According to Professor Muiznieks, since the early 1990s, the Baltic states have been seen as unfriendly in the eyes of Russians due to their "return to the West" attitude. Professor Muiznieks explains the key features of Baltic-Russian relations while looking at how these problems may be resolved in the future.

Synopsis

Professor Muiznieks begins by discussing the less than warm relations between the Baltic states and Russia. He explains how this is particularly due to the Baltic states’ desire to “return to the West” since the early 1990s and escape Russian influence after so many years of occupation. This is particularly evident in the EU and the UN where Poland and Baltic States form a sort of anti-Russian “axis.” However, the Baltic states’ membership of such organizations means a share of their secrets, which, as Professor Muiznieks explains, the Russians subsequently exploit for intelligence purposes.

At the same time, Professor Muiznieks cites another crucial security issue for the Baltic states, energy security. Currently, there is less oil transit through the Baltic states then there was before; Professor Muiznieks believes this has helped issues of corruption. However, he notes energy companies still play a significant role both locally and in relations with Russia. Looking the future, Professor Muiznieks believes that while there are options for the Baltic states to lessen their electrical dependence on Russia by looking to Scandinavia, the shutting of Lithuania’s nuclear plant will most likely mean Latvia and Lithuania will turn to Russia for further supply. To Professor Muiznieks, the current situation holds opportunities but also many risks.

Unfortunately, the strategic power-plays continue on another platform, memory wars. Professor Muiznieks feels World War II is the key point of debate between the Baltic states and Russia. While Russia sees the war as a great triumph, the Baltic states view the conflict as a catastrophe which led to further occupation. Professor Muiznieks discusses the fact that this battle plays out locally through monuments or textbooks but also internationally through border disputes and UN resolutions. He cites the European Court of Human Rights as a new strategic arena for this war because of its utmost authority on the continent and the fact that its rulings can cement one group as victims and force others to pay compensation.  However, Professor Muiznieks believes any truce is unlikely. For him, this conflict is too linked to many personal family histories and not government based enough to be put to a real end.

Professor Muiznieks also looks to “compatriots” as a focal point of Baltic-Russian relations. “Compatriots,” in this case, are Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in the Baltic states. This issue is serious because Russian speakers comprise over a quarter of both Latvia and Estonia’s populations. Professor Muiznieks explains that tension was caused in the Baltic states after Russia’s war with Georgia as to how Russian policy would change towards its diasporas. In addition, Professor Muiznieks reveals that there is further concern over the possibility that Russia is encouraging speakers abroad to take up citizenship to create legal basis for any action against other states in the future. Professor Muiznieks also argues that funding for these “compatriots” is perhaps to counteract increasing EU influence in the region.

Overall, Professor Muiznieks believes that the Baltic states are seriously suffering from the global economic crisis which in turn is making it difficult for them to counteract Russian policy and be effective. Professor Muiznieks argues this makes the Baltic states quite vulnerable.

In a lengthy question-and-answer session, a multitude of points were raised. One of the key issues addressed was where the Baltic States, and in particular Latvia, fit in the European framework. This led to discussion of several other issues such as Scandanivia's changing role in the Baltic States, the role of the Baltic States in NATO, and language integration. Finally, another possibility much emphasized was the potential creation of nuclear power plants as a way to offset surging prices for Russian energy.

Ambassador Sheinwald discusses how he envisages international relations will form in the near and far future. He places particular emphasis on the growing importance of the US-China relationship. At the same time, Ambassador Sheinwald explores the EU as a key global power and its necessary cooperation with the US.

Synopsis

Ambassador Sheinwald clearly feels that the international stage is moving. In fact, for him, the change in the international order is accelerating due to the global financial crisis. In this sense, Ambassador Sheinwald explains that the UK has long supported expanding decision-making international institutions such as the UN Security Council. However, the UK still sees the value in intimate, power-focused bodies such as the G8. Ambassador Sheinwald discusses the fact that there is increasingly a sense that a ‘G2’ is developing between the US and China. To Ambassador Sheinwald, this model would not literally work as he argues China needs, at this stage in its development, a multilateral setting to grow into the active and cooperative power we would all like to see it become. At the same time, Ambassador Sheinwald believes that the partnership between the US and China is important in paving a solution to the current economic state and shaping the future global economy. In fact, the UK and the EU welcome this new cooperation between the two powers. Ambassador Sheinwald feels the US and the EU can harness China’s shared global interest on issues such as climate change, in which the EU has played a front role, to develop at stable global relationship. Moreover, he believes that if the US and EU can cooperate to form low carbon economies, it could incentivize China and India to act similarly. However, Ambassador Sheinwald stresses that for non-economic issues the US and China’s relationship is still important but slow moving, and he expresses the belief that it will take decades for any real ‘G2’ to emerge.

In the meantime, Ambassador Sheinwald argues that while the US looks round the world for support on key issues, it will find that the EU shares the most values and has the capacity to promote them. He cites the enormous investments between the two in comparison to the US and China to show the scale of the US and the EU’s relationship. Ambassador Sheinwald argues that financially the US and EU need regulatory cooperation, using a scientific basis, to set global standards. He stresses as well that the EU is a major global power on its own. It is increasingly seen as an honest, multilateral broker and plays a crucial in global economic recovery. Moreover, it has strong interest in fighting world terrorism. In comparison to other partners, the US can find similar values, intelligence, and capacity in the EU. In addition, the US can see more stability in Europe’s own backyard than perhaps 20 years ago. Looking to the future, Ambassador Sheinwald hopes that the Lisbon Treaty would help the EU organize itself further. Further stressing the importance of the US-EU partnership, Ambassador Sheinwald explains “nothing is more likely to be as dependable a foundation.”

In taking the time to answer questions, Ambassador Sheinwald discusses a number of issues. One partiuclar area of focus much emphasized was Europe's role in the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, he addresses the issue of Britain and the US's relationship with China. Moreover, he also explains that he hopes that as developed countries deal with increasing security threats, their resolve in keeping their borders open will remain strong. Finally, Ambassador Sheinwald stresses the need to employ methods of sustainable, intelligent, and low carbon growth.

About the Speaker

Nigel Sheinwald joined the British Diplomatic Service in 1976 and has served in Washington (twice), Brussels (twice) and Moscow and in a wide range of policy jobs in London. 

He took up his position as British Ambassador to the United States in October 2007.  In that role he leads the Embassy in Washington and nine Consulates-General around the United States.   He had an earlier posting to Washington in 1983-87 as First Secretary (Political) in the Embassy. 

Before becoming Ambassador in Washington, Sir Nigel served as Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser to the Prime Minister from 2003-2007.

Sir Nigel was the UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the European Union in Brussels from 2000-2003.  Before that he was Europe Director in the FCO (1998-2000).  He had an earlier posting in the UK Representation in 1993-95 as Head of its Political and Institutional Section.  He began his career in EU work as Deputy Head of the FCO's European Union Department in 1989-92. 

Sir Nigel's first foreign posting was in Moscow in 1978-79.  He was also Head of the Foreign Office's Anglo-Soviet Section in 1981-83.

Sir Nigel has had a wide variety of other appointments in the FCO in London.  From 1995-98, he was the FCO Press Secretary and Head of News Department.  He was Deputy Head of the Foreign Office's Policy Planning Staff in 1987-1989, responsible for transatlantic relations and other issues.  He also worked in London on the Japan Desk (1976-77) and on Zimbabwe (1979-81), including the Lancaster House Conference.

Sir Nigel was born in 1953 and educated at Harrow County Grammar School and Balliol College, Oxford.  He is married with three sons.

This event is jointly sponsored by the Office for International Visitors at the Bechtel International Center, the Forum on Contemporary Europe, and the British Consulate General in San Francisco.

Latvia is a country that has come through a crisis before; can it do it again? Professor Stranga examines the current crisis in Latvia, a country much evolved over the past 50 years. He focuses on a variety of social, economic, and political factors in assessing how Latvia can move forward.

Synopsis

Prof. Stranga begins by examining what he calls Latvia’s “first great crisis” from 1929-1933. At the time, Latvia was a democracy, a member of the League of Nations, but critically had no security guarantees and was stuck between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Prof. Stranga explains that this crisis was overcome by the dictatorship of Karlis Ulmanis, whose regime lasted from 1934 until the Nazi occupation. Those years were seen as the ‘Golden Years,’ times of economic flourishing and national freedom from occupation. Prof. Stranga reveals this period had long lasting effects on the national psyche of Latvia.

To Prof. Stranga, Latvia is in a very different situation today. He argues that these are times of very limited sovereignty, particularly for his country. Prof. Stranga explains that this is mainly due to Latvia’s dependence on the EU, NATO, and the IMF which provide economic and military security. Prof. Stranga identifies the effects of Karlis Ulmanis’ regime as the perception in Latvia that a ‘strong man’ is needed to guide Latvia out of its current crisis. However, the necessity for Latvia to remain a democracy is made clear by the help it receives from the organizations mentioned above.

Although the help is clearly needed, Prof. Stranga feels that its consequences are often very painful. The IMF’s conditions for essentially saving Latvia’s economy include cutbacks in medical assistance and a reduction of teachers and schools, facets of public life deeply engrained in Latvia’s culture. In addition, Prof. Stranga examines the question of energy security. He looks particularly at Latvia’s absolute dependence on Russia exhibited by the fact that Gazprom’s first foreign office is in Latvia, and the fact that this has perhaps hindered Latvia’s progress.

At the same time, it seems clear that Prof. Stranga sees this crisis also as an opportunity. Firstly, he argues that now is probably the time to not be shy but to look for alternative energy sources such as nuclear energy, something Prof. Stranga further discussed when answering questions. Moreover, Prof. Stranga believes there are too many bureaucratic positions, and the crisis is an opportunity to cut these off and direct funding elsewhere. In addition, he feels the crisis is a chance to reconstruct exports. In particular, Prof. Stranga would like to see Latvia leaning more towards innovation rather than timber or agriculture. Finally, Prof. Stranga addresses Latvia’s issue of an internally divided society, particularly between Latvians and Russian speakers. He analyzes Latvian Russians’ diminishing impact as Russia’s economy falters but also expresses concern at the fact that Russian influence in Latvia seems to be heavily dependent on Russia’s economic state.

Prof. Stranga kindly takes the time to briefly answer a few questions and raises several issues in the process. Prof. Stranga cites Latvia's population reduction as perhaps the "greatest" problem it faces. However, he feels reassured by the help of the friendly states of Scandinavia and other organizations across the world. At the same time, Prof. Stranga explains such organizations are not having an entirely positive impact. In particular, he argues against the "inhuman" approach of solely focusing on cutting back capital of the IMF which he feels is an assault on Latvian life.

About the speaker

Aivars Stranga is professor and chair of the Department of History at the University of Latvia. He is the author of seven monographs and more than 150 scholarly and general publications on Latvian domestic and foreign policy andinternational relations between 1918 and 1940, and Latvian foreign policy from 1991 to 2000. Professor Stranga was a distinguished visiting professor at Stanford in 2003, teaching courses on Baltic History and the History of the Holocaust in the Baltics.

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Stanford Humanities Center, Department of History, Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.