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Visiting Student Researcher at The Europe Center, 2016-2017
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Jaakko Meriläinen is a Visiting Student Researcher from the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University, Sweden. His primary area of research is Political Economics with empirical emphasis, and he is also interested in Economic and Political History as well as immigration-related questions. Jaakko's current research concerns political careers, economic consequences of political representation, historical development of voting behavior and historical impacts of time saving technologies on women's labor force and political participation.

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The United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union this summer promises to fundamentally alter the political and economic future of the UK and the rest of the European Union. Stanford faculty Nick Bloom and Christophe Crombez will lead a discussion about the future of the UK's relationship with Europe and Brexit's most important political and economic consequences.

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Nicholas (Nick) Bloom is the William Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University, a Senior Fellow of SIEPR, and the Co-Director of the Productivity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship program at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research focuses on management practices and uncertainty. He previously worked at the UK Treasury and McKinsey & Company.

Nick is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the recipient of the Alfred Sloan Fellowship, the Bernacer Prize, the European Investment Bank Prize, the Frisch Medal, the Kauffman Medal and a National Science Foundation Career Award. He has a BA from Cambridge, an MPhil from Oxford, and a PhD from University College London.

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Christophe Crombez is a political economist who specializes in European Union politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions and their impact on policies, EU institutional reform, party politics, and parliamentary government. Crombez is Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (since 1999). He teaches Introduction to European Studies and The Future of the EU in Stanford’s International Relations Program. Furthermore, he is Professor of Political Economy at KU Leuven in Belgium (since 1994). His teaching responsibilities in Leuven include Political Business Strategy and Applied Game Theory. Crombez obtained a B.A. in Applied Economics from KU Leuven in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University in 1994.

 

Nicholas Bloom William Eberle Professor of Economics; Senior Fellow, SIEPR; Co-Director of the Productivity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship Program, NBER Panelist Department of Economics

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Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center
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Christophe Crombez is a political economist who specializes in European Union (EU) politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions and their impact on policies, EU institutional reform, lobbying, party politics, and parliamentary government.

Crombez is Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (since 1999). He teaches Introduction to European Studies and The Future of the EU in Stanford’s International Relations Program, and is responsible for the Minor in European Studies and the Undergraduate Internship Program in Europe.

Furthermore, Crombez is Professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven in Belgium (since 1994). His teaching responsibilities in Leuven include Political Business Strategy and Applied Game Theory. He is Vice-Chair for Research at the Department for Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation.

Crombez has also held visiting positions at the following universities and research institutes: the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, in Florence, Italy, in Spring 2008; the Department of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy, in Spring 2004; the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, in Winter 2003; the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, Illinois, in Spring 1998; the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in Summer 1998; the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in Spring 1997; the University of Antwerp, Belgium, in Spring 1996; and Leti University in St. Petersburg, Russia, in Fall 1995.

Crombez obtained a B.A. in Applied Economics, Finance, from KU Leuven in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University in 1994.

Senior Research Scholar Panelist The Europe Center
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In studies of cultural globalisation, the influence of communist regimes on Western Europe has remained under-theorised and little explored. Addressing this gap in research, this article puts forward the glocalisation grid of world-polity theory as a means for conceptualising and investigating how East European communist regimes helped shape the evolution of West European welfare states during the Cold War. The article re-traces the 1960s struggle over expert discourse within the International Labour Organization (ILO) in which communist regimes, including Yugoslavia and Poland, struggled to win the bureaucratic legitimacy of the ILO for their domestic policies. In focus are vertical, horizontal and temporal dimensions of glocalisation and the ensuing perceived or superficial similarity – so-called isomorphism – of legislation on worker participation in decision-making at the workplace. The article maps the timing of reforms across Europe, showing how East European reforms preceded and were co-constitutive to a pan-European process of policy isomorphism.

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European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology
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Astrid Hedin
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European governments are struggling with the biggest refugee crisis since World War II, but there exists little evidence regarding how the management of the asylum process affects the subsequent integration of refugees in the host country. We provide new causal evidence about how one central policy parameter, the length of time that refugees wait in limbo for a decision on their asylum claim, affects their subsequent economic integration. Exploiting exogenous variation in wait times and registry panel data covering refugees who applied in Switzerland between 1994 and 2004, we find that one additional year of waiting reduces the subsequent employment rate by 4 to 5 percentage points, a 16 to 23% drop compared to the average rate. This deleterious effect is remarkably stable across different subgroups of refugees stratified by gender, origin, age at arrival, and assigned language region, a pattern consistent with the idea that waiting in limbo dampens refugee employment through psychological discouragement, rather than a skill atrophy mechanism. Overall, our results suggest that marginally reducing the asylum waiting period can help reduce public expenditures and unlock the economic potential of refugees by increasing employment among this vulnerable population.

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Science Advances
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Jens Hainmueller
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Clifton B. Parker
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A British exit from the European Union would slow economic growth, reduce Europe's impact in world politics, and strengthen regimes such as Russia's that prefer a weaker, less united Europe, Stanford expert Christophe Crombez says.

The United Kingdom would lose more than it would gain if it left the European Union, a Stanford scholar said.

So would other European nations, and the real winners would be countries that seek to divide European unity, said Christophe Crombez, a consulting professor in Stanford’s Europe Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Britain is holding a referendum on June 23 to decide whether the country should leave or remain in the European Union.

“It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty,” said Crombez, who studies European Union politics, parliamentary systems, political economy and economic analysis of political institutions. He is an economist from Belgium.

The Stanford News Service recently interviewed Crombez on the upcoming vote, known as “Brexit.”

What is Brexit?

The term Brexit refers to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union allows member states to withdraw.

What are the arguments for and against Brexit?

The campaign for the UK to leave the EU uses the following main arguments: leaving would save UK taxpayers money, since the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget; the UK would no longer have to comply with EU laws it does not want, whereas currently it can be outvoted in EU institutions and forced to adopt laws it opposes; and it would allow the UK to better control migration, whereas EU citizens are currently free to move and work throughout the EU.

These three arguments can easily be refuted, however. The UK does indeed contribute to the EU budget, but the benefits it derives from being part of the EU market far outweigh the budgetary contributions. Moreover, (if Britain were to withdraw) the EU would require the UK to pay into its budget, if it wants to remain part of the EU’s internal market, as it has done with Switzerland and Norway.

Also, about half of UK exports are destined for the EU. If the UK were to leave, it would no doubt want to continue to trade with the EU. UK products would have to conform to EU rules for them to be sold in the EU. UK companies that want to export to the EU would thus continue to comply with EU rules. The difference would be that the UK would no longer be involved in setting those EU rules. Post-Brexit, the rules would thus be less to the UK’s liking than prior to it, and UK companies would comply to these less advantageous rules.

Finally, the EU would impose requirements on immigration and free movement of people on the UK in exchange for free trade with the EU, as it has with other countries in similar situations, such as Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, member states may no longer feel inclined to stop refugees from moving on to the UK if the UK were to leave, which may lead to higher rather than lower immigration.

In addition to these arguments, the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign (which supports the UK remaining in the EU) argues that Britain carries more weight in world politics as part of the EU than on its own, in trade negotiations as well as on security issues, and that a united Europe is better at dealing with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin and other authoritarian rulers, terrorist threats and international crime.

What do you think is the best decision for the United Kingdom to make on this vote?

I see no advantages to leaving the EU. It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty – consider the points above. The vote would have a negative impact on growth in the UK and the rest of the EU and, in fact, the world, and it would weaken the UK, the EU and the West in world politics.

What happens economically to Britain if the country leaves the European Union?

Trade and hence gross domestic product would be negatively affected, especially in the short term. Uncertainty would reduce investment and trade. The UK and the EU would be consumed with the negotiations on the break-up for years. This would prevent both the UK and EU from tackling more important economic and security issues. In the long term, the economy would readjust, but the result would be suboptimal.

What happens to the EU if Britain leaves?

The EU is less dependent on trade with the UK than vice versa. There would be an economic impact, but it would be less substantial. The effect would be more significant for a few countries that trade more with the UK, such as Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Brexit would, however, deliver a major blow to the idea of European unification. It would weaken the EU impact in world politics and strengthen such rulers as Putin and (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan in their dealings with the EU.

Could a British exit open up a Pandora’s Box of other EU countries exiting or spark other regional independence movements, like  Catalonia?

That is quite possible. A number of other countries may want to hold referendums on the EU. Moreover, Brexit is likely to lead to a break-up of the UK. Scotland would likely hold another referendum and decide to leave the UK in order to stay in the EU. The same may be true for Northern Ireland in the long run. Scottish secession may then give other EU regions, such as Catalonia, further incentives to secede.

 
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As the American presidential election nears, Stanford political scientist and TEC director Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage (New York University) argue that the next president could deal with voter resentment by ending lower effective tax rates for the wealthiest Americans.

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Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution
Professor of Law
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Deborah R. Hensler is the Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies Emerita at Stanford Law School, where she teaches courses on complex and transnational litigation, the legal profession, and empirical research methods. She co-founded the Law and Policy Laboratory at the law school with Prof. Paul Brest (emeritus). She is a member of the RAND Institute Civil Justice Board of Overseers and the Berkeley Law Civil Justice Initiative Advisory Board. From 2000-2005 she was the director of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation.

Prof. Hensler has written extensively on mass claims and class actions and is the lead author of Class Actions in Context: How Economics, Politics and Culture Shape Collective Litigation (2016) and Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (2000) and the co-editor of The Globalization of Class Actions (2009). Prof. Hensler has taught classes on comparative class actions and empirical research methods at the University of Melbourne (Australia) and Catolica Universidade (Lisboa) and held a personal chair in Empirical Legal Studies on Mass Claims at Tilburg University (Netherlands) from 2011-2017. In 2014 she was awarded an honorary doctorate in law by Leuphana University (Germany). Prior to joining the Stanford faculty, Prof. Hensler was Director of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ). She is a member of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. Prof. Hensler received her A.B. in political science summa cum laude from Hunter College and her Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Stanford scholar Kenneth Scheve says history shows that mass mobilizations and changing tax fairness norms were key factors behind higher tax rates for the wealthy based on the premise that if labor is conscripted, the wealthy should pay their share, too.

U.S. and European societies tax the rich at higher rates when people believe that the wealthy have unfair privileges due to their economic status, a Stanford professor said.

Kenneth Scheve, a professor of political science and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, recently published a book, Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe, with co-author David Stasavage, a New York University political scientist.

Scheve studies international and comparative political economy and comparative political behavior. The Stanford News Service interviewed him about the issue of taxes, the wealthy and inequality.

What are the historical origins behind the decisions for countries to impose high taxes on the rich?

The real watershed for taxing the rich came in 1914.  Before that time, even among countries who adopted income taxes, the rates on high earners never exceeded 10 percent. Most countries had some sort of inheritance tax, but rates were never above 15 percent. Among the countries that mass-mobilized for World War I, this changed dramatically with countries adopting top income tax rates that exceeded 70 percent during and immediately after the war. These increases were repeated during World War II with top rates in some countries exceeding 90 percent. We show in the book that these decisions had more to do with changing beliefs about tax fairness and preserving equal sacrifice in the war effort than simply that the wars were expensive. It was not the most financially desperate countries that taxed the rich the most. Democratic countries for which equality fairness norms were the strongest tended to respond to mass mobilization with higher taxes on the rich much more so than non-democracies.

What does your book debunk – what is its most surprising finding?

The two most commonly held ideas about when and why countries tax the rich are when they democratize and when inequality is high. We find surprisingly little evidence for either one of these ideas. The latter finding is particularly important for understanding what’s happening today in countries like the United States that have high and rising economic inequality. A common question is, “Why hasn’t the political system responded with higher taxes on the rich?” In sorting out which answers to this question are compelling, it is critical to understand that this lack of response is not unusual historically, and so answers that emphasize specific purported shortcomings in contemporary American democracy may be misleading.

Do high taxes on the rich actually reduce inequality between the rich and poor?

The short answer is yes. We found that the countries which, for whatever reason, raised taxes on income and wealth subsequently had lower levels of income and wealth inequality. The longer answer is that this finding comes with some caveats. It is hard to identify factors that lead countries to change their tax policies that wouldn’t also influence inequality, making it difficult to isolate the impact of high taxes on inequality.

What roles do war and technology play on the imposition of high taxes on the richest segment?

We found that it is not just war but mass-mobilized wars, often with conscripted armies, that lead countries to impose high taxes on the rich. Technology has played a decisive role in whether countries can and want to fight wars with mass armies in which a substantial proportion of the population is mobilized. It was not possible to transport, supply, and command these armies until the railroad and other technologies of the industrial revolution were developed, and once militaries could employ technologies such as cruise missiles that allowed them to deliver force at a distance with precision, mass armies became much less desirable. The late 19th to the mid-20th century was the era of the mass army and, in many ways, the era of high taxation on incomes and wealth.

Looking ahead, what do you expect to be the future tax burden for those at the top of income and wealth levels?

We should not expect a return to the high top tax rates of the post-war era. Future wars are more likely to be fought with drones and professional soldiers than mass armies. Absent the new fairness arguments that mass-mobilized wars made credible, it is not clear that in most countries, including the United States, there is likely to be a consensus that taxing income and wealth at substantially higher levels is fair. This is the lesson that we draw from history, and it also fits with what many American voters prefer today. When we have conducted surveys on representative samples of Americans, we have found only minority support for implementing a tax schedule radically more progressive than the one in place today.

We do find, however, that citizens care a great deal about tax fairness and there is substantial support for some tax reforms that resonate with a variety of competing visions for what counts as a fair tax system. For example, in the current U.S. tax system, in some instances the rich actually pay a lower rate of tax than everyone else.  Reforms to address these privileges seem both desirable and a reasonable expectation for future policy.

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In today's social climate of acknowledged and growing inequality, why are there not greater efforts to tax the rich? In this wide-ranging and provocative book, Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage ask when and why countries tax their wealthiest citizens—and their answers may surprise you.

Taxing the Rich draws on unparalleled evidence from twenty countries over the last two centuries to provide the broadest and most in-depth history of progressive taxation available. Scheve and Stasavage explore the intellectual and political debates surrounding the taxation of the wealthy while also providing the most detailed examination to date of when taxes have been levied against the rich and when they haven't. Fairness in debates about taxing the rich has depended on different views of what it means to treat people as equals and whether taxing the rich advances or undermines this norm. Scheve and Stasavage argue that governments don't tax the rich just because inequality is high or rising—they do it when people believe that such taxes compensate for the state unfairly privileging the wealthy. Progressive taxation saw its heyday in the twentieth century, when compensatory arguments for taxing the rich focused on unequal sacrifice in mass warfare. Today, as technology gives rise to wars of more limited mobilization, such arguments are no longer persuasive.

Taxing the Rich shows how the future of tax reform will depend on whether political and economic conditions allow for new compensatory arguments to be made.

Kenneth Scheve is professor of political science and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the coauthor of Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers. David Stasavage is Julius Silver Professor in the Wilf Family Department of Politics at New York University. He is the author of States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities (Princeton).

 

Listen to a podcast with Ken Scheve on themes addressed in this book, on FSI's WorldClass.

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Omer Moav is a Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick.

This workshop is part of the Economic History Workshop series in the Department of Economics and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

 

Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy
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