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Christophe Crombez
Journal Articles

Spatial Models, Legislative Gridlock, and Resource Policy Reform

Nathan Chael, Christophe Crombez, Pieterjan Vangerven
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2020 August 19, 2020

This review evaluates the use of spatial models for the analysis of policymaking. First, we examine spatial theory and its applications in a variety ofinstitutional settings.

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Journal Articles

Do fiscal rules decrease public investment? Evidence from European panel data

Sebastiaan Wijsman, Christophe Crombez
European journal of economics and economic policies intervention, 2020 July 31, 2020
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Books

Governance of the global commons: a question of supply and demand, the answer of polycentricism

Rutger Hagen, Christophe Crombez
Leuven Global Governance series, 2018 December 28, 2018

Edited by Samuel Cogolati and Jan Wouters

Given the new-found importance of the commons in current political discourse, it has become increasingly necessary to explore the democratic, institutional, and legal implications of the commons for global governance today.
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Working Papers

Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession

Martijn Huysmans, Christophe Crombez
KU Leuven LICOS, 2017 June 1, 2017

This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. Over time, members’ benefits from being in a federation can fluctuate because of changes in the state of the world. If a member stops benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on a real options model, we show that state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions. In addition to the substantive implications, this represents a methodological contribution to real options theory.

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Blogs

The election of Antonio Tajani as EP President: A backroom deal that creates clarity

Christophe Crombez
LSE European Politics and Policy , 2017 January 26, 2017

On 17 January, Antonio Tajani took over as the new President of the European Parliament. Christophe Crombez argues that while Tajani’s election has been portrayed by some observers as another EU backroom deal, the developments that led to his appointment lay the groundwork for more clearly defined policy choices to be presented to voters at the 2019 European Parliament elections.

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Journal Articles

Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union

Christophe Crombez, Martijn Huysmans, Wim Van Gestel
European Union Politics, 2017 January 18, 2017

We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information.

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Working Papers

The political economy of enforcing fiscal rules

Sebastiaan Wijsman, Christophe Crombez
SSRN, 2017 January 1, 2017

A large literature is focused on governments’ fiscal policy making under the disciplining force of fiscal rules. That literature is devoted to map governments’ incentives for (non)compliance, but widely ignores the role of fiscal rule enforcement. This is remarkable, given the situation in the European Union, where we observe frequent breaches of the fiscal rules in the absence of sanctions. This paper focuses therefore on the incentives of the European Commission as enforcer of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and on how individual governments take these incentives into account.

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Journal Articles

The role of oversight committees in closed rule legislation

Christophe Crombez, Wim Van Gestel
The Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013 November 20, 2013
In this article, Professor Christophe Crombez (Stanford University) and Wim Van Gestel (University of Leuven)  formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the presence of informational asymmetries. In the model, an agenda setter with private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The legislature appoints an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. Crombez and Van Gestel study the rationale for this appointment, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member choices for the legislators.
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Working Papers

The Political Economy of Transatlantic Free Trade

Timothy E. Josling, Christophe Crombez
2013 July 17, 2013

On July 8th, 2013, the United States and the European Union started negotiations on the  Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), which is to create a free trade area.  In this working paper, Tim Josling and Christophe Crombez study the prospects for such a transatlantic free trade area, starting with the background behind why the T-TIP is on the agenda now and what areas of trade are being negotiated.  They analyze who stands to benefit from such a trade and investment agreement, how long it might take to reach such an agreement, and what factors might influence its acceptab

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Commentary

The European parliament elections in 2014 are about more than protest votes

Simon Hix, Christophe Crombez
The Guardian, 2013 June 3, 2013

The European Parliament elections in May 2014 are about more than protest votes. In an opinion piece that appeared in The Guardian newspaper Christophe Crombez (The Europe Center) and Simon Hix (The London School of Economics and Political Science) argue that next year's European Parliament elections are the most important such elections to date. European politics has been dominated by the eurocrisis in recent years, and by the austerity policies European governments have followed to combat it. These policies are largely set at the European level, in particular by the EU Commission.

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Working Papers

Institutional Reform and Codecision in the European Union

Christophe Crombez
EF Working Paper, 1999 August 1, 1999

This paper studies the Treaty of Amsterdam's reform of the codecision procedure in the European Union. The paper presents spatial models of the procedure, and examines whether the Treaty significantly alters it. The theory analyzes the implications of the Treaty for the equilibrium EU policies and the institutions' powers. It characterizes sets of policies the Commission can successfully propose under the old procedure, and sets of policies the Council and the Parliament can successfully propose as joint texts under the new procedure.

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Journal Articles

Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

Christophe Crombez, Simon Hix
British Journal of Political Science,

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval.

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