Economic Affairs

Modern European states have significant responsibilities to their populace, including ensuring that citizens’ basic needs are met and the provision of security, law and order, and other public goods. In spite of these common obligations, there exist significant variations in how European states prioritize and fund programs designed to meet their responsibilities. Recognizing the integral connection between state finance and the social, political, and economic conditions, The Europe Center supports scholarly, interdisciplinary research on public finance in European states.

Paragraphs

The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about economic policy. This article investigates whether self-centered inequity aversion along with self-interest influences individual tax policy opinions. We conduct original survey experiments in France and the United States, and provide evidence that individuals care about both how policy alternatives affect their own interests and how they influence the welfare of others relative to themselves.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Comparative Political Studies
Authors
Xiabo Lü
Number
49(14)
Paragraphs
We study the impact of the introduction of a form of bankruptcy protection on household investment in the U.S. South in the 1840s, which predated modern bankruptcy laws. During this period, certain southern states passed laws that protected married women's property from seizure in the case of insolvency, amending the common law default which vested a wife's property in her husband and thus allowed it to be seized for the repayment of his debts. Importantly, these laws only applied to newlyweds. We compare couples married after the passage of a law with couples from the same state who married before the passage of a law. Since states passed laws at different points in time, we can exploit variation in protection conditional on state and year of marriage. We find that the effect on household investment was heterogeneous: if most household wealth came from the husband (wife), the law led to an increase (decrease) in investment. This is consistent with a simple model where downside protection leads to both an increase in the demand for credit and a reduction in supply. Demand effects will only dominate if a modest fraction of total wealth is protected.
All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
NBER Working Paper Series
Authors
Peter Koudijs
Laura Salisbury
Number
21952
Paragraphs

What explains the sharp divide among European publics over the Grexit? We explore this question using original surveys from four of the largest European economies. We contend that differences in citizens' own economic interests, as well as the often-mentioned chasm between supporters of mainstream and extremist parties, provide little insight into the public divide over the Grexit. Instead, we show that the key factor is the split between the left and right. We then develop and test a set of theoretical explanations for this cleavage. We find that the left-right divide over the Grexit is not driven by differences in attitudes on redistribution, levels of empathy, or general EU support. Instead, we find that the primary mechanism is that left and right voters have different expectations about the impact of a Grexit on the European economy as a whole. These expectations largely reflect differences in core beliefs about the promise of a free-market approach.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Social Science Research Network
Authors
Kirk Bansak
Michael M. Bechtel
Jens Hainmueller
Yotam Margalit
Paragraphs
This study tests the hypothesis that lean manufacturing improves the social performance of manufacturers in emerging markets. We analyze an intervention by Nike, Inc., to promote the adoption of lean manufacturing inits apparel supply chain across 11 developing countries. Using difference-in-differences estimates from a panel of more than 300 factories, we find that lean adoption was associated with a 15 percentage point reduction in noncompliance with labor standards that primarily reflect factory wage and work hour practices. However, we find a null effect on factory health and safety standards. This pattern is consistent with a causal mechanism that links lean to improved social performance through changes in labor relations, rather than improved management systems. These findings offer evidence that capability-building interventions may reduce social harm in global supply chains.

 

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Management Science
Authors
Greg Distelhorst
Jens Hainmueller
Richard M. Locke
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

At a recent European Security Initiative (ESI) lecture held at the GSB's Oberndorf Event Center, Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the US, described US-Russia relations as being at its worse point since the end of the Cold War.

Ambassador Kislyak then went on to list the series of US actions that he believes led up to this.  

Moderated by Michael McFaul, the Director of FSI, Professor of Political Science, and former US Ambassador to Russia, the lecture drew a large audience of over 200 students, faculty, staff and members of the public. 

To listen to the lecture in its entirety, please visit our YouTube Channel.

All News button
1
-

Image
Image of The Great Leveler book cover
DUE TO THE OVERWHELMING RESPONSE FOR THIS EVENT, WE ARE NOW FULLY BOOKED AND UNABLE TO TAKE FURTHER RSVPS.

 

Are mass violence and catastrophes the only forces that can seriously decrease economic inequality? To judge by thousands of years of history, the answer is “Yes.” Tracing the global history of inequality from the Stone Age to today, Walter Scheidel shows that inequality never dies peacefully. Periods of increased equality are usually born of carnage and disaster and are generally short-lived, disappearing with the return of peace and stability. The Great Leveler is the first book to chart the crucial role of violent shocks in reducing inequality over the full sweep of human history around the world.

Ever since humans began to farm, herd livestock, and pass on their assets to future generations, economic inequality has been a defining feature of civilization. Over thousands of years, only violent shocks have significantly lessened inequality. The “Four Horsemen” of leveling—mass-mobilization warfare, transformative revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic plagues—have repeatedly destroyed the fortunes of the rich. Scheidel identifies and examines these processes, from the crises of the earliest civilizations to the cataclysmic world wars and communist revolutions of the twentieth century. Today, the violence that reduced inequality in the past seems to have diminished, and that is a good thing. But it casts serious doubt on the prospects for a more equal future.

An essential contribution to the debate about inequality, The Great Leveler provides important new insights about why inequality is so persistent—and why it is unlikely to decline any time soon.

 

Image
Image of Walter Scheidel

 

Walter Scheidel is the Dickason Professor in the Humanities, Professor of classics and history, and a Kennedy-Grossman Fellow in Human Biology at Stanford University. The author or editor of sixteen previous books, he has published widely on premodern social and economic history, demography, and comparative history.

 

 

Walter Scheidel Dickason Professor in the Humanities Speaker Stanford University
Lectures
Paragraphs

What types of asylum seekers are Europeans willing to accept? We conducted a conjoint experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in 15 European countries to evaluate 180,000 profiles of asylum seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes. Asylum seekers who have higher employability, have more consistent asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are Christian rather than Muslim received the greatest public support. These results suggest that public preferences over asylum seekers are shaped by sociotropic evaluations of their potential economic contributions, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness of their claims, and anti-Muslim bias. These preferences are similar across respondents of different age, education, income, and political ideology, as well as across the surveyed countries. This public consensus on what types of asylum seekers to accept has important implications for theory and policy.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Science
Authors
Kirk Bansak
Jens Hainmueller
Dominik Hangartner
-

According to the OECD, corporate taxation has steadily fallen since 1994 and today represents around 8.5 per cent of all taxes raised by governments across the globe. The proliferation of tax-efficient structures that route profits to low tax countries in the form of interest payments and royalties has been a big drain on revenues. The European Commission has made several unfruitful attempts to coordinate ‘anti-avoidance’ measures. In a recent effort to crack down on ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ [BEPS] to safeguard the future of corporate tax and curb competition between Member States based aggressive tax rulings, the European Commission has embarked on a ‘fairness’ crusade using antitrust prerogatives. Apple, Starbucks, Amazon, McDonalds and many more others have been accused of benefiting from illegal State aid resulting in orders to pay (back) billions of euros. Are American companies really being targeted by the European Commission? How will corporate taxation in the European Union evolve from here?


Image
Photo of Jacques Derenne (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Brussels)

Jacques Derenne is the head of the EU Competition & Regulatory practice at Sheppard Mullin’s Brussels office.  He has over 28 years of competition law experience in all areas (mergers, cartels, abuses of dominance and State aid), in EU regulatory and related competition law issues in a variety of regulated industries such as energy, the postal sector, aviation, railways, telecoms, satellites, the audio-visual sector and tobacco products. He regularly appears at competition hearings before the European Commission, and pleads cases before the General Court and the Court of Justice of the EU, national competition authorities, the Belgian and French courts and various regulatory bodies.

Jacques' State aid experience spans more than two decades, during which time he has acted for beneficiaries, competitors and Member States before the European Commission, EU courts and national courts. He co-directed and co-authored studies for the European Commission on the enforcement of State aid rules at the national level (2006 and 2009), which contributed to the Commission's Recovery and Enforcement Notices in 2007 and 2009 respectively. He co-edited a book on the Enforcement of EU State aid law at national level - 2010 - Reports from the 27 Member States (Lexxion, October 2010), and has written quarterly comments on State aid case law and the Commission’s decisional practice in the journal Concurrences since 2004 (together with EU officials).

Jacques also publishes widely on various other EU constitutional, competition and regulatory issues.  He is a founding member of the Global Competition Law Centre (College of Europe, Scientific Council and Executive Committee). He graduated from the University of Liège (Belgium, 1987) and from the College of Europe (Bruges, 1988), and teaches competition law (State aid aspects) at the University of Liège and at the Brussels School of Competition.

Image
Photo of Yaniss Aiche (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Brussels)

Yaniss Aiche is a Counsel in the EU Competition and Regulatory Practice in Brussels. His practice focuses on the intersection between public policy, government affairs and legal advocacy. He brings corporations, financial institutions, non-profit organizations and government bodies an integrated strategic insight that combines a deep legal, political and business expertise to help them with policy risk assessments and compliance, monitor relevant policy developments and effectively advocate their interests towards key EU institutions and EMEA governments.

Yaniss has over 15 years of experience in EU Policy, international trade and strategic business development. Yaniss started his career in 2000 in Brussels as an expert advisor on international trade and trade negotiations within the WTO's Doha Development Agenda where he advised governments, corporations and trade associations on a range of intricate political and legal challenges including investment promotion, cultural services and goods, defense contracting an free trade. In 2007, Yaniss joined AHEL, the consulting arm of The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London where he focused on advising F500 companies at executive and board level on geopolitical and military risk, investment policy development. In this role he supported the business expansion of European and US companies in the Far and Near East.

In more recent years Yaniss has worked in senior positions for leading global law firms assisting them with their regional expansion, client development strategies and legal services packaging.

Yaniss holds a JD from the University of Gent, a Masters from UC Berkeley and an MBA from Chicago Booth.

Jacques Derenne Partner, Head of EU Competition & Regulatory Speaker Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Brussels
Yaniss Aiche Counsel EU Policy and EMEA Government Affairs Speaker Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Brussels
Panel Discussions

Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

0
Visiting Scholar at The Europe Center, 2016-2017
thumbnail_website_markus_tepe_.jpg

Markus Tepe is a professor of Political Science (Political System of Germany) at the University of Oldenburg. He holds a doctoral degree from the Free University of Berlin (FU Berlin) and an MA in Political Science, Public Law and Economic Policy from the University of Münster. His research centers on public policies, political economy, and laboratory experiments in social science research. Currently, he is conducting a research project on need-based justice and redistribution (FOR2104) funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

Subscribe to Economic Affairs