This event is sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Center for European Studies, and Center for Russian, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies.

Event Summary:

Professor Koll's presentation describes the "dekulakization" process in Estonia during the 1940s as a systematic class struggle campaign aimed at breaking up the cohesion of the perceived ruling rural bourgeoisie, so as to make Soviet influence in the region easier. Tools of the campaign included taxation, forced reduction in farm size, redistribution of livestock and equipment, political persecution, severe social stigmatization, and in some cases deportation to Siberia. The difficulty in identifying "kulaks" from an egalitarian countryside full of similarly small farms was addressed by enlisting locals to identify, to a surprising extent, perceived kulak members of their own communities. These were often neighbors, and sometimes family. Still, there remained a hazy line between perpetrators and victims, as Koll illustrates with a case study toward the end of her talk. Koll also discusses the role of German occupation during the early 1940s, and the German POW camps that followed, in the dekulakization process. In her concluding comments, Professor Koll notes the ambiguous nature of a campaign aimed at dividing a population across invisible lines, which nonetheless left no option for passive observation and made everyone choose a side. Koll notes that the effects of class warfare persist to this day among the rural Estonian population, in the pervasiveness of alcoholism and strong distrust between neighbors.

A discussion session following the presentation raised such issues as how locals came to be in the position of identifying kulaks; whether there were regional variations in deportation rates; what aspects of the Estonian environment facilitated dekulakization; where the Estonian case falls on a continuum of collectivization; and what the success rates was of appeals by families accused of being kulaks.

Please join the Forum on Contemporary Europe for a first assessment of the September 27 German elections by FSI Senior Fellow Josef Joffe.

Josef Joffe is publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, and was previously columnist/editorial page editor of Sddeutsche Zeitung (1985-2000). Abroad, his essays and reviews have appeared in: New York Review of Books, New York Times Book Review, Times Literary Supplement, Commentary, New York Times Magazine, New Republic, Weekly Standard, Prospect (London), Commentaire (Paris). Regular contributor to the op-ed pages of Wall Street Journal, New York Times and Washington Post; Time and Newsweek.  In 2005, he co-founded the foreign policy journal "The American Interest" in Washington (with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Francis Fukuyama).

His most recent book is Überpower: America's Imperial Temptation (2006, translated into German and French). His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, International Security, The American Interest and Foreign Policy as well as in professional journals in Germany, Britain and France. He is the author of The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance, The Future of International Politics: The Great Powers; co-author of Eroding Empire: Western Relations With Eastern Europe.

Event Synopsis:

As Professor Joffe describes, political scientists predicting the outcome of the recent German elections based on economic factors were surprised by the victory of the Center Right, expecting a "Red-Red-Green" (Social Democrats-Left-Green Party) coalition instead of Merkel's "Black-Yellow" (Christian Democrats and Free Democrat) coalition party. He sees the outcome more as a loss for the Social Democrats, Lefts, and Greens - who should have done better in tough economic times, and capitalized on left-leaning ideology in Germany - than as a decisive victory for the winners.  He disagrees with the New York Times' declaration of a "mandate for change" in Germany for several reasons:

1. The proportional representation party system based on coalitions rather than majorities makes it impossible to enact wholesale change
2. The "stalemate system" features too many centers of power and makes change difficult
3. Germans like these features of their political system too much to change them

Professor Joffe asserts that the outcome of the elections is a good one for Germany. A victory by the "Red-Red-Green" coalition would have brought about years of instability under a grand coalition that would be characterized by high taxes and spending, pacifism, and the status quo, and which would soon have broken down. In the coming years, Joffe predicts a medium-term exit of German troops from Afghanistan, resistance of US calls for more troops in the Middle East, a pro-Israel stance, and little to no change in domestic policy.  He believes there should be greater focus on preventing the collapse of social support programs, but admits this does not fit into the electoral cycle of domestic politics and will likely be overlooked.

In conclusion, Joffe views the election outcome as the best possible one given alternatives, and as a message to Angela Merkel that Germans are realistic and want German politicians to be less timid.

A discussion session following the talk addressed such issues as: Will Germany revise its position toward Turkey's EU integration under Merkel's leadership? Will the election outcome affect the competitive position of German business? How are rising debt levels in Europe felt by Germany? How do the German people feel about their economic situation and competitiveness?

The period of French revolutionary turmoil known as the Terror is often blamed on ideological rigidity, popular anger, or civil dissensions. In this discussion of his new book, The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution (Chicago, 2009), Dan Edelstein points instead to the role played by liberal theories of natural law, and asks what this example teaches us about legislating the exceptional in troubled times.

In recent years, the United States and its European Union partners have often diverged in their policy outlooks towards the wider European periphery—the diverse region stretching from the Balkans and Turkey, to the Westernmost former-Soviet republics and Russia. Whether a temporary hiatus or a more profound strategic divergence, this state of affairs reflects a departure from the mission of extending peace, freedom and prosperity to the European continent that the two sides have pursued in the post-Cold War period.

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Event Synopsis:

Dr. Tassinari's talk draws upon his recent book, "Why Europe Fears its Neighbors" (Praeger Security International, 2009), which attempts to survey and quantify the many challenges facing Europe with respect to its borders. Tassinari describes Europe's position toward neighbor countries as being influenced by the threat of immigration. He describes a "security-integration nexus" in progress since 1945, involving a gradual economic opening of Europe's borders to promote stability. While the EU today maintains to some degree its enlargement policy toward Turkey and the Western Balkans, other border-region states are classified under a "European neighborhood policy" with no prospects for EU membership. Recent policy discourse has decoupled security concerns from integration. The neighborhood approach, undermines EU policy by keeping neighbor states at too great a distance.

Next Tassinari offers Turkey and Russia as case studies. The debate within Turkey is leaning away from EU membership as the primary path toward modernization. Recent dialogue focuses less on meeting technical standards for EU membership and more on reckoning with issues of religion, identity and history within Turkey. With regards to Russia, in the past decade the country has become more assertive abroad and moved away from cooperation with the EU, preferring not to be grouped with countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in the EU's approach to foreign policy.

In addressing the transatlantic relationship, Dr. Tassinari reflects that the US and EU have long disagreed about EU membership for Turkey, the direction of state building in the Balkans, and integration of some of Europe's neighbor states into NATO.

Finally, responding to the question of whether this divergence comes from a conflict over the "European power constellation" or rather is simply the result of issue-specific philosophical differences, Dr. Tassinari offers three arguments:

1. Strategic: EU policy reflects multi-level integration, wherein countries can be "more than partners and less than members." Tassinari believes even countries with no prospect for membership should be integrated as much as possible. 
2. Normative - in reality, the US and EU share goals for Europe's "neighborhood" - promoting democracy, human rights, and other values. Despite this, each side's initiatives are viewed with suspicion by the other. 
3. Institution - US policymakers buy in to the EU enlargement policy, with its firm commitments and well-rehearsed conditionality process, and don't see alternative policies such as the "neighborhood" approach as being useful. 

A Q&A session following the talk raised such issues as: Will the EU’s problems with “deepening” its relationships with neighbors hurt its prospects for “widening” through enlargement? What are the reasons for the mixed signals to Turkey from the EU? Do arguments about the EU’s denial of Turkey’s membership being based on racism hold any merit? If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, what cross-border policy areas will remain the prerogative of nation-states and which might fall under EU Commission jurisdiction?

Twenty years ago, in November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. In one of modern history’s most miraculous occurrences, communism imploded – not with a bang, but with a whimper. In circumstances eerily reminiscent of our own day, the establishments in Eastern Europe had borrowed large huge amounts of money (in hard currency), which they had no way to pay back (except by taking more hard currency loans). As the loan crisis deepened, they did . . . nothing.

Stephen Kotkin teaches history and international affairs at Princeton University. He is the author of "Armageddon Averted: the Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000" (new edition 2008).

Jan T. Gross also teaches history at Princeton. He is the author of the acclaimed "Neighbors" (2001) and, most recently, "Fear" (2006).

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Center for European Studies.

In this public lecture, Timothy Garton Ash asks if 1989 established a new model of non-violent revolution, supplanting the violent one of 1789. Where might it happen next? Should democracies support it? If so, how?

Professor Norman Naimark, McDonnell Professor of East European Studies; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, will chair the discussion. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Deputy Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, will be the respondent.

According to Professor Muiznieks, since the early 1990s, the Baltic states have been seen as unfriendly in the eyes of Russians due to their "return to the West" attitude. Professor Muiznieks explains the key features of Baltic-Russian relations while looking at how these problems may be resolved in the future.

Synopsis

Professor Muiznieks begins by discussing the less than warm relations between the Baltic states and Russia. He explains how this is particularly due to the Baltic states’ desire to “return to the West” since the early 1990s and escape Russian influence after so many years of occupation. This is particularly evident in the EU and the UN where Poland and Baltic States form a sort of anti-Russian “axis.” However, the Baltic states’ membership of such organizations means a share of their secrets, which, as Professor Muiznieks explains, the Russians subsequently exploit for intelligence purposes.

At the same time, Professor Muiznieks cites another crucial security issue for the Baltic states, energy security. Currently, there is less oil transit through the Baltic states then there was before; Professor Muiznieks believes this has helped issues of corruption. However, he notes energy companies still play a significant role both locally and in relations with Russia. Looking the future, Professor Muiznieks believes that while there are options for the Baltic states to lessen their electrical dependence on Russia by looking to Scandinavia, the shutting of Lithuania’s nuclear plant will most likely mean Latvia and Lithuania will turn to Russia for further supply. To Professor Muiznieks, the current situation holds opportunities but also many risks.

Unfortunately, the strategic power-plays continue on another platform, memory wars. Professor Muiznieks feels World War II is the key point of debate between the Baltic states and Russia. While Russia sees the war as a great triumph, the Baltic states view the conflict as a catastrophe which led to further occupation. Professor Muiznieks discusses the fact that this battle plays out locally through monuments or textbooks but also internationally through border disputes and UN resolutions. He cites the European Court of Human Rights as a new strategic arena for this war because of its utmost authority on the continent and the fact that its rulings can cement one group as victims and force others to pay compensation.  However, Professor Muiznieks believes any truce is unlikely. For him, this conflict is too linked to many personal family histories and not government based enough to be put to a real end.

Professor Muiznieks also looks to “compatriots” as a focal point of Baltic-Russian relations. “Compatriots,” in this case, are Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in the Baltic states. This issue is serious because Russian speakers comprise over a quarter of both Latvia and Estonia’s populations. Professor Muiznieks explains that tension was caused in the Baltic states after Russia’s war with Georgia as to how Russian policy would change towards its diasporas. In addition, Professor Muiznieks reveals that there is further concern over the possibility that Russia is encouraging speakers abroad to take up citizenship to create legal basis for any action against other states in the future. Professor Muiznieks also argues that funding for these “compatriots” is perhaps to counteract increasing EU influence in the region.

Overall, Professor Muiznieks believes that the Baltic states are seriously suffering from the global economic crisis which in turn is making it difficult for them to counteract Russian policy and be effective. Professor Muiznieks argues this makes the Baltic states quite vulnerable.

In a lengthy question-and-answer session, a multitude of points were raised. One of the key issues addressed was where the Baltic States, and in particular Latvia, fit in the European framework. This led to discussion of several other issues such as Scandanivia's changing role in the Baltic States, the role of the Baltic States in NATO, and language integration. Finally, another possibility much emphasized was the potential creation of nuclear power plants as a way to offset surging prices for Russian energy.

Swedish Minister of Employment, Sven Otto Littorin, will present the strategies of the Swedish Government for handling the financial crisis and the challenges on the labor market. He will talk about the previous Swedish financial crisis in the 1990's, when he had a central role in handling the crisis. Salvaging the Swedish Banking System at that time is today much discussed as the model for the present US banking crisis. Sweden starts its Presidency of the European Union on July 1, 2009, a role which will encompass the addressing of these issues. Minister Littorin will be the president of the European Council of Ministers for Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs.

The presentation is co-hosted by the recently launched VINNOVA-Stanford Research Center of Innovation Journalism and the Forum on Contemporary Europe.