This talk presents the prolonged deadly encounter between the Germans and Soviets in World War II as a clash between two different interpretive templates.  In engaging the Soviet enemy, Nazi German leaders and soldiers employed visual frames of analysis, centering on physiognomy and racial makeup.  As they fought back, the Soviets assessed the German invaders through a palpably textual register, focusing on their psychology and political consciousness.  The talk shows how these templates worked in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and how they collided in the course of the war.

Talk Synopsis:

In this seminar Jochen Hellbeck explains the German-Soviet war as having been a battle of "images against words," a term that reflects both a clash of wartime ideologies and the different choices of media used to express these ideologies. Germany, Hellbeck explains, relied heavily on visual media, using videos and photos as propaganda, while the Soviets used written materials to inspire their soldiers and citizens and to demoralize Germans. Hellbeck focuses on the battle of Stalingrad, which involved a long standoff and extended exposure between the two sides.

The Germans used multimedia, as well as strong visual imagery in written materials, to portray the battle as a conquest of an inferior race and a vast landscape available for the taking. A compilation of German soldiers' reports from the Eastern front in July 1941, and the 1942 war diary of a German journalist  embedded with troops in Stalingrad, use descriptive imagery to paint Soviets as mute and beastly and Germans as war heroes full of vitality.  Letters from German officials employed vivid language of the landscape, with repeated references to art as representations of German culture and greatness. Wartime photography by German soldiers, many of whom were amateur photographers, was common. The German use of visual media is exemplified by "Soviet Paradise," a 1942 short film made to discredit the Soviet Union's campaign of print propaganda. The film, which employed sophisticated cinematography techniques and very little commentary, was made into an exhibit in Berlin during the summer of 1942 and was visited by 1 million people.

In contrast, the Soviets did not come close to the amount of investment the Germans made in wartime multimedia.   Soviet soldiers were forbidden from keeping photos, and only officers could occasionally take them, in the rare event they had access to cameras. Instead, Hellbeck finds ample written records of the Soviet wartime experience. The Soviet military leadership commissioned a war history and invested heavily in the work of Soviet writers and historians, rather than photographers or film crews, to document events on the front lines.

Hellbeck’s presentation also includes analysis of the war records of prominent military personnel on both sides, as well as a review of the sources he used in his research, and his perceptions of how the Germans and Soviets interpreted each other’s wartime records. The next step in Hellbeck's research project will involve comparing techniques used in German and Soviet news film chronicles.

A discussion period following the talk addressed such questions as: did Germans and Soviets employ the same strategies in their military engagements with other countries? Why is there so much portrayal of Soviet POWS in Germany, and so little of German POWs in the Soviet Union? How was the defeat at Stalingrad represented by the Germans and by the Soviets? How did the strategies resonant with the respective sides?

About the Speaker:

Jochen Hellbeck is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Rutgers University.  He is the author of Revolution On My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Harvard, 2006), and is currently writing a book about the clash and the entanglements of Germans and Soviets in the battle of Stalingrad.

With democratic revolutions spreading throughout the region, and as US, European and NATO forces enter the conflict in Libya, the transatlantic community shares concern over events in the greater Middle East. The Europe Center presents a timely seminar by Ami Ayalon, former director of the Shin Bet and commander of the Israeli Navy, about the interdependence of Israeli security and Palestinian statehood and the urgent necessity of achieving a two-state solution to ensure democratic self-determination for both peoples.

Ami Ayalon is a former Member of the Israeli Knesset, Commander of the Israeli Navy, and director of the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service. In 2003, Ayalon launched, together with former PLO representative Sari Nusseibeh, a peace initiative called “The National Census" to collect signatures of millions of Israelis and Palestinians in support of a two-state solution.

About the Speaker

Admiral Ami Ayalon was born in pre-state Israel in 1945, growing up on Kibbutz Maagan. He served in the Israeli Navy for 30 years. During his service he was decorated with the Medal of Valor, Israel's highest award and the Medal of Honor for carrying out a long list of operations without casualties as the commander of the elite Shayetet 13 Naval commando unit. From 1992-1996 he served as Chief of the Israeli Navy.

Upon retiring from the Navy, Admiral Ayalon was appointed director of the Shin Bet (Israel’s General Security Service). He is credited with rehabilitating the service, which had been hard-hit by its failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

In 2003, Admiral Ayalon founded the People’s Voice, a grassroots movement that, together with Palestinian professor Sari Nusseibeh, formulated a set of principles for a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. To date, over 400,000 people from both sides have signed the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles.

In 2005, Admiral Ayalon was elected to a senior Labor Party seat in the Knesset, and served on the several committees, including as Chair of the Knesset Subcommittee on National Emergency Readiness. In 2007, Admiral Ayalon joined Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's cabinet where he served until 2009.

Having formally retired from politics, Admiral Ayalon serves as Chairman of the Executive Committee of Haifa University, leading research on terror, ethics and international law. He is chair of AKIM, a charity for people with intellectual disabilities. He holds two degrees from Bar-Ilan University: a BA in Economics and Political Science and an MA in law, in addition to an MA in Public Administration from Harvard University. He is a graduate of the Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island.

The countries sandwiched between Russia and the European Union are not fully independent actors in regional and international politics: they cannot join the EU or NATO and do not wish to form a community dominated by Russia. Most of of these ‘in-between state’ are caught in a political impasse and security deadlock. This lecture will consider the argument that partnership between Russia and Europe will remain strained as long as the status quo for these states persists.

Marie Mendras is Professor at Sciences Po University and Research Fellow with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. She runs the Observatoire de la Russie, a study group and workshop a at the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales in Paris.

In 2008-2010, Marie Mendras was Professor in the Government Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Along with her academic work, she worked as a consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Ministry (1983-1991) and for the Directorate for Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence (1992-1998).

Her publications deal with Russian political developments and foreign policy. She is on the editorial board of the journals Esprit and Pro et Contra and is the author of Russie. L’envers du pouvoir (Odile Jacob, 2008) to be published in English in June 2011 (Hurst, London, and Columbia University Press, New York).

Co-sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies.

Frédéric Mitterrand is the French Minister of Culture and Communication. Throughout his career, he has been an actor, screenwriter, television presenter, writer, producer and director.

Sponsored by The France-Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, The San Francisco French Consulate, The Stanford Humanities Center and The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University.

About the speaker:

Dr. Franz Cede is a retired Austrian diplomat who served as the Austrian Ambassador to Russia (1999-2003) and to NATO (2003-2007). He also was the Legal Advisor to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. He has a strong California connection dating back to the time when he was the Austrian Consul General in Los Angeles 20 years ago. Dr Cede holds the degree "Doctor of Law" from Innsbruck University. He received an M.A. in international affairs from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., and is currently an associate professor at the Andrassy University in Budapest, Hungary. Dr. Cede has published several books and articles in the field of international relations, international law and diplomacy.

Jointly sponsored by The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Audio Synopsis:

In this talk, Dr. Cede details his views on Russia's evolving relationships with the EU, NATO, and the US, drawing on his experiences as Austrian ambassador to the Soviet Union from1999 to 2003. Cede first outlines his perceptions of present-day Russia-US and Russia-NATO relations. Russia, he explains, still thinks in Cold War terms of bilateral relations and considers the United States to be its primary strategic partner on global security issues, especially in light of the Obama administration's recent "reset" of relations and ratification of the new START treaty. In contrast, Russia views NATO as outdated and yet still a threat. Its expansion to the East is viewed with suspicion by Putin's administration, which considers these developments to be distinctly anti-Russian. Russia engages with NATO only to the extent that it believes it can influence the organization's behavior and policies toward Moscow.  Still, in Cede's experience, the NATO-US-Russia triangle continues to be at the forefront of Russian policymakers' dialogue. Russian leaders prefer to avoid dealing with the EU because it lacks a coherent foreign policy, and also because Russia prefers bilateral relations with countries that offer a strategic benefit. Dr. Cede quotes Timothy Garton Ash, who wrote in a recent op-ed that "much of the Russian foreign policy elite treats the European Union as a kind of transient, post-modern late 20th century anachronism: flawed in principle, and feeble in practice. What matters in the 21st century, as much as it did in the 19th century, is the...determination of great powers." Dr. Cede cites the Georgian military intervention and recent Ukrainian gas crisis as examples of Russia's renewed attempts to reestablish dominance in its neighborhood.  

In the second portion of his talk Dr. Cede traces the evolution of Russian views of the EU and NATO.  Ten years ago, the EU-Russia relationship was largely ignored in the Russian media. When Cede asked Russian citizens for their views on the EU, they "either didn't know or didn't care." As Ambassador, Dr. Cede found Russian officials better informed, but  disdainful of being given orders by EU donors and "treated like a developing country." Cede illustrates this dynamic by recounting the 2004 incident in which the EU forced the residents of Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast region to apply for EU Shengen visas, which then required special permits to travel throughout Russia.  Western assurances that EU expansion to the east was not an attack on Russia but rather an attempt to extend stability to the Eastern bloc fell on deaf ears. Cede believes that notwithstanding Russia's attitude, the country is too big to ever join the EU, or to be influenced by Europe in its policy decisions. Because Russia still views itself as "one of the poles in a multipolar world," Dr. Cede insists that any change must come from within the country. However, Cede views Russia's candidacy to the WTO, which would require a clearer commitment to democracy and open economic policies, as a glimmer of hope.

Finally, Dr. Cede outlines several "permanent" features of Russia's relationship with the world, including economic interdependence, lack of cooperation on security policy, and weak relations with stateless organizations like the EU and NATO. He lays out several recommendations, which are elaborated on during the Q&A session:

1. EU policymakers and other Western powers (notably the US) should strengthen their common Russia policy. Given the EU's dependence on Russia for oil and gas, it should also diversify its own energy sources to strengthen its bargaining position.
2. The EU should consider membership for "bridge countries" such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.
3. Personal diplomacy between universities, civil society, and citizens is important.  This includes reevaluation of visa policy. Cede hopes that the advent of the internet will also help improve attitudes between Russia and the rest of the world.