Economic Affairs
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What do we know about wealth inequality and democracy? Our review shows that the simple conjectures that democracy produces wealth equality and that wealth inequality leads to democratic failure are not supported by the evidence. Why are democracy and high levels of wealth inequality sustainable together? Three key features of democratic politics can make this outcome possible. When societies are divided along cleavages other than wealth, this can inhibit the adoption of wealth-equalizing policies. Likewise, voter preferences for the redistribution of wealth depend on the beliefs they form about the fairness of these measures, and some voters without wealth may feel that redistribution is unfair. Finally, wealth-equalizing policies may be absent if the democratic process is captured by the rich; however, the evidence explaining when, where, and why capture accounts for variation in wealth inequality is less convincing than is often claimed. This phenomenon is a useful avenue for future research.

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Annual Review of Political Science
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David Stasavage
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Associate Professor, Political Science
Faculty Research Fellow at NBER
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PhD

Vicky Fouka is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER, and a Research Affiliate at CEPR. She is a political economist with interests in group identity and intergroup relations, culture, and historical social dynamics. Her articles are published in journals such as the American Political Science Review, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Politics, the Economic Journal, Public Opinion Quarterly, and Nature Human Behaviour. Her work has received the Joseph L. Bernd award for best paper published in the Journal of Politics, the Economic Journal Austin Robinson prize, and the best article award of the APSA Migration and Citizenship section. She holds a PhD in Economics from Pompeu Fabra University.

Fouka's research was featured in The Europe Center April 2018 Newsletter.

Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
CDDRL Affiliated Faculty
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Although sheep are only one of the important domesticates exploited in many parts of the world, it has played a near-paradigmatic role throughout the emergence and spread of European civilization. Domestic sheep and goat unambiguously originate from Southwest Asia where their wild ancestors live. Therefore sheep distributions across Europe represent an element of evident diffusion in the otherwise complex neolithization process. The numerical increase in sheep remains can be spectacular at Early Neolithic sites in Central Europe, even in habitats less than favorable for sheep. In various instances mutton outcompeted locally available pork in the diet as shown by animal remains from archaeological sites across Eurasia. Reasons for this trend seem to be diverse, ranging from greater pastoral mobility through secondary products (wool and dairy) to side effects of religious regulations such as the Iron Age taboo imposed on pork first documented in Judaism. Concomitant strict regulations concerning the “proper” way of slaughtering livestock link the increased dietary importance of sheep to the emergence of metallurgy, i.e. availability of quality blades.

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Image of László Bartosiewicz


László Bartosiewicz has worked as an archaeozoologist since 1979. He has studied animal-human relationships during various time periods in several countries of Europe and some in the Near East as well as South America. His research often has a cultural anthropological focus viewing animals as material culture. Recently he has specialized in animal palaeopathology. He published three books and over 350 academic papers. Following teaching positions at the Universities of Budapest (Hungary) and Edinburgh (UK), he currently heads the Osteoarchaeological Research Laboratory at Stockholm University (Sweden). He was twice elected president of the International Council for Archaeozoology (2006–2014).

 

 

This event is part of the Origins of Europe Series and is sponsored by the Stanford Archaeology Center and co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Archaeology Center, Building 500

László Bartosiewicz Speaker Stockholm University
Lectures
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What do we know about wealth inequality and democracy? Our review shows that the simple conjectures that democracy produces wealth equality and that wealth inequality leads to democratic failure are not supported by the evidence. Why are democracy and high levels of wealth inequality sustainable together? Three key features of democratic politics can make this outcome possible. When societies are divided along cleavages other than wealth, this can inhibit the adoption of wealth-equalizing policies. Likewise, voter preferences for the redistribution of wealth depend on the beliefs they form about the fairness of these measures, and some voters without wealth may feel that redistribution is unfair. Finally, wealth-equalizing policies may be absent if the democratic process is captured by the rich; however, the evidence explaining when, where, and why capture accounts for variation in wealth inequality is less convincing than is often claimed. This phenomenon is a useful avenue for future research.

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Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Annual Review of Political Science
Authors
David Stasavage
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This workshop is part of the Economic History Workshop series in the Department of Economics and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

351 Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

Peter Temin MIT
Workshops
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This workshop is part of the Economic History Workshop series in the Department of Economics and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

351 Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

Jose Espin-Sanchez Yale University
Workshops
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Daniel Stegmueller is a Professor of Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences at the Graduate School of Social and Economic Sciences, University of Mannheim. He is also an associate member of Nuffield College, University of Oxford, and of CAGE, University of Warwick. His research lies at the intersection of political economy and political behavior. He studies political preferences and choices in advanced industrialized societies, specifically individuals' preferences for redistribution and redistributive voting. He is interested in how these are shaped by social structure and institutions, but also by basic individual gcharacteristics, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills.

 

This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Daniel Stegmueller University of Mannheim
Workshops
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Torun Dewan is a political scientist at the London School of Economics. His main research is in political economy and in the formal and empirical analysis of decision making in political parties, legislatures and executives. Amongst other issues he has looked at how cabinets structure the incentives of ministers, how leadership acts as a coordinating focal point, how political parties aggregate dispersed information, and how elections provide incentives for policy experimentation.

 

This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Torun Dewan London School of Economics
Workshops
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What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Using unique archival data on collateralized lending, we show that personal experience can affect individual risk-taking and aggregate leverage. When an investor syndicate speculating in Amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt, many lenders were exposed. In the end, none of them actually lost money. Nonetheless, only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly; they lent with much higher haircuts. The rest continued largely as before. The differential change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge. Overall leverage in the Amsterdam stock market declined as a result.
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American Economic Review
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Peter Koudijs
Hans-Joachim Voth
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In recent decades inequality in the United States has increased dramatically, but policy responses in terms of redistribution have been limited. This is not easily explained by standard political economy theory, which predicts a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution. One set of explanations for this puzzle focuses on whether and why redistributive preferences are muted in the presence of high inequality. While much recent research has focused on citizens’ preferences over government spending, we argue that preferences over taxation are a central piece of this puzzle. This article implements an experimental conjoint survey design to measure American income tax preferences across six income brackets. We find that policy opinions are generally progressive but that preferences do not vary substantially from current tax policies, and support for taxing the rich is highly inelastic. We show that both economic and fairness concerns affect individual tax preferences and find that conflict is primarily over taxing high incomes.

 

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Journal Articles
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The Journal of Politics
Authors
Cameron Ballard-Rosa
Lucy Martin
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