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Why Sweden Did Not Build the Bomb: Testing the Swedish Case Against International Relations Theories

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Why did Sweden choose, in the late 1960s, to abandon its long-standing nuclear weapons plans? A number of historical investigations have analyzed some aspects of this issue, particularly as it related to the public political debate in Sweden and the formulation of the Swedish defense doctrine in the postwar years. Some studies have attempted to explicate, from a more overarching perspective, why Sweden opted not to develop anuclear weapons capability, but these efforts have generally been hampered by heavy dependence on secondary source materials consisting of published English-language works. Taken together, these studies provide a far-from-complete picture of Sweden’s historical nuclear weapons plans. The main reason for this lack of a comprehensive picture has been the paucity of primary sources. Today, however, the end of the cold war and the declassification of large parts of the relevant documentary record, especially concerning the technical preparations for nuclear weapons production, have created the prerequisites for a more penetrating analysis of this important historical issue. The purpose of this presentation is to summarize the research on Sweden’s plans to acquire nuclear weapons based on primary sources. This overarching analysis is then tested against International Relation theories which have sought to explain factors of proliferation and non-proliferation.

Thomas Jonter is Professor in International Relations at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm University. His research is focused on nuclear non-proliferation and energy security. He is also project leader for different educational and research programs in Russia with the aim to initiate academic courses and programs in nuclear non-proliferation at different universities in the regions of Tomsk and Jekaterinburg. These projects are carried out in a cooperation between Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey, United States, and  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  Professor Jonter is also chair of the ESARDA (European Safeguards and Research Development Association) working group for Training and Knowledge Management. Currently he is a visiting scholar at The Europe Center at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

 

Audio Synopsis:

First, Professor Jonter explains that Sweden initiated nuclear weapons research in the 1950’s because of the presence of a large uranium supply, ample technological and scientific knowledge, and concerns about self-defense. He cites wide support for nuclear research during that time, including from Prime Minister Tage Erlander, the Defense Ministry, and the military. In 1945 the Swedish National Defense Research Establishment created plans for a nuclear weapons program within a civilian nuclear power program, necessitating high levels of cooperation between military and civilian entities.  Despite pressure from the United States to abandon nuclear research, uranium production began in 1955 along with the construction of two reactors. Eventually, social groups within Sweden protested and a debate emerged within Parliament, resulting in a decision that Sweden would only pursue research related to self-defense against the Soviet Union. Behind the scenes, however, nuclear weapons research carried on covertly for some time. Jonter addresses questions of whether the program was really weapons-based or simply scientific research, how the debates in Sweden were influenced by criticisms at home and abroad, the role of private investors in the Swedish nuclear research program, and the factors that ultimately allowed Sweden to publicly back away from a weapons program.

Professor Jonter then examines implications for the international system by analyzing the Swedish nuclear case in light of several international relations theories. He also considers the argument that "outward looking" states which are active in international trade are less likely to develop nuclear weapons. Jonter asserts that research on this topic would benefit from more historical analysis of primary resources, although the secret nature of nuclear records make them difficult to access.

 A question and answer period following the presentation addressed such issues as: How does the Swedish case study compare with the Danish case? Did the Swedish government tie its hands with a public decision not to pursue weapons development? Is there evidence of Sweden having to balance nuclear weapons research with other military expenses?  Why did the government switch from high levels of secrecy about the nuclear program decisions to a policy of openness and public discussion?

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CISAC Conference Room

Thomas Jonter

Department of Economic History
Stockholm University
SE-106 91 Stockholm
Sweden

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Professor of International Relations, Department of History, Stockholm University
Thomas2.jpg
PhD

Thomas Jonter is Professor in International Relations at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm University. His research is focused on nuclear non-proliferation and energy security. He is also project leader for different educational and research programs in Russia with the aim to initiate academic courses and programs in nuclear non-proliferation at different universities in the regions of Tomsk and Jekaterinburg. These projects are carried out in a cooperation between Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey, United States, and  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  Professor Jonter is also chair of the ESARDA (European Safeguards and Research Development Association) working group for Training and Knowledge Management. Currently he is a visiting scholar at The Europe Center at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

Anna Lindh Fellow, The Europe Center
Thomas Jonter Speaker
Seminars

The United States, NATO's Strategic Concept, and Nuclear Issues

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In March 2011, NATO launched its Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which will examine the Alliance's nuclear posture, among other issues.  At about the same time, the U.S. government began its formal interagency consideration of options for dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons in a possible future round of arms reduction talks with Russia.

Written for the Nuclear Policy Paper series sponsored by the Arms Control Association, BASIC and the University of Hamburg, it describes the thinking within the U.S. government on NATO's future nuclear posture, including Alliance declaratory policy, and the possible arms control approaches for dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons.

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Steven Pifer
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Energy Security, Memory Wars and "Compatriots" in Baltic-Russian Relations

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According to Professor Muiznieks, since the early 1990s, the Baltic states have been seen as unfriendly in the eyes of Russians due to their "return to the West" attitude. Professor Muiznieks explains the key features of Baltic-Russian relations while looking at how these problems may be resolved in the future.

Synopsis

Professor Muiznieks begins by discussing the less than warm relations between the Baltic states and Russia. He explains how this is particularly due to the Baltic states’ desire to “return to the West” since the early 1990s and escape Russian influence after so many years of occupation. This is particularly evident in the EU and the UN where Poland and Baltic States form a sort of anti-Russian “axis.” However, the Baltic states’ membership of such organizations means a share of their secrets, which, as Professor Muiznieks explains, the Russians subsequently exploit for intelligence purposes.

At the same time, Professor Muiznieks cites another crucial security issue for the Baltic states, energy security. Currently, there is less oil transit through the Baltic states then there was before; Professor Muiznieks believes this has helped issues of corruption. However, he notes energy companies still play a significant role both locally and in relations with Russia. Looking the future, Professor Muiznieks believes that while there are options for the Baltic states to lessen their electrical dependence on Russia by looking to Scandinavia, the shutting of Lithuania’s nuclear plant will most likely mean Latvia and Lithuania will turn to Russia for further supply. To Professor Muiznieks, the current situation holds opportunities but also many risks.

Unfortunately, the strategic power-plays continue on another platform, memory wars. Professor Muiznieks feels World War II is the key point of debate between the Baltic states and Russia. While Russia sees the war as a great triumph, the Baltic states view the conflict as a catastrophe which led to further occupation. Professor Muiznieks discusses the fact that this battle plays out locally through monuments or textbooks but also internationally through border disputes and UN resolutions. He cites the European Court of Human Rights as a new strategic arena for this war because of its utmost authority on the continent and the fact that its rulings can cement one group as victims and force others to pay compensation.  However, Professor Muiznieks believes any truce is unlikely. For him, this conflict is too linked to many personal family histories and not government based enough to be put to a real end.

Professor Muiznieks also looks to “compatriots” as a focal point of Baltic-Russian relations. “Compatriots,” in this case, are Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in the Baltic states. This issue is serious because Russian speakers comprise over a quarter of both Latvia and Estonia’s populations. Professor Muiznieks explains that tension was caused in the Baltic states after Russia’s war with Georgia as to how Russian policy would change towards its diasporas. In addition, Professor Muiznieks reveals that there is further concern over the possibility that Russia is encouraging speakers abroad to take up citizenship to create legal basis for any action against other states in the future. Professor Muiznieks also argues that funding for these “compatriots” is perhaps to counteract increasing EU influence in the region.

Overall, Professor Muiznieks believes that the Baltic states are seriously suffering from the global economic crisis which in turn is making it difficult for them to counteract Russian policy and be effective. Professor Muiznieks argues this makes the Baltic states quite vulnerable.

In a lengthy question-and-answer session, a multitude of points were raised. One of the key issues addressed was where the Baltic States, and in particular Latvia, fit in the European framework. This led to discussion of several other issues such as Scandanivia's changing role in the Baltic States, the role of the Baltic States in NATO, and language integration. Finally, another possibility much emphasized was the potential creation of nuclear power plants as a way to offset surging prices for Russian energy.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Nils Muiznieks Director, Advanced Social and Political Research Institute, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia Speaker
Seminars

Buying Insurance in the Post-Cold War World: Constructing a New Nuclear Security Regime

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The events of September 11, 2001 have heightened concerns about the potential for terrorist actions involving nuclear or radioactive materials and facilities. Questions about the vulnerability of such materials and facilities have forced governments to implement new security measures at the national level; however, such measures are of limited value in addressing influential factors in play beyond national boundaries. The existing nuclear weapons among states, is insufficient to address this new threat. A new, broader international nuclear security regime needs to be constructed. This regime must also take into account the growing influence of sub-state, trans-national actors. A key element in this new nuclear security regime is the important role international organizations can play in shoring up the weakness of the nation-state in a chaotic, post-Cold War international environment.

Ron Stansfield is current Coordinator of International Programmes at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) in Ottawa. Mr. Stansfield has over a quarter century of experience in international security issues, including non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Prior to joining the CNSC in 1991 as Senior Advisor on Non-proliferation, he served as Director Parliamentary Affairs at the Canadian Department of National Defence from 1988-1989. From 1975-1988, he held several positions at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), including Head of the Conventional and Nuclear Arms Control Section of DFAIT's Defence Relations Division (1986-1988) and diplomatic assignments in the Netherlands (1981-1985) and South Korea (1977-1979). From 1998-2001, Mr. Stansfield was seconded to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna as a Senior Policy Office for nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards issues in the Agency's Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. Mr. Stansfield is a graduate of the University of Saskatchewan and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Ron Stansfield Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Speaker
Seminars

Managing the Cold-War Legacy in Europe

A dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, but the legacy remains in both Western and Eastern Europe. This workshop aims to bring together scholars and experts from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds to discuss the ways in which the detrimental effects on social, political and economic structures of the legacy can be alleviated.

The workshop will develop two aspects of this issue: the external security structure represented by NATO and the emerging EU security policy; and the internal security structure including threats to civil society and problems of political and economic transition. Four papers would be delivered in each of two sessions. Participation would be balanced between US and European contributors.

Session One: The Legacy of the Cold War on Europe's External Security Structure

Paper 1:

NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Common Foreign- and Security Policy of the European Union: Cooperation or Competition?

Paper 2:

The Transatlantic Imbalance: Why does the US still carry the burden of Europe's defense?

Paper 3:

NATO Expansion and the Russian Reaction

Paper 4:

The EU's CFSP and the Role of the Rapid Reaction Force

Session Two: The Legacy of the Cold War on Europe's Internal Security and Stability

Paper 5:

Nuclear Safety and the Problem of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

Paper 6:

Immigration and Asylum Issues in the Light of EU Enlargement

Paper 7:

Economic Stability and the Incorporation of the Transition Economies

Paper 8:

The Political Legacy of the Cold War and the Development of Democratic Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Workshops

David Holloway

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 723-1737 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies
Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History
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PhD

David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
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