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The people of Nagorno-Karabakh have long strived for the recognition of their right to self-determination. Azerbaijan reacted by unleashing a large scale military offensive that led to war, which ended in May 1994 with the signing of the cease-fire agreement by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia. The negotiation process is mediated by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group – the USA, France and Russia. Though the parties were close to a solution on several occasions, the negotiations have not yielded a durable settlement. In April 2016 the conflict once again erupted with violence leaving hundreds killed and maimed. Since then, two summits have been convened to create conducive conditions for the advancement of the peace process.

 
Minister Edward Nalbandian has been the Foreign Affairs Minister of Armenia since 2008. He studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and received his PhD (in political science) from the Institute of Oriental Studies at the National Academy of Sciences. Minister Nalbandian began working at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late 1970s. After Armenia's independence he was invited to work for the Armenian diplomatic service. He has been Armenia's Ambassador to Egypt, Morocco, Oman, France, as well as Israel, the Vatican and Andorra. He has also been Special Representative of the President of Armenia in different international organizations. Minister Nalbandian has published several works on international relations. He is the recipient of several awards, including the Armenian Medal of Mkhitar Gosh and the second-grade and first-grade Medals of Services to the Motherland, Commandeur and Grand Officier de la Légion D'honneur of France, Saint Gregory's Grand Cross Order of the Holy See (Vatican), the USSR order of Friendship of Nations, and others. He is married and has a daughter. 
 
Edward Nalbandian, Foreign Affairs Minister of Armenia Foreign Affairs Minister of Armenia Speaker
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When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the worry in the West was what would happen to that country’s thousands of nuclear weapons. Would “loose” nukes fall into the hands of terrorists, rogue states, criminals – and plunge the world into a nuclear nightmare?

Fortunately, scientists and technical experts in both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union rolled up their sleeves to manage and contain the nuclear problem in the dissolving Communist country.

One of the leaders in this relationship was Stanford engineering professor Siegfried Hecker, who served as a director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory before coming to Stanford as a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is a world-renowned expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security.

Hecker cited one 1992 meeting with Russian scientists in Moscow who were clearly concerned about the risks. In his new book, Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear dangers, Hecker quoted one Russian expert as saying, “We now need to be concerned about terrorism.”

Earning both scientific and political trust was a key, said Hecker, also a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The Russians were proud of their scientific accomplishments and highly competent in the nuclear business – and they sought to show this to the Americans scientists, who became very confident in their Russian counterparts’ technical capabilities as they learned more about their nuclear complex and toured the labs.

Economic collapse, political turmoil

But the nuclear experts faced an immense problem. The Soviets had about 39,000 nuclear weapons in their country and in Eastern Europe and about 1.5 million kilograms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (the fuel for nuclear bombs), Hecker said. Consider that the bomb that the U.S. dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki in 1945 was only six kilograms of plutonium, he added. Meanwhile, the U.S. had about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.

Hecker and the rest of the Americans were deeply concerned about the one million-plus Russians who worked in nuclear facilities. Many faced severe financial pressure in an imploding society and thus constituted a huge potential security risk.

“The challenge that Russia faced with its economy collapsing was enormous,” he said in an interview.

The Russian scientists, Hecker said, were motivated to act responsibly because they realized the awful destruction that a single nuclear bomb could wreak. Hecker noted that one Russian scientist told him, “We arrived in the nuclear century all in one boat, and a movement by anyone will affect everyone.” Hecker noted, “Therefore, you know, we were doomed to work together to cooperate.”

All of this depended on the two governments involved easing nuclear tensions while allowing the scientists to collaborate. In short order, the scientists developed mutual respect and trust to address the loose nukes scenario.

The George H.W. Bush administration launched nuclear initiatives to put the Russian government at ease. For example, it took the nuclear weapons off U.S. Navy surface ships and some of its nuclear weapons off alert to allow the Russians to do the same. The U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation, which helped fund some of the loose nuke containment efforts.

While those were positive measures, Hecker said, it was ultimately the cooperation among scientists, what they called lab-to-lab-cooperation, that allowed the two former superpower enemies to “get past the sensitivity barriers” and make “the world a safer place.”

Since the end of the Cold War, no significant nuclear event has occurred as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its nuclear complex, Hecker noted.

Lesson: cooperation counts

One lesson from it all, Hecker said, is that government policymakers need to understand that scientists and engineers can work together and make progress toward solving difficult, dangerous problems.

“We don’t want to lose the next generation from understanding what can actually be done by working together,” he said.  “So, we want to demonstrate to them, Look, this is what was done when the scientists were interested and enthusiastic and when the government gave us enough room to be able to do that.”

Hecker said this scientific cooperation extended to several thousand scientists and engineers at the Russian sites and at U.S. nuclear labs – primarily the three defense labs: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national laboratories. Many technical exchanges and visits between scientists in Russia and the United States took place.

He recalled visiting some of the nuclear sites in Russian cities shrouded by mystery. “These cities were so secret, they didn’t even appear on Soviet maps.”

Change of threat

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the nature of the nuclear threat changed, Hecker said. The threat before was one of mutual annihilation, but now the threat changed to what would happen if nuclear assets were lost, stolen or somehow evaded the control of the government.

“From an American perspective we referred to these as the ‘four loose nuclear dangers,'” he said.

This included securing the loose nukes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; preventing nuclear materials or bomb fuel from getting into the wrong hands; the human element involving the people who worked in the Soviet nuclear complex; and finally, the “loose exports” problem of someone trying to sell nuclear materials or technical components to overseas groups like terrorists or rogue nations.

For Hecker, this is not just an American story. It is about a selfless reconciliation with a longtime enemy for the greater global good, a relationship not corrupted by ideological or nationalistic differences, but one reflective of mutual interests of the highest order.

“The primary reason,” he said, “why we didn’t have a nuclear catastrophe was the Russian nuclear workers and the Russian nuclear officials. Their dedication, their professionalism, their patriotism for their country was so strong that it carried them through these times in the 1990s when they often didn’t get paid for six months at a time … The nuclear complex did its job through the most trying times. And it was a time when the U.S. government took crucial conciliatory measures with the new Russian Federation and gave us scientists the support to help make the world a safer place.”

 

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Siegfried Hecker (second from left) takes a tour of a secret Russian nuclear facility in the city of Sarov in February, 1992. Hecker was serving as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during his visit.
Siegfried Hecker (second from left) takes a tour of a secret Russian nuclear facility in the city of Sarov in February, 1992. Hecker was serving as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during his visit. | CISAC
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Despite the increasing state control over free speech, the Russian media market is still alive — and huge. There are tens of independent online media with a multimillion audience and each year we get more. How do you survive on the internet when it is controlled by the state? How do you find professional journalists when there are no decent schools of journalism? How do you manage a media outlet when you do not know what is going to happen tomorrow? Publisher of the popular Russian language online media outlet Meduza Ilia Krasilshchik will explain how the world of Russian media works.

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After dropping out of university at 21, in 2008 Ilya Krasilshchik became the editor of the then most influential Moscow entertainment and city life magazine Afisha. During his five-year tenure, Afisha published more than 100 issues, including specials like “Oral History of the Russian
Media” and “Oral History of the Russian Internet” and a “Coming Outs” issue (as an answer to the ”LGBT propaganda” law adopted by the Russian State Duma). He stepped down in 2013 to become the Product Director at Afisha publishing company, launching three separate web-based media and а TV streaming service in one year. In October 2014, he finally left Afisha, and together with two partners launched Meduza, a groundbreaking Russian language web news outlet based in Riga, Latvia. By December 2015 the monthly readership of Meduza exceeded 3.5 million unique visitors, with 320,000 app downloads and more than 500,000 followers on social media. Seventy percent of Meduza’s audience is based in Russia.

 

Ilia Krasilshchik Publisher Speaker Meduza.io
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After the attacks in Paris, TEC faculty affiliate Russell A. Berman argues that "ISIS is hardly the only challenge to American power and the international order" and that "strategic thinking has to consider long term issues and not merely react to immediate events or even the most terrible headlines." Instead, he encourages the U.S. to strengthen alliances with the Europeans and the Sunnis in the December 1, 2015 edition of The Caravan.

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"Tracking the Travels of Adam Olearius" is chapter 9 of the book Word and Image in Russian History: Essays in Honor of Gary Marker, edited by Maria di Salvo, Daniel H. Kaiser, and Valerie A. Kivelson and published by Academic Studies Press.

Word and Image invokes and honors the scholarly contributions of Gary Marker. Twenty scholars from Russia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Ukraine and the United States examine some of the main themes of Marker’s scholarship on Russia—literacy, education, and printing; gender and politics; the importance of visual sources for historical study; and the intersections of religious and political discourse in Imperial Russia. A biography of Marker, a survey of his scholarship, and a list of his publications complete the volume.

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Word and Image in Russian History: Essays in Honor of Gary Marker, edited by Maria di Salvo, Daniel H. Kaiser, and Valerie A. Kivelson
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In an opinion piece published on October 23, 2015 in the New York Time, FSI director and senior fellow Michael McFaul shares his latest comentary on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Read Professor McFaul's Op Ed in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/opinion/the-myth-of-putins-strategic-….

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The fate of a soldier serving in the Russian army in the First World War largely depended on luck and circumstances. But even though his own means of influencing his fate were limited, there were available certain active choices – such as shirking and desertion – that could turn his life around in both positive and negative ways. For Russian civil and military authorities, of course, desertion was a nuisance that was fought against by all available means. Sometimes, such as with physical punishment, these means only succeeded in lowering the already low morale and increasing the number of deserters.

Dr. Mart Kuldkepp's presentation will focus on a small and somewhat exceptional group of deserters from the Russian army: the soldiers who served in the border guard regiments in Northern Finland and deserted alone or in small groups over the border to neutral Sweden. He will consider their motivation in doing so, and their subsequent fate, as much as it is known. At the same time, he will also look at how Sweden administratively handled this very unforeseen phenomenon and how the deserters were treated by Swedish authorities.

Mart Kuldkepp completed his PhD dissertation at University of Tartu, Estonia, in 2014 and joined University College London in 2015. Dr. Kuldkepp has been active as an academic in the field of Scandinavian Studies since 2007. Dr. Kuldkepp’s primary research focus is on 20th century Scandinavian political history, with a particular interest in contacts between the Scandinavian and the Baltic states, but also has interest in the history of secret services and espionage and Old Norse-Icelandic literature and culture. His teaching has mostly concerned the history of Scandinavian culture, society, and politics from the earliest times up to today. He has taught subjects related to Old Norse studies and overview courses in humanities.

Organized by the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and co-sponsored by The Europe Center and Stanford University Libraries

Mart Kuldkepp Lecturer Speaker Scandinavian Studies, University College London
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The Pussy Riot protest, and the subsequent heavy handed treatment of the protestors, grabbed the headlines, but this was not an isolated instance of art being noticeably critical of the regime. As this book, based on extensive original research, shows, there has been gradually emerging over recent decades a significant counter-culture in the art world which satirises and ridicules the regime and the values it represents, at the same time putting forward, through art, alternative values. The book traces the development of art and protest in recent decades, discusses how art of this kind engages in political and social protest, and provides many illustrations as examples of art as protest. The book concludes by discussing how important art has been in facilitating new social values and in prompting political protests.


Lena Jonson is Associate Research Fellow at UI. Her research currently focuses on Russian domestic politics and issues of political and societal change (modernisation) as well as the contemporary role of culture and its standing in Russia.

Lena Jonson has published several articles and works examining Russian society and politics (mainly foreign and security policy), Russia's relations with Europe and Russian relations with the former Soviet territories. She has also published widely on Central Asia, and on Tajikistan in particular. 

Lena Jonson is one of the founders of the network "Sällskapet för studier av Ryssland, Central-och Östeuropa samt Centralasien" (1997) and was its first chairperson. She has been a guest researcher at George Washington University and the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Centre, as well as a scholarship recipient at the universities of (then) Leningrad and Moscow. From 2005-2009, she served as Cultural Attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. In 2002, she worked as a Political Officer at the OSCE-office i Dushanbe, Tajikistan. In 1997-1998, she was a Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

Sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Lena Jonson Associate Research Fellow Speaker Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)
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This event is now full, and we are unable to accept any further RSVPs.  Please email khaley@stanford.edu if you would like to be added to a wait list.

 

Russia's aggressive foreign policy is backed by Putin's domestic popularity ratings and his strong grip on Russia's political system. But in reality, how firmly does Putin control Russian politics? Can the ongoing economic crisis in Russia pose challenges to his system and the upcoming federal elections of 2016-2018? What impact will Russian domestic politics play in Russia's international behavior?

 

Vladimir Milov is a Russian opposition politician, publicist, economist & energy expert. He was the Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia (2002), adviser to the Minister of Energy (2001-2002), and head of strategy department at the Federal Energy Commission, the natural monopoly regulator (1999-2001). Milov is the author of major energy reform concepts, including the concept of market restructuring and unbundling of Gazprom, which was banned from implementation by President Vladimir Putin. He is the founder and president of the Institute of Energy Policy, a leading independent Russian energy policy think tank (since 2003). Milov is a columnist of major Russian political and business publications, including Forbes Russia, and a frequent commentator on Russian political and economic affairs in major Western media outlets (The New York Times, The Financial Times, The Washington Post, The Economist, etc.). Since leaving the Russian Government in 2002, Milov has became a vocal public critic of Vladimir Putin’s dirigiste and authoritarian course. Milov is also active in the Russian opposition politics, serving as Chairman of the “Democratic Choice” opposition party (www.en.demvybor.ru), and is also known as co-author of the critical public report on Vladimir Putin’s Presidential legacy called “Putin. The Results”, written together with Boris Nemtsov (several editions published since 2008).

Vladimir Milov former Russian Deputy Minister of Energy Speaker
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