Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

Daniel Keleman presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on April 16, 2026.
Daniel Keleman presented his research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026. | Hesham Sallam

Hanna Folsz then took a closer, domestic look at the Tisza Party and how they triumphed over Orbán. As Kelemen discussed, Orbán's new electoral rules strongly favored large parties with rural bases, the characteristics of the Fidesz party. The Fidesz Party also controlled the media and enjoyed advantages in party financing. However, the Tisza Party, led by Peter Magyar, dominated the 2026 election, despite the electoral system being stacked against opposition parties. 

Economic woes, corruption, and scandals surrounding Fidesz created broad voter discontent and set the stage for the Tisza Party’s victory. Tisza worked to create a broad coalition through extensive group-level campaigning, messaging that focused on competent economic governance and anti-corruption, and the idea of reclaiming patriotism. Magyar also extensively campaigned, holding rallies all over Hungary in localities of all sizes. The district candidates within the Tisza Party campaigned in a similar manner. 

The Tisza Party focused its policy proposals on extensive welfare, public services improvement, the elimination of corruption, strengthening relationships with the EU and neighbors, and largely avoided divisive topics. The Party also distanced itself from the discredited and divisive established opposition parties, and they did not coordinate with past opposition parties. 

Folsz outlined the lessons Hungary’s electoral outcome shows for democratic resistance against autocratization. The Hungarian case demonstrated the importance of connecting with voters and building credibility by campaigning a lot and across the country, including in rural constituencies. The Tisza Party also smartly presented a vision for a better future with concrete proposals, rooted in citizens’ core concerns– in this case, the economy and corruption, and distanced themselves from divisive opposition politicians and parties. The Tisza Party focused its messaging on unity and reclaiming patriotism from the far right.

Hanna Folsz presented her research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026.
Hanna Folsz presented her research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026. | Emil Kamalov

The 2026 Hungarian election offered a rare example of democratic recovery in a system widely considered entrenched, raising important lessons for opposition movements confronting democratic erosion.

Read More

Hero Image
Peter Magyar, lead candidate of the Tisza party, speaks to supporters after the Tisza party won the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026 in Budapest, Hungary.
Peter Magyar, lead candidate of the Tisza party, speaks to supporters after the Tisza party won the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, in Budapest, Hungary.
Getty Images
All News button
1
Subtitle

Scholars Daniel Keleman and Hanna Folsz examine the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party and the implications for Hungary and Europe.

Date Label
In Brief
  • At a REDS Seminar hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center seminar on April 16, 2026, Daniel Kelemen and Hanna Folsz discussed Hungary’s 2026 election and Viktor Orbán’s defeat by Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party.
  • They analyzed how Tisza overcame media control, electoral rules, and institutional advantages favoring Fidesz through broad-based campaigning.
  • The case highlights how opposition movements can challenge entrenched regimes and offers lessons for democratic recovery amid backsliding.
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
No
-

*Please note the date has changed from September 23 to September 22*

A talk by Arnold Suppan, author of Hitler - Beneš - Tito: Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and South East Europe. The monograph explores the development of the political, legal, economic, social, cultural and military “communities of conflict” within Austria-Hungary (especially in the Bohemian and South Slav lands); the convulsion of World War I and the Czech, Slovak and South Slav break with the Habsburg Monarchy; the difficult formation of successor states and the strong discussions at Paris 1919/20; the domestic and foreign policies of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the question of national minorities (Sudeten Germans, Magyars in Slovakia and the Vojvodina, Danube Swabians, Germans in Slovenia); Hitler’s destruction of the Versailles order; the Nazi policies of conquest and occupation in Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia; the genocide committed against the Jews in the Protectorate, Slovakia, the Ustaša-state and Serbia; the collaboration of the Tiso­- and Pavelić-regime with Nazi Germany; the retaliation against and expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and finally the issue of history and memory east and west of the Iron Curtain as well as in the post-communist states at the end of the 20th century.

Sponsored by The Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and co-sponsored by The Europe Center and the Department of History.

Free and open to the public.

 

Pigott Hall (Building 260)
Room113

Arnold Suppan Professor of History University of Vienna
Lectures
-

Co-sponsored by The Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies and The Europe Center

 

Event Synopsis:

The End of Hungarian Democracy? International Implications
October 21, 2011

After an introduction by Professor Dornbach, Professor Wittenberg asserts that while a spirit of bipartisan ship is a nice feature of the U.S. legislature, it is not a fundamental requirement of democracy and  has historically not characterized the Hungarian parliament. He traces a decades-long tradition of ruling parties using Parliament to limit the presence and influence of minority parties. The current Fidesz government, which ended up with 2/3 of the seats after the 2012 election, now has a supermajority necessary to alter the constitution. Professor Wittenberg attributes Fidesz’s victory to three factors: the incompetence of older right wing parties, partly resulting from lack of governing experience during last four decades of Socialist rule; 2) the arrogance of the Socialist party; and 3) a simple lack of alternatives for voters. Wittenberg points out that Hungary’s complex electoral system resulted in more Fidesz parliamentary seats than the party’s actual popularity with voters would predict. He concludes that the 70% of parliamentary vote won, cumulatively, by extreme nationalist parties, does not bode well for the future of liberal politics in Hungary.

Professor Scheppele describes how the Fidesz party under the leadership of (Victor) Orban has taken its victory as a “mandate to change everything,” often in ways that will allow Fidesz to stay in power in the future. The constitution was amended 10 times during the party’s first year in power. Key changes included reducing the size and jurisdiction of constitutional courts, limiting media activities, allowing election commission representatives to be appointed with a 2/3 majority, and fast tracking the process of voting on new laws to approximately 3 days, leaving little room for discussion and debate. Scheppele echoes Professor Wittenberg’s argument that many voters simply did not have an attractive alternative to Fidesz, which would be less of a danger if the country’s constitution were not so easy to amend. She predicts that Hungary’s current situation should offer lessons to other countries on how to design constitutions.

Professor Halmai concludes the panel by crediting the arrogance (and corruption) of the Socialist coalition with the success of Fidesz in the 2010 elections. He highlights three central problems with the new constitution: 1) It leaves questions regarding who is to be subject to the constitution – for example, does this include the Roma population within Hungary, or Hungarian-Americans living within the United States? 2) The constitution intervenes in the private lives of Hungarians with respect to religion, marriage, abortion, etc. 3) It limits constitutional courts to narrower jurisdictions. He also laments the lack of consensus within the Hungarian government on a set of liberal democratic values.

A discussion session raised such questions as: What prospects are there for pushback from the European Union against some of the recent constraints on rule of law in Hungary? Does the fact that the Hungarian constitution considers the 1.4 million Hungarian-Americans in the United States as Hungarian citizens raise any legal challenge from the U.S.? Does the fact that Hungary has to operates within the frameworks of the European Union and NATO put constraints on its actions with regards to democracy and the constitution? Where does Fidesz’s funding come from?

CISAC Conference Room

Gabor Halmai Speaker Institute for Political and International Studies, Budapest; former chief counselor to the President of the Constitutional Court and former Vice President of the Hungarian Electoral Commission
Kim Lane Scheppele Speaker Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Jason Wittenberg Speaker UC Berkeley
Marton Dornbach Speaker Stanford University
Panel Discussions
-

As Hungary took over the EU  presidency, the EU member states watch the crisis in the Middle East unfold with great concern.  H.E. Dr. Gyorgy Szapary, the newly appointed Hungarian Ambassador to WDC, will discuss the political, economic, security and social implications for Hungary and the Europe of the last weeks events.

An economist by training, Dr. Szapary spent several years at the IMF in WDC, and is in a unique position to discuss the current events and their potential effects.

Jointly sponsored by The Europe Center at FSI, and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Philippines Conference Room

H.E. Mr. György Szapáry Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary to the United States Speaker
Seminars
-

About the speaker:

Dr. Franz Cede is a retired Austrian diplomat who served as the Austrian Ambassador to Russia (1999-2003) and to NATO (2003-2007). He also was the Legal Advisor to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. He has a strong California connection dating back to the time when he was the Austrian Consul General in Los Angeles 20 years ago. Dr Cede holds the degree "Doctor of Law" from Innsbruck University. He received an M.A. in international affairs from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., and is currently an associate professor at the Andrassy University in Budapest, Hungary. Dr. Cede has published several books and articles in the field of international relations, international law and diplomacy.

Jointly sponsored by The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

 

Audio Synopsis:

In this talk, Dr. Cede details his views on Russia's evolving relationships with the EU, NATO, and the US, drawing on his experiences as Austrian ambassador to the Soviet Union from1999 to 2003. Cede first outlines his perceptions of present-day Russia-US and Russia-NATO relations. Russia, he explains, still thinks in Cold War terms of bilateral relations and considers the United States to be its primary strategic partner on global security issues, especially in light of the Obama administration's recent "reset" of relations and ratification of the new START treaty. In contrast, Russia views NATO as outdated and yet still a threat. Its expansion to the East is viewed with suspicion by Putin's administration, which considers these developments to be distinctly anti-Russian. Russia engages with NATO only to the extent that it believes it can influence the organization's behavior and policies toward Moscow.  Still, in Cede's experience, the NATO-US-Russia triangle continues to be at the forefront of Russian policymakers' dialogue. Russian leaders prefer to avoid dealing with the EU because it lacks a coherent foreign policy, and also because Russia prefers bilateral relations with countries that offer a strategic benefit. Dr. Cede quotes Timothy Garton Ash, who wrote in a recent op-ed that "much of the Russian foreign policy elite treats the European Union as a kind of transient, post-modern late 20th century anachronism: flawed in principle, and feeble in practice. What matters in the 21st century, as much as it did in the 19th century, is the...determination of great powers." Dr. Cede cites the Georgian military intervention and recent Ukrainian gas crisis as examples of Russia's renewed attempts to reestablish dominance in its neighborhood.  

In the second portion of his talk Dr. Cede traces the evolution of Russian views of the EU and NATO.  Ten years ago, the EU-Russia relationship was largely ignored in the Russian media. When Cede asked Russian citizens for their views on the EU, they "either didn't know or didn't care." As Ambassador, Dr. Cede found Russian officials better informed, but  disdainful of being given orders by EU donors and "treated like a developing country." Cede illustrates this dynamic by recounting the 2004 incident in which the EU forced the residents of Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast region to apply for EU Shengen visas, which then required special permits to travel throughout Russia.  Western assurances that EU expansion to the east was not an attack on Russia but rather an attempt to extend stability to the Eastern bloc fell on deaf ears. Cede believes that notwithstanding Russia's attitude, the country is too big to ever join the EU, or to be influenced by Europe in its policy decisions. Because Russia still views itself as "one of the poles in a multipolar world," Dr. Cede insists that any change must come from within the country. However, Cede views Russia's candidacy to the WTO, which would require a clearer commitment to democracy and open economic policies, as a glimmer of hope.

Finally, Dr. Cede outlines several "permanent" features of Russia's relationship with the world, including economic interdependence, lack of cooperation on security policy, and weak relations with stateless organizations like the EU and NATO. He lays out several recommendations, which are elaborated on during the Q&A session:

  1. EU policymakers and other Western powers (notably the US) should strengthen their common Russia policy. Given the EU's dependence on Russia for oil and gas, it should also diversify its own energy sources to strengthen its bargaining position.
  2. The EU should consider membership for "bridge countries" such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.
  3. Personal diplomacy between universities, civil society, and citizens is important.  This includes reevaluation of visa policy. Cede hopes that the advent of the internet will also help improve attitudes between Russia and the rest of the world.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Franz Cede Former Austrian Ambassador to Russia Speaker
Seminars
-

Soviet policy in Eastern Europe during the final year and immediate aftermath of World War II had a profound impact on global politics. By reassessing Soviet aims and concrete actions in Eastern Europe from the mid-1940s through the early 1950s, Kramer’s essay touches on larger questions about the origins and intensity of the Cold War. The essay shows that domestic politics and postwar exigencies in the USSR, along with Iosif Stalin’s external ambitions, decisively shaped Soviet ties with Eastern Europe. Stalin’s adoption of increasingly repressive and xenophobic policies at home, and his determination to quell armed insurgencies in areas annexed by the USSR at the end of the war, were matched by his embrace of a harder line vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. This internal-external dynamic was not wholly divorced from the larger East-West context, but it was, to a certain degree, independent of it. At the same time, the shift in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was bound to have a detrimental impact on Soviet relations with the leading Western countries, which had tried to avert the imposition of Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe. The final breakdown of the USSR’s erstwhile alliance with the United States and Great Britain was, for Stalin, an unwelcome but acceptable price to pay.

Mark Kramer is Director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He has taught at Harvard, Yale, and Brown Universities and was formerly an Academy Scholar in Harvard's Academy of International and Area Studies and a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University.

Professor Kramer is the author of Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion; Soldier and State in Poland: Civil-Military Relations and Institutional Change After Communism; Crisis in the Communist World, 1956: De-Stalinization, the Soviet Union, and Upheavals in Poland and Hungary; The Collapse of the Soviet Union; and Income Distribution and Social Transfer Policies in the Post-Communist Transition: Changing Patterns of Inequality. He is completing another book titled From Dominance to Hegemony to Collapse: Soviet Policy in East-Central Europe, 1945-1991, which, like his earlier books on the Soviet bloc, draws heavily on new archival sources from the former Communist world.

Co-sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

CISAC Conference Room

Mark Kramer Director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard University; Senior Fellow of Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Speaker
Seminars
-

This lecture deals with the strategies of reconstructing the suppressed memory of traumatic events in Kosova, Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the 20th century. In this period of transitions and changes, history has become a key conflict arena in which identity and memory are being waged. Milica Tomic's work addresses these issues in an unconventional way that challenges traditional ‘representation’ (or lack of thereof) of the past events. By combining three of her exhibited projects xy-üngelost, container and Srebrenica – this talk attempts to investigate the ways in which we can engage with the past to confront the drives to forget. Thus re-constructed material and social network of events critically investigate the politics of rights to narrate traumatic events from the past. Proceeding from the fact that what we cannot remember tells us about that which we cannot forget, Milica Tomic interprets the syntagm “politics of memory” as a demand for a renewal of politics. Stated in the negative form, it goes: There is no memory without politics!/There is no oblivion without politics!

Milica Tomic works and lives in Belgrade as a visual artist, primarily video, film, photography, performance, action, light and sound installation, web projects, discussions etc. Tomic's work centers on issues of political violence, nationality and identity, with particular attention to the tensions between personal experience and media constructed images. Milica Tomic's has exhibited globally since 1998 and participated in numerous exhibitions including Venice Biennale in 2001 and 2003, Sao Paulo Biennale in1998, Istanbul Biennale in 2003 and Sidney Biennale in 2006, Prague Biennale in 2007, Gyumri Biennale in 2008. Tomic's work was exhibited in a wide international context including the Museum voor Moderne Kunst, Arnhem, Holland, Kunsthalle Wien, Austria, Moderna Museet, Stockholm, Sweden, MUMOK- Museum Moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig Wien, Vienna, Austria, Fundacio Joan Miro, Barcelona, Spain, Ludwig Museum Budapest, Hungary, Malmo Konsthall, Malmo, Sweden, Palazzo Della Triennale Milano, Milan, Italy, Museum of Contamporary Art Belgrade, Serbia, GfZK- Galerie fur Zeitgenussische Kunst, Leipzig, Germany, State Museum of Contemporary Art Thessaloniki, Greece, Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel, Germany, Copenhagen Contemporary Art Center, Copenhagen, Denmark, Brooklyn Museum of Art, New York, USA, Freud Museum, London, UK, KIASMA Nykytaiteen Museo, Helsinki, Finland, Nasjonalmuseet for Kunst, Arkitektur og Design, Oslo, Norway, Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, Holland etc.

A founder and member of the Monument Group, Tomic is a organizer of numerous international art projects and workshops, as well as lecturer at international institutions of contemporary art, such as: NIFCA (Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art), Kuvataideakatemia / Academy of Fine Arts, Helsinki, Finland, Piet Zwart Institut, Rotterdam, Holland, Akademie der bildenden Künste, Vienna, Austria and others.

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Archaeology Center, Department of Art and Art History, and Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Building 500, Archaeology Center
488 Escondido Mall
Seminar Room
Stanford University

Milica Tomic Visual Artist, Belgrade Speaker
Seminars
Subscribe to Hungary