Project Description & Purpose of Trip to the United Kingdom
My dissertation project in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University addresses the following question: why have military coups declined over time? To address this question, I investigate a number of international and domestic factors such as foreign military presence, post-coup reactions, domestic political violence, and elite bargaining during both the Cold War and post-Cold War period. In particular, I theorize three key points. First, coups have declined not because of the end of the Cold War or due to increased democratization but rather because of coup-vulnerable leaders becoming better at non-violently negotiating themselves out of power. Second, foreign states have influenced the decline due to increased foreign military presence instead of threat of sanctions. Finally, despite the overall decline of coups, domestic political violence such as insurgencies and armed protests can still make states vulnerable to coups.
The clear challenge in the study of coups is that coups by nature are quick, often covert actions; therefore, we only observe the cases that do occur and as scholars we often must rely on second-hand reporting of the events. As a result, relevant factors such as contingency planning, foreign involvement, and even why a coup occurred and why it succeeded or failed is often unknown. Therefore, looking at classified intelligence reporting as well as talking to people who have first-hand experience working with coup-vulnerable governments and militaries are crucial sources of information.
My trip to the United Kingdom was necessary to obtain access to both. The United Kingdom is a particularly important state in the study of civil-military relations for two reasons. First, many of the states that have faced coups in the last fifty years have been former colonies of the United Kingdom including Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The British army played a crucial role in helping to developing the militaries of their former colonies as a result of transference from the old colonial armies to the new independent armies. Moreover, the British government has still played an active role in the military affairs of states that are still part of the Commonwealth through the United Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS). Second, due to its active role in NATO and its close allied relationship with the United States, the UK has played an active role in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with a particular focus on helping to build up their armies. In short, my work in the United Kingdom allowed me to cover the time range of both the Cold War (when colonial independence occurred) as well as the modern period.
My fieldwork in the United Kingdom had two distinct parts. First, I conducted archival research at the National Archives in London with a particular focus on examining what occurred during the Cold War period. I then traveled to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst1 to do both archival work with a focus on the end of the Cold War period and elite interviews with academics and military officers who had had experience working with foreign militaries in various deployments.
Archival Research at the National Archives in Kew (London)
At the National Archives, I looked at four types of documents. All of the files included a variety of documents including internal correspondence within the relevant ministry, telegrams back to London, notes for Prime Ministers’ Questions, and policy memos. What was particularly interesting was that numerous drafts of the same documents were often included such that any changes of thinking or concerns about word choice could be seen.
First, I looked at files that had contemporaneous reporting of the time period before and during military coups. In order to do a more in-depth study, I largely focused on sub-Saharan African countries that were former British colonies like Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. Unlike previous sources I had examined, these were largely government documents either by the Defence Office, Foreign Office, or Foreign and Commonwealth Office, that were secret and confidential and are now declassified. Within the documents, I was able to get a much clearer view of what actually occurred as the coup unfolded. Those corresponding often made statements about why the coup occurred and who the coup plotters were. I noticed that there were often discrepancies between previous secondary sourcing I had seen and what was contained in these primary documents. For example, news reporting said that Gen. Murtala Muhammed was behind the 1975 Nigerian coup, when it was in fact Colonel Garba. Since coup plotters often wanted to quickly obtain British support and recognition, overtures and statements about motivations and subsequent policies were made to the British officials that I would not have seen elsewhere. In addition, I also saw pre-assessments on the vulnerability of certain states to coups.
Second, I looked at documents outlining British decision-making on recognition policy of new military regimes. I learned that the British government had secret detailed criteria that a new government had to meet in order to receive recognition. For example, governments had to meet a certain level of permanence and hold over the territory - how they came to that control mattered less. However, much like the modern context, I also saw that there were inconsistencies on how these criteria were applied including variation on how the British governments approached a new military regime in a NATO ally (Greece), a Commonwealth country (Ghana), and a Communist regime (Laos). These documents indicated to me that in contrast to some scholarly arguments, there was no clear change in the post-coup policy during and after the Cold War.
Third, I examined documents that outlined how the British facilitated the transition from the colonial armies of West African Command and East Africa Command to the new independent armies. In these documents, I read about three particular struggles. First, the British struggled with deciding how to divide up former elite units that were made up of soldiers that were now nationals of different independent states. Second, the government and the newly independent government disagreed about how much financial and expert support the British army owed the new armies. Third, the remaining British military high command struggled with understanding how to implement Internal Security Schemes; in other words, the British army realized that the new armies would face internal security threats that they previously did not have. Reading these documents, I was able to see how otherwise similar states like Kenya and Tanzania had different outcomes in regards to coups in the future.
Fourth, in order to prepare for my work at Sandhurst, I examined documents detailing the beginning of UKMTAS and how it was implemented in sub-Saharan Africa. I examined how the British government decided how to facilitate training both of foreign soldiers in their home country as well as decision-making on who should be trained at Sandhurst. Throughout all four types of documents, I often came across British government and military concerns about the possibility of a coup and how they should prepare to react. This was incredibly helpful because it provided insight as to what signs those who work in foreign and defense policy actually look for in assessing the likelihood of a coup.
Interviews and Archival Research at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
I continued my archival work while at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS). RMAS, unlike West Point, is a one year program that fully focuses on teaching cadets operational skills as opposed to granting a Bachelor’s degree. RMAS also has an extensive collection and archive. In particular, I examined files on policies regarding the training of overseas cadets. I saw how different countries made and removed bids to send their nationals to Sandhurst. For example, Ghana, at times removed its bids, which somewhat seemed to line up with when they had coups. In addition, I found a list of “distinguished foreign alumni” of Sandhurst, many of whom went on to mount their own coups in the future.
What made my trip to Sandhurst particularly special was the series of on-the-record interviews I had with both academics and military officers about their experiences deployed abroad. The former group largely worked with foreign military academies and therefore, had an intimate knowledge of the modern training of soldiers. The latter group primarily had UN peacekeeping operations training in sub-Saharan Africa. I will just briefly highlight two of my interviews.
In one interview, I spoke with a military historian, who had spent months in Afghanistan helping to build up the National Military Academy in Afghanistan (NMA). Originally, the United States had tried to model NMA after the West Point system, but the hybrid of military training and academics resulted in officers ill-prepared for active combat. Therefore, this gentleman was part of the contingency sent in to move NMA towards a Sandhurst-style institution and worked closely with General Karimi, the Chief of Staff of the Afghani Army. In particular, he told me despite a past coup history that Afghanistan is likely not to face a coup today for three reasons. First, the presence of American and British soldiers for the foreseeable future actively deters any military incentives. Second, Presidents Karzai and now Ghani were good at satisficing the military and worked to have a good relationship with their top generals. Third, the situation in Afghanistan with the Taliban, Haqqani network, and army factionalism makes the military unwilling to take charge of the country. In short, based on his experiences, he believed that foreign military presence and concerns about large scale civil war were two explanations for the global decline of coups. His experiences were very much in line with my theoretical notions.
In a second interview, I spoke with a retired Lt. Colonel who had served as an operational planner for the US Mission at the UN. He also had several deployments in advisory roles in sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans. In particular, he discussed how he had had to do peacekeeping planning in the aftermath of the 2012 Malian coup. While the military had stepped down from governmental power, he said one of the challenges was planning knowing that the military could step in again at any time. He clearly highlighted that domestic political violence can alter military incentives especially because militaries and governments assess risk of conflict very differently. This was again in line with arguments made in the dissertation.
Conclusion
This field trip provided me with a treasure trove of valuable information and very much met my expectations as to what I would find. Now that I have completed my archival work, my plan is to incorporate the findings in a number of relevant sections of my dissertation. The information about the military coup cases will be incorporated into a qualitative chapter I have already written. The remaining archival work will go into my theory chapter while the interviews will become a crucial part of the evidence chapter of my international factors section.
1. This is the British equivalent of the United States Military Academy at West Point
