Please join the Forum on Contemporary Europe for a first assessment of the September 27 German elections by FSI Senior Fellow Josef Joffe.

Josef Joffe is publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, and was previously columnist/editorial page editor of Sddeutsche Zeitung (1985-2000). Abroad, his essays and reviews have appeared in: New York Review of Books, New York Times Book Review, Times Literary Supplement, Commentary, New York Times Magazine, New Republic, Weekly Standard, Prospect (London), Commentaire (Paris). Regular contributor to the op-ed pages of Wall Street Journal, New York Times and Washington Post; Time and Newsweek.  In 2005, he co-founded the foreign policy journal "The American Interest" in Washington (with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Francis Fukuyama).

His most recent book is Überpower: America's Imperial Temptation (2006, translated into German and French). His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, International Security, The American Interest and Foreign Policy as well as in professional journals in Germany, Britain and France. He is the author of The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance, The Future of International Politics: The Great Powers; co-author of Eroding Empire: Western Relations With Eastern Europe.

 

Event Synopsis:

As Professor Joffe describes, political scientists predicting the outcome of the recent German elections based on economic factors were surprised by the victory of the Center Right, expecting a "Red-Red-Green" (Social Democrats-Left-Green Party) coalition instead of Merkel's "Black-Yellow" (Christian Democrats and Free Democrat) coalition party. He sees the outcome more as a loss for the Social Democrats, Lefts, and Greens - who should have done better in tough economic times, and capitalized on left-leaning ideology in Germany - than as a decisive victory for the winners.  He disagrees with the New York Times' declaration of a "mandate for change" in Germany for several reasons:

1. The proportional representation party system based on coalitions rather than majorities makes it impossible to enact wholesale change
2. The "stalemate system" features too many centers of power and makes change difficult
3. Germans like these features of their political system too much to change them

Professor Joffe asserts that the outcome of the elections is a good one for Germany. A victory by the "Red-Red-Green" coalition would have brought about years of instability under a grand coalition that would be characterized by high taxes and spending, pacifism, and the status quo, and which would soon have broken down. In the coming years, Joffe predicts a medium-term exit of German troops from Afghanistan, resistance of US calls for more troops in the Middle East, a pro-Israel stance, and little to no change in domestic policy.  He believes there should be greater focus on preventing the collapse of social support programs, but admits this does not fit into the electoral cycle of domestic politics and will likely be overlooked.

In conclusion, Joffe views the election outcome as the best possible one given alternatives, and as a message to Angela Merkel that Germans are realistic and want German politicians to be less timid.

A discussion session following the talk addressed such issues as: Will Germany revise its position toward Turkey's EU integration under Merkel's leadership? Will the election outcome affect the competitive position of German business? How are rising debt levels in Europe felt by Germany? How do the German people feel about their economic situation and competitiveness?

In recent years, the United States and its European Union partners have often diverged in their policy outlooks towards the wider European periphery—the diverse region stretching from the Balkans and Turkey, to the Westernmost former-Soviet republics and Russia. Whether a temporary hiatus or a more profound strategic divergence, this state of affairs reflects a departure from the mission of extending peace, freedom and prosperity to the European continent that the two sides have pursued in the post-Cold War period.

Fabrizio Tassinari, PhD, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins’ SAIS in Washington, DC. He has written extensively on European security and integration. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, was published on September 30, 2009.

 

Event Synopsis:

Dr. Tassinari's talk draws upon his recent book, "Why Europe Fears its Neighbors" (Praeger Security International, 2009), which attempts to survey and quantify the many challenges facing Europe with respect to its borders. Tassinari describes Europe's position toward neighbor countries as being influenced by the threat of immigration. He describes a "security-integration nexus" in progress since 1945, involving a gradual economic opening of Europe's borders to promote stability. While the EU today maintains to some degree its enlargement policy toward Turkey and the Western Balkans, other border-region states are classified under a "European neighborhood policy" with no prospects for EU membership. Recent policy discourse has decoupled security concerns from integration. The neighborhood approach, undermines EU policy by keeping neighbor states at too great a distance.

Next Tassinari offers Turkey and Russia as case studies. The debate within Turkey is leaning away from EU membership as the primary path toward modernization. Recent dialogue focuses less on meeting technical standards for EU membership and more on reckoning with issues of religion, identity and history within Turkey. With regards to Russia, in the past decade the country has become more assertive abroad and moved away from cooperation with the EU, preferring not to be grouped with countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in the EU's approach to foreign policy.

In addressing the transatlantic relationship, Dr. Tassinari reflects that the US and EU have long disagreed about EU membership for Turkey, the direction of state building in the Balkans, and integration of some of Europe's neighbor states into NATO.

Finally, responding to the question of whether this divergence comes from a conflict over the "European power constellation" or rather is simply the result of issue-specific philosophical differences, Dr. Tassinari offers three arguments:

1. Strategic: EU policy reflects multi-level integration, wherein countries can be "more than partners and less than members." Tassinari believes even countries with no prospect for membership should be integrated as much as possible. 
2. Normative - in reality, the US and EU share goals for Europe's "neighborhood" - promoting democracy, human rights, and other values. Despite this, each side's initiatives are viewed with suspicion by the other. 
3. Institution - US policymakers buy in to the EU enlargement policy, with its firm commitments and well-rehearsed conditionality process, and don't see alternative policies such as the "neighborhood" approach as being useful. 

A Q&A session following the talk raised such issues as: Will the EU’s problems with “deepening” its relationships with neighbors hurt its prospects for “widening” through enlargement? What are the reasons for the mixed signals to Turkey from the EU? Do arguments about the EU’s denial of Turkey’s membership being based on racism hold any merit? If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, what cross-border policy areas will remain the prerogative of nation-states and which might fall under EU Commission jurisdiction?

 

Ambassador Sheinwald discusses how he envisages international relations will form in the near and far future. He places particular emphasis on the growing importance of the US-China relationship. At the same time, Ambassador Sheinwald explores the EU as a key global power and its necessary cooperation with the US.

Synopsis

Ambassador Sheinwald clearly feels that the international stage is moving. In fact, for him, the change in the international order is accelerating due to the global financial crisis. In this sense, Ambassador Sheinwald explains that the UK has long supported expanding decision-making international institutions such as the UN Security Council. However, the UK still sees the value in intimate, power-focused bodies such as the G8. Ambassador Sheinwald discusses the fact that there is increasingly a sense that a ‘G2’ is developing between the US and China. To Ambassador Sheinwald, this model would not literally work as he argues China needs, at this stage in its development, a multilateral setting to grow into the active and cooperative power we would all like to see it become. At the same time, Ambassador Sheinwald believes that the partnership between the US and China is important in paving a solution to the current economic state and shaping the future global economy. In fact, the UK and the EU welcome this new cooperation between the two powers. Ambassador Sheinwald feels the US and the EU can harness China’s shared global interest on issues such as climate change, in which the EU has played a front role, to develop at stable global relationship. Moreover, he believes that if the US and EU can cooperate to form low carbon economies, it could incentivize China and India to act similarly. However, Ambassador Sheinwald stresses that for non-economic issues the US and China’s relationship is still important but slow moving, and he expresses the belief that it will take decades for any real ‘G2’ to emerge.

In the meantime, Ambassador Sheinwald argues that while the US looks round the world for support on key issues, it will find that the EU shares the most values and has the capacity to promote them. He cites the enormous investments between the two in comparison to the US and China to show the scale of the US and the EU’s relationship. Ambassador Sheinwald argues that financially the US and EU need regulatory cooperation, using a scientific basis, to set global standards. He stresses as well that the EU is a major global power on its own. It is increasingly seen as an honest, multilateral broker and plays a crucial in global economic recovery. Moreover, it has strong interest in fighting world terrorism. In comparison to other partners, the US can find similar values, intelligence, and capacity in the EU. In addition, the US can see more stability in Europe’s own backyard than perhaps 20 years ago. Looking to the future, Ambassador Sheinwald hopes that the Lisbon Treaty would help the EU organize itself further. Further stressing the importance of the US-EU partnership, Ambassador Sheinwald explains “nothing is more likely to be as dependable a foundation.”

In taking the time to answer questions, Ambassador Sheinwald discusses a number of issues. One partiuclar area of focus much emphasized was Europe's role in the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, he addresses the issue of Britain and the US's relationship with China. Moreover, he also explains that he hopes that as developed countries deal with increasing security threats, their resolve in keeping their borders open will remain strong. Finally, Ambassador Sheinwald stresses the need to employ methods of sustainable, intelligent, and low carbon growth.

About the Speaker

Nigel Sheinwald joined the British Diplomatic Service in 1976 and has served in Washington (twice), Brussels (twice) and Moscow and in a wide range of policy jobs in London. 

He took up his position as British Ambassador to the United States in October 2007.  In that role he leads the Embassy in Washington and nine Consulates-General around the United States.   He had an earlier posting to Washington in 1983-87 as First Secretary (Political) in the Embassy. 

Before becoming Ambassador in Washington, Sir Nigel served as Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser to the Prime Minister from 2003-2007.

Sir Nigel was the UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the European Union in Brussels from 2000-2003.  Before that he was Europe Director in the FCO (1998-2000).  He had an earlier posting in the UK Representation in 1993-95 as Head of its Political and Institutional Section.  He began his career in EU work as Deputy Head of the FCO's European Union Department in 1989-92. 

Sir Nigel's first foreign posting was in Moscow in 1978-79.  He was also Head of the Foreign Office's Anglo-Soviet Section in 1981-83.

Sir Nigel has had a wide variety of other appointments in the FCO in London.  From 1995-98, he was the FCO Press Secretary and Head of News Department.  He was Deputy Head of the Foreign Office's Policy Planning Staff in 1987-1989, responsible for transatlantic relations and other issues.  He also worked in London on the Japan Desk (1976-77) and on Zimbabwe (1979-81), including the Lancaster House Conference.

Sir Nigel was born in 1953 and educated at Harrow County Grammar School and Balliol College, Oxford.  He is married with three sons.

This event is jointly sponsored by the Office for International Visitors at the Bechtel International Center, the Forum on Contemporary Europe, and the British Consulate General in San Francisco.

AGENDA

9:30AM	Welcome
10:00AM - 12:00PM	Morning Session “Religious Divisions After the Reformation: A Spur to Secularization?” Benjamin Kaplan (University College London) “Judaism in Europe” John Efron (UC Berkeley)
2:00PM - 4:00PM	First Afternoon Session “Secularism and Islam in Europe” John Bowen (Washington University, Saint Louis) “The Vatican, the EU, and the Enduring Dream of a ‘Catholic Europe” Tim Byrnes (Colgate University)
4:30PM - 6:30PM	Second Afternoon Session “American and European Exceptionalisms Revisited” Jose Casanova (Georgetown University) “Is there really a religious Europe? Some remarks on European diversity” Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (Universität München)
6:30PM - 7:00PM	Concluding Discussion

Co-sponsored by the Stanford Department of Religious Studies, the Taube Center for Jewish Studies, the Mediterranean Studies Forum, the Department of History, the Stanford Humanities Center,and the Forum on Contemporary Europe.