.35 Brandt as well as Raab and Kreisky knew what it was like to live with Communist regimes as neighbors. They were realistic enough to understand that “rapprochement” was a precondition to “transformation” and that they first had to accept the postwar reality in order to later, possibly, be able to change it a little bit. Both Brandt and the Austrians felt that it was better to agree with the Soviets to not agree, than not to talk at all. Although Brandt’s first offensive failed and literally crashed against the Berlin wall, he did not give up his policy of “active coexistence.” It would be an exaggeration to claim that Austria’s Ostpolitik was actually a model for the later German one, since Brandt developed his concept and initiatives soon after he was elected Berlin mayor in 1957. However, it has been argued that it was, at least on the national level, a precursor of what was later implemented by Brandt as chancellor,36 and many Austrian experiences with Ostpolitik were communicated not only between the Social Democrats Brandt and Kreisky, but also between conservatives such as Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus and his German colleague Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and ÖVP and CSU politicians.37

37 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 300.
One of the most important features of “peaceful coexistence” and Ostpolitik was travel diplomacy. In many cases, Austria, both in politics and trade, became a scout for East-West relations. After the meetings in Moscow in April 1955 to negotiate the State Treaty and Austrian neutrality (a trip that was followed, albeit without much success, by West Germany’s Konrad Adenauer38), numerous visits of various delegations and ministers were exchanged between the Austrian government and the Soviet Union and, later, the “people’s democracies.” In 1957, Anastas Mikoian came to Vienna, in 1958 Raab traveled to Moscow a second time, in 1959 the Austrian president, Adolf Schärf, followed suit, and in 1960 Khrushchev, by lashing out against the West during his trip to Vienna, made the whole Austrian government sweat. The same year Kreisky visited postwar Poland as the second Western foreign minister to do so; later he earned the title of the first Western politician to visit Rumania 1963, Hungary 1964, and Bulgaria 1965. The Austrian Karl Biełka became the first Western foreign minister to visit the GDR (following his Finnish colleague) in 1976.

Vienna was also chosen as the destination of the first trips to the West, for example, of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev 1964, the Polish and Romanian prime ministers Cyrankiewicz and Maurer 1965, of Soviet President Podgorny 1966, Prime Minister Tikhonov 1981, of the Hungarian premier Kádár 1976 as well as of GDR Chairman Erich Honecker 1980. Although the Finnish president Urho Kekkonen had already visited the GDR, Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschläger’s return visit, which took place from 11 to 14 October 1983, was regarded as the first visit of a Western head of state to East Germany.39

However, in the 1950s and 1960s, no diplomatic relations were maintained with the GDR – much to the displeasure of the Kremlin who tried to press Austria into establishing official relations with the SED regime. Due to the revolution of 1956, the Soviet intervention and its aftermath, which for a short time shattered Austria’s relations with the USSR and the entire Eastern bloc,40 Hungary proved to be a difficult partner for estab-

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39 On Austria’s relations to the GDR, see the chapter in this volume by Friedrich Bauer.
lishing friendly relations; Czechoslovakia, for other reasons, even more so. Here, the expulsion of the German-speaking minority in 1945, combined with Austrian-Czech tensions dating back to the Habsburg Monarchy, and unsettled property issues tainted the relations until 1989 – with the exception of the “Prague Spring” months of 1968. In both the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak case, the geographical closeness to Austria did not make things easier – given the existence of the Iron Curtain, numerous “border incidents,” and the death toll that was paid by hundreds of refugees.41

Another special case was Yugoslavia – a country that, like Austria, was forced more by outside influences than “inner” conviction to follow a foreign policy beyond the blocs and that made a virtue out of this necessity. Despite this similar international position, relations were often shattered by the conflict over the Slovene minority in Austria’s southern province of Carinthia.42 In the State Treaty of 1955, Austria had, under Soviet pressure, agreed to grant certain minority rights to its Slovene citizens.43 However, once the treaty was signed, Austria, as well as the provincial government in particular, dragged its feet against fulfilling its obligations. Unfortunately, the pattern remains until today of Austria letting nationalist groups and an otherwise minor provincial administration frustrate the establishment of sufficient minority rights in Carinthia for chauvinistic-populist reasons.

When Austrian negotiations with East European states started, in many cases (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria), property, restitution and compensation issues held the first points on the agenda. An agreement was signed in 1960 with Yugoslavia, with Bulgaria in 1963, with Poland in 1970, but with neighboring Czechoslovakia it took until 1974. However, in some cases, no full settlement was reached until the breakdown of the Communist regimes in 1989.44

Nevertheless, in economic relations, Austria in the late 1950s and 1960s was able to develop economic ties and, in the case of the USSR, even to gain a significant lead in Osthandel over other Western states (with the exception of Finland). Until the partial opening of the planned economies for


41 On Hungary, see the chapter by Andreas Gémes; on Czechoslovakia, see the chapter by David Schrijff in this volume.


44 See the chapters in this volume by Arnold Suppan, Michael Portmann, Klaus Bachmann, Paul Ullmann, and Peter Bachmaier.
East-West trade in the 1970s, neutral Austria played a special role in economic relations. Political neutrality and regional proximity led to an intensity and quantity of economic contacts that went far beyond those of other Western countries (again, with the exception of Finland). A certain role in Osthandel and, later, economic relations with the GDR was played by the KPÖ, Austria’s unreformed Communist Party.

A third issue, which was relatively unproblematic and thus came on the bilateral agendas early, was cultural relations. They were initiated mostly by Eastern states, which were much more active and eager to establish such contacts. Due to the highly regulated and state-organized character of culture in the “people’s democracies” and the USSR, the framework of most cultural relations was state-controlled “friendship societies” and focused on high culture. Again, Austria, due to its neutrality, had a special standing for East European activities: It was the first Western addressee of Soviet invitations to sign a cultural agreement, and became the center of Bulgarian cultural activities in the Western world altogether. However, “friendship societies” and cultural exchange was meant to transport not only cultural values: In the 1970s, the Communist satellites were instructed by Moscow to use their foreign cultural activities to wage a “long-term ideological attack of socialism on the territory of the adversary.” On the Austrian side, the “friendship societies” were organized not only by Communists and enthusiasts, but also by businessmen whose material interests were (and generally still are) “more compatible with the political interests” of dictatorial regimes in their trading-partner countries.

Among Austrian writers, the situation in Eastern Europe and the Cold War were picked up not only by popular novelists such as Milo Dor and Reinhard Federmann, whose novels are scarcely remembered today, but also by Thomas Bernhard in a fragment on the Hungarian revolution, by Ingeborg Bachmann, and by Marlen Haushofer, whose novel *Die Wand* can be interpreted not only as a timeless parable on human existence, but also as a response to visions of nuclear destruction, as well as to the Iron Cur-

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46 The performances and tours of the Austrian Eisrevue ice skating show that traveled widely in the Eastern bloc in the 1950s were an exception.

47 Quoted in Peter Bachmaier, “Austrian-Bulgarian Cultural Relations,” in this volume.

48 Klaus Bachmann, “Poland and Austria,” in this volume.

49 The fragment was rediscovered after Bernhard’s death by Lajos Adamik. *Der Standard: Dossier Ungarnaufstand*, 6 October 2006.
tain and the Berlin wall. In general, however, literary attention seems later to have turned away from the Cold War and communism in Eastern Europe and towards the Austrian reality and Nazi past.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Austrian Ostpolitik was continued under the ÖVP cabinet of Josef Klaus 1966-1970, and the SPÖ government of Bruno Kreisky 1970-1983. At the same time, a growing “neutralization” of Austrian foreign policy was noted. The roots of this development went back as far as the Hungarian revolution 1956, when the support of the Austrian media and popular opinion for the uprising and the courageous Austrian appeal to the Soviet Union to end the bloodshed had exposed the country to severe Soviet verbal attacks and a full-fledged East European propaganda campaign charging the neutral state with having overstepped its status. Later, US flights over Austrian territory, as during the Lebanon crisis 1958, again provoked Soviet criticism concerning alleged violations of neutrality. In the discussion about Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC, the Soviet Union accused Austria of violating its international status, and it tried to impose its interpretation of “total” neutrality on Austria.

As a consequence, Chancellors Raab, Alfons Gorbach, and Klaus took pains to avoid any measure that could be interpreted by the USSR as a violation of neutrality. In 1958, Raab openly protested the US flights – a move that was, at least partially, due to Soviet pressure and led, among other reasons, to an estrangement between Austria and the United States. The West’s bewilderment at Austria’s behavior was expressed by the British ambassador to Vienna, who claimed in 1959 that “Austria is often prepared to avoid angering the Russians at the expense of irritating her Western friends.” At the same time, Austrian politicians strove to increase the credibility of neutrality by reducing international tensions and endorsing

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50 See Günter Stocker, “Austrian Literature and the Cold War,” in this volume.
54 Quoted in Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 296.
Soviet proposals of “peaceful coexistence.” This new Austrian interpretation of neutrality, which Raab also saw as a means to create an Austrian national consciousness, was much nearer the Soviet interpretation than that originally conceived in 1955. Foreign Ministers Kreisky and particularly Kurt Waldheim (1968-1970) underlined Austria’s obligation to maintain equidistance and a more comprehensive, “active neutrality” even further – thus echoing Soviet calls and giving the international law expert Konrad Ginther reason for criticizing that the Austrian interpretation of neutrality approached that of the Soviet’s “peaceful coexistence.” When in 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the “Prague Spring,” in contrast to 1956, no official Austrian protest or appeal was heard, and the government even tried to suppress criticism in the Austrian media coverage.

After 1968, with progressing détente and the beginning of the new West German Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt, the continuation of Austria’s Nachbarschaftspolitik became easier, though less exclusive. Already in the mid-1960s, France had embarked on détente with the USSR and the “people’s democracies,” and in 1967 the FRG had offered them full diplomatic relations, thus, de facto abandoning the Hallstein doctrine. Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschläger stressed in 1970 that Austria was now “in the happy position of not having to make special mention of Ostpolitik as such any more.” Even the expression of “peaceful coexistence,” once anathema in the West because of its Janus-faced character and its declared aim to promote the transition of the West to communism, now entered the vocabulary of East-West declarations. Had it been cautiously circumscribed in

60 Die Presse, 6 June 1970.
the late 1950s and 1960s as “peaceful and friendly relations” or even “cooperation” in UN declarations,\(^\text{61}\) it was, in the 1970s erased of its ideological content and adopted by Western diplomats.\(^\text{62}\) The Principles of Relations between the USSR and France of 1971 explicitly used the once forbidden term, and the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972, even stated that there was “no alternative to conducting the mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.”\(^\text{63}\) Kreisky’s statement that the alternative to “peaceful coexistence” was “non-existence”\(^\text{64}\) had become mainstream opinion.

The heyday of détente and the mounting number of East-West contacts could not hide the fact that the importance of Austria for establishing some sort of relations across the Iron Curtain was reduced. Although it had been for years an almost exclusive partner for the Kremlin and the Eastern states, they now turned directly to Paris, Bonn, and Washington. This development was mirrored in Soviet-Austrian trade: Despite continuing rapid growth, the Austrian share in the Soviet market fell drastically.\(^\text{65}\) Similarly, the necessity of using Austria as a “diplomatic postbox” (K. Bachmann) also disappeared. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union and its satellite countries had repeatedly relied on Austria as a messenger for passing on proposals to the West concerning the German question, as well as during the Berlin and the Cuban crises, and the Vietnam War.\(^\text{66}\) Although Austria’s mediation efforts remained mostly unsuccessful or irrelevant, they had formed an important part of the country’s good services towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Similar Austrian services seem to have been expected by the Kremlin in order for the dearest projects of Soviet diplomacy to be brought about: the convocation of an all-European conference on security. Originally con-


\(^{62}\) Ginther, Neutralität, 99-105; Alfred Verdross, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs (Vienna: Geschichte und Politik, 1980), 75-79.


ceived, in the 1950s, as a means for squeezing the United States out of Europe, it had received little attention in the West whenever it was brought up by the Kremlin or one of its satellites. The USSR therefore turned its hopes to the neutrals, particularly those who were most exposed to Soviet pressure: Finland and Austria. The Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw-Pact states of 1966, and then, even more explicitly, Brezhnev in his speech in Karlovy Vary called upon the neutrals to take the initiative. In the following months Soviet diplomacy worked Austrian politicians hard, particularly pressing on Austria’s relations to the EEC, in order to produce the wanted declaration. Although Vienna would not take the initiative and launch a call on its own, Austria was the first country to react positively to the Finnish conference proposal in 1969.

The CSCE became a central framework for Austrian relations with Eastern Europe in the détente years. Relations however to Yugoslavia, also a member of the group of neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states, again suffered in the mid-1970s due to Austrian failure to grant sufficient minority rights to its Slovene citizens. Despite the generally friendly international climate in the 1970s, however, it also became clear that even before the breakdown of détente no further significant progress was possible in bilateral East-West political relations with the other East European states. The rapprochement seemed to have reached the maximum possible between “states of different social systems.” While the number of bilateral meetings still rose, the significance of their content fell. The late 1970s brought a decline.

When the next peak of the Cold War approached, a role that had been assigned to Austria already in the 1950s gained new importance: being an icebreaker for the USSR and Eastern Europe in international relations and providing otherwise restricted Western goods. A few months after the Hungarian crisis of 1956, Austria, as the first Western nation (other than Finland) to do so, had sent a minister and even the chancellor to Moscow, thus breaking the Western boycott against the USSR. Similarly, Vienna, again as the first Western capital, in 1957 received a leading Soviet statesman. Later, the same pattern was repeated in times of international isolation or embargos. Foreign Minister Kirchschläger was the first Western politician to visit Poland in 1971, only six weeks after the Danzig massacre;


68 Cf. the chapters by Peter Bachmaier, Klaus Bachmann, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Mueller, and Paul Ullmann in this volume.
his successor Leopold Gratz visited Poland in the middle of the crisis of the early 1980s, and Polish Vice-Premier Rakowski was invited to Vienna even before the abolition of martial law. The Austrian ÖGB as the only Western trade union recognized the Polish Communist stooge trade union OPZZ in 1981. Despite calls to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games due to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Austria participated.69

It cannot be decided if Austria actually helped Communist regimes to survive by breaking the international ice, restoring their foreign acceptability, and providing them with needed goods. Too often, Austria did not publicly express concern about Communist human rights violations. Both sides, obviously, opted for “peaceful coexistence” despite the Iron Curtain. It seems clear, however, that this development was accompanied by Austria’s further moral “neutralization.” Bruno Kreisky was reluctant to condemn martial law in Poland 1981 (as his predecessor had been in the case of the Soviet intervention in Prague 1968), and in August 1991, the Austrian “neutral” stance was reflected by its government’s appeasing statement about the attempted Communist putsch in Moscow – a moral embarrassment and, as it turned out, a political miscalculation.

In the case of Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, but also the Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union as well as that of dissidents from the USSR, the GDR, and Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, the “soft” Austrian attitude towards oppressive regimes and violations of democracy, human rights, and international law was balanced by its granting asylum or at least transit visas for a considerable number of refugees, in addition to quiet attempts at freeing certain dissidents.70 However, over the years, Austria’s readiness to accept refugees from Eastern Europe diminished sharply. In the 1980s, refugees from Poland were given a much cooler welcome than had been given those from Hungary in 1956. The reintroduction of visa requirements for Poland two weeks before the implementation of martial law in 1981 was considered by some Austrians a “national blemish.”71

After the deterioration of East-West relations in the 1980s and the second peak of the Cold War had brought about a brief and slight increase in


70 Vladimir Vertlib, Osteuropäische Zuwanderung nach Österreich 1976-91 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung jüdischer Immigration aus der Sowjetunion (Vienna: ÖAW, 1995). Cf. the chapters by Klaus Bachmann, Friedrich Bauer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Mueller, and Arnold Suppan; on Yugoslav guest workers, see the chapter by Michael Portmann in this volume.

Austria’s importance as a trader of products, otherwise restricted by the COCOM embargo, it was reduced again by the new international détente following Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” When, in the late 1980s, the Eastern bloc countries showed signs of change and Poland and Hungary embarked on internal reforms that would, in the end, lead to an end of the Communist monopoly of power, Austria was caught by surprise – although there had been some clandestine contacts of Vienna’s vice-mayor Erhard Busek and others with Central European dissidents. In June 1989, Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock and his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn, in a symbolic gesture, cut the barbed wire fences between the two countries.72 A wave of refugees from East Germany used this hole in the Iron Curtain to flee to the West, thus contributing to the downfall of the GDR and, later, the Communist regime in Prague.73

The chances offered by the sea change of 1989-1991 where, however, not fully appreciated by Austria in its relations with Eastern Europe. When its government realized that Soviet resistance to European integration74 had faded as quickly as the USSR’s ability to force its will upon other states, it resumed its striving for European integration and applied for EC membership already in June 1989, entering in due course the European Union75 – as did the other Central European states some years later. In the Austrian population and some of its media, however, the euphoria about these events gave way to fears about the country being flooded by East European workers, smugglers, and criminals. Most Austrians approved of their East European neighbors now living in freedom, but were ambiguous about the form that freedom should take, preferring them still safely stored

75 Cf. the chapter in this volume by Michael Gehler.
away behind the Iron Curtain. Once the fences had been removed on the Eastern side, the Austrian army took over the task of guarding the border.\textsuperscript{76}

Since the full integration of the Central European states into the European Union and NATO,\textsuperscript{77} the role of Ostpolitik and neutrality has been reduced further. The icebreaker has been scraped; the East-West broker seems obsolete. No diplomatic postbox is necessary. Central European states are sitting at one table with Western Europe, voicing their own concerns and interests. However, this fortunate development should not let us underestimate the historic merits and the shortcomings of past efforts to promote peaceful relations across an Iron Curtain in times of the Cold War and détente.

\textsuperscript{76} See Schriffl, “Austria and Czechoslovakia,” in this volume.