The Europe Center is jointly housed in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Stanford Global Studies Division.
FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.
They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.
FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.
FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.
The 1400 page Lexikon der Geisteswissenschaften (Encyclopedia of the Humanities) offers a co
The 1400 page Lexikon der Geisteswissenschaften (Encyclopedia of the Humanities) offers a co
This article sketches the outlines of a contemporary inter- and transdisciplinary methodology to understand the current global change. It gives a short overview over the seven-fold approach of the author called “System Action Theory”, which tries to integrate the typological discourses and systemic order patterns of politics, economics, culture, religion, technology and demography. According to the author, the “global systemic shift” is nevertheless not reducable to the sum of these six dimensions, but is “more than the sum of its parts” and thus a seventh dimension which has to be understood through its inbuilt dialectics, conflicts and (productive) contradictions. Because most relevant problems in the globalized world get multidimensional, plurifaceted and ambiguous, no single discipline will be able to achieve a sound, complex-adequate analysis anymore. Instead, an inter- and transdisciplinary stance will always be more necessary.
Transitions in technology are shaping, defining and establishing the future of the globalized social sphere with increasing pace and impact. As seen from a systemic viewpoint, the overall process seems to consist of a two-fold movement, in which an outer process of transition is joined by an inner transformational drive. While new social media like Facebook, Twitter, webcams, smartphones and iPads change the outer dimension of how we perceive, interpret and handle our social lives, thus transforming our habits of cultural consumption, contemporary brain and consciousness research are changing the inner dimension of the contemporary social by dramatically re-shaping the self-perception and interpretation of the individual through the findings, cultural distribution and practical applications of neuroscience and neurotechnology, thus questioning the conceptual cornerstones of sociality as conceived by Western modernity. This two-fold argument examines both processes from the inside out and the outside in. As such, the primary task as at now may not be trying to “explain” the meaning(s) of the new developments, but rather to identify an array of crucial questions at the inter- and trans-disciplinary crossroads between the different societal fields, culturo-political trends and scientific disciplines.
This two-fold paper discusses 15 years of privatization of Italian cultural and architectural heritage between 1996 and 2010. The paper is composed by I) an introductory talk between Salvatore Settis und Roland Benedikter, and II) an essay by Roland Benedikter. It builds upon a 2004 publication by Roland Benedikter in the International Journal of Heritage Studies (IJHS), London. The present paper is one of the first attempts to get an overall view of the privatization process of Italian cultural and architectural heritage of the past 15 years. Part I is an easy to read introduction into the outstandingly complex topic. Part II is an in-depth elaboration that builds upon a review of the history of Italian heritage conservation, including the laws of the “Berlusconi culture” since the second half of the 1990s. It discusses some case studies and assesses the perspectives of the process at its 15-year-anniversary. The importance of the issue derives from the fact that the privatization process of Italian cultural heritage, numerically speaking the most important in Europe and one of the most important in the world, can be seen as to some extent exemplary for the development of the sector in Europe, including both its ambivalences and chances.
Following the Second Industrial Revolution, Western medicine has become an interwoven enterprise of humanitarian and technologic values. In this essay, we posited that rather than being seen as a means toward achieving the ends of providing technically right and morally sound pain care, the resources and goods of pain medicine have been subordinated to a market-based values system that regards these tools as ends unto themselves. We argued that this approach is 1) pragmatically inapt, in that it fails to acknowledge and provide those tools as rightly necessary for the “good” of pain medicine to be enacted; and is therefore 2) morally unsound, in that the good, while recognized, is not afforded, thereby disserving the fiduciary of science/technology, medicine, and economics. We framed these issues within 1) the context(s) and effects of postmodernism and 2) the increasing call for a globally relevant and applicable system of pain care. Toward this latter end, we addressed how policies can be created that accommodate differing social values, and still enable the execution of care in ways that are morally sound, yet economically viable. We posited that such policies need to be finely grained so as to 1) sustain research in pain diagnosis, assessment, treatment, and management; 2) translate research efforts into clinically relevant resources; 3) enable availability and just distribution of both low- and high-tech resources; and 4) prompt fiscal programs that support, allow, and reinforce responsible choice (of such resources) as socioculturally required, valued, and valid.
Silvio Berlusconi has been a force in Italian politics during the past two decades. As the country’s prime minister and richest man, the media mogul managed to slip through sex scandals and criminal charges only to be forced out of office by Europe’s debt crisis.
As a new government led by economist Mario Monti takes place, Ronald Spogli talks about Berlusconi’s fall, what’s next for Italy and whether the United States should get involved in the eurozone’s tailspin. Spogli, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Italy from 2005 to 2009, is a Stanford trustee and major benefactor to the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
What will Italy’s government look like under Mario Monti, and how will it trim the country’s $2.5 trillion debt?
Monti is an economist by training and has been president of Bocconi University, Italy’s most prestigious business school. He was the European Commissioner and that position earned him international influence and experience. So here’s somebody who has economic savvy, institutional gravitas, and the ability to be perceived as above politics.
The new government is expected to carry out the stability program enacted immediately before Berlusconi’s resignation on Saturday. This law contemplates asset sales to reduce debt, among other measures. The idea of a wealth tax has been floated in Italy – which by most measures is the richest country on the continent – as a way to immediately and significantly pay down the nation’s debt.
The Monti government is likely to consider this and other options to reduce the country’s indebtedness. However, it will have to gain parliamentary approval for any new laws. And depending on the nature of the bill proposed, passage of legislation could prove problematic.
How did Berlusconi manage to survive sex scandals and corruption charges, only to be brought down by Italy’s financial crisis?
I think he survived because for most Italians, his personal life was less relevant than his actions and promises as a politician who could do good things for Italy.
He came into power in 1994, and his ability to dominate Italian politics for nearly two decades has been the main story. He came in with an expectation that as Italy’s richest man and as a successful businessman, he would help jumpstart a country that had begun to stall economically. The notion was that after stagnation had begun to creep in, Silvio Berlusconi was the person to break the logjam and move Italy forward.
But for the last 20 years, Italy has had half the economic growth rate of Europe. That’s the biggest issue against Berlusconi. But nobody is 100 percent convinced that he’s really gone for good. He has an amazing ability to resurrect himself. He’s proven that throughout his political career.
How does Italy’s debt burden fit in to the rest of Europe’s economic woes?
Image
In terms of the sheer magnitude of the problem, the Italian circumstance dwarfs Greece’s situation and the ability of the initiatives meant to deal with other countries’ crises. The issue is whether the new Italian government will be able to calm the bond markets.
Restoring credibility is absolutely vital. The fundamental concern is that there’s no offered solution to an Italian debt problem. There is no bailout being contemplated that’s big enough to be able to deal with the issue, unlike Greece.
The euro crisis has claimed the political lives of prime ministers in Greece, Spain and Italy. Can we expect more high-profile political casualties?
It’s interesting how the markets – in such a short period of time – have forced a political change that the internal Italian political system has been unable to achieve for quite some time. It’s difficult to speculate as to whether those forces will move to more counties. But it certainly wasn’t contemplated that they’d have this impact on Italy, so its fair to say that nothing is completely off the table.
In the United States, candidates vying for the Republican nomination in next year’s election say America shouldn’t get involved in Europe’s financial mess. Is that the right attitude?
Europe is extremely important to the United States. Not just for economic reasons, but for political reasons. This is a European problem to solve. On the other hand, if it gets to the point where it continues to have a very damaging impact on the world’s capital markets, I think the resolve to keep it as an isolated problem may fade.
Beyond the narrowly defined economic impact of the crisis, we have many issues of global security that we cannot effectively deal with without the help of Europeans. If they’re going to go into a pronounced period of economic contraction, that’s going to heavily impact their ability to be a great partner for us. Italy is a perfect example of this concern. We counted on its help in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Those are expensive missions, and if the country doesn’t grow its economy, it’s harder for them to be a great American ally. Italy’s economic situation extends to our basic international security interests.
Italy's economic crisis is the subject of a Nov. 18 presentation given by Roland Benedikter, a scholar at FSI's Europe Center.
Italy is the 8th biggest national economy in the world and the 3rd biggest in the Euro zone after Germany and France. Although it holds the third-largest gold reserves in the world, enjoys a high living standard with comparatively low private debts and is technologically innovative, as for example the recent takeover of parts of the U.S. car industry during the financial crisis 2008-11 underscored, it is currently considered to be the most vulnerable national economy threatened by the European debt crisis because of its huge public debt which reached 118% of the GDP in 2011. Although Italy is considered as "too big to fail" because it could hardly be saved by the European rescue funding programme with a GDP of more than 2.1 trillion Euro, there are fears that a further loss of trust by the international money markets could trigger an unprecedented crisis. Interest rates payed for Italian public debt rose to record numbers in fall 2011 due to the downgrading by leading rating agencies since summer 2011. The seminar gives a concise overview over the current state of affairs in Italy, including its debt and economic crises, and discusses their potential interweavement with the social crisis the country is undergoing in the view of international observers. In the age of media democracy, contextual political factors like social and cultural psychology, public appearances and symbolic events are increasingly impacting Italian politics and economics in ambivalent ways.
A podcast of this talk will soon be made available.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
In the last two decades there has been a sharp growth in the numbers of people that have been “expelled,” numbers far larger than the newly “incorporated” middle classes of countries such as India and China. I use the term “expulsion” to describe a diversity of conditions: the growing numbers of the abjectly poor, of the displaced in poor countries who are warehoused in formal and informal refugee camps, of the minoritized and persecuted in rich countries who are warehoused in prisons, of workers whose bodies are destroyed on the job and rendered useless at far too young an age, able-bodied surplus populations warehoused in ghettoes and slums. One major trend is the repositioning of what had been framed as sovereign territory, a complex conditions, into land for sale on the global market – land in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Central Asia and in Latin America to be bought by rich investors and rich governments to grow food, to access underground water tables, and to access minerals and metals. My argument is that these diverse and many other kindred developments amount to a logic of expulsion, signaling a deeper systemic transformation in advanced capitalism, one documented in bits and pieces but not quite narrated as an overarching dynamic that is taking us into a new phase of global capitalism. The paper is based on the author’s forthcoming book Expulsions.
Saskia Sassen is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology and Co-Chair, The Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University (www.saskiasassen.com). Her recent books are Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press 2008), A Sociology of Globalization (W.W.Norton 2007), both translated into Spanish by Editorial Katz (Madrid y Buenos Aires), and the 4th fully updated edition of Cities in a World Economy (Sage 2012). Among older books is The Global City (Princeton University Press 1991/2001). Her books are translated into over 20 languages. She is the recipient of diverse awards and mentions, ranging from multiple doctor honoris causa to named lectures and being selected as one of the 100 Top Global Thinkers of 2011 by Foreign Policy Magazine.
Recommended readings:
Sponsored by The Europe Center, the Abassi Program in Islamic Studies, and the Mediterranean Studies Forum
CISAC Conference Room
Ronald I. McKinnon is an applied economist whose primary interests are international economics and economic development-with strong secondary interests in transitional economies and fiscal federalism. Understanding financial institutions in general, and monetary institutions in particular, is central to his teaching and research. His interests range from the proper regulation of banks and financial markets in poorer countries to the historical evolution of global and regional monetary systems. His books, numerous articles in professional journals, and op-eds in the financial press such as The Economist, The Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal reflect this range of interests.
Event Summary
Professor McKinnon first outlines the two major assumptions behind his paper (available on this page). First, that from December 2008 to August 2011, an inflow of "hot money" to emerging economies resulted from low U.S., European, and Japanese interest rates. Since then, the trend has reversed in the wake of the European banking crisis and bank lending has fallen. Second, the dollar remains the widespread central bank reserve currency despite instability in the U.S. system.
McKinnon voices concern about Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke's zero interest rate policy, calling it an overreaction to the crisis and a "lose-lose" policy as it deters investment in the U.S. while simultaneously spurring destabilizing hot money flows to surrounding emerging markets. These countries are in turn forced to suppress interest rates to mitigate the inflows, and to build up dollar reserves to keep exchange rates in check. The zero interest rate policy also stimulates carry trades in commodities by speculators.
The belief that under a zero interest rate regime, inflation will stimulate the economy by bringing real interest rates to negative levels, is misplaced in McKinnon's view. He argues that this simply adds uncertainty and interferes with efficient bank intermediation, as banks hold high excess reserves and tighten lending, causing a procyclical contraction as has been seen in the United States and Europe. He contrasts this approach with China, which stabilized its economy following the “dot-com” bust by expanding rather than contracting bank credit. He criticizes U.S. pressure on China to appreciate or float its currency, asserting that these strategies would fail to reduce China's trade surplus.
McKinnon suggests that international reforms should target interest rates instead of exchange rates. He recommends coordination between central banks of the major industrialized countries, especially the United States, European countries, and Japan - to collectively raise interest rates to approximately 2%. This would improve overall bank intermediation, and would benefit both central and peripheral countries in Europe.
A question and answer session following the talked addressed topics including: the likelihood of a coordinated effort between central banks; the potential effects of Kucinich's monetary reform proposal; the potential negative effects on real growth from carry trades, and whether this is a cause for concern; and the effects of bank borrowing trends in Europe on the European monetary system.
CISAC Conference Room