In a REDS Seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), Cornell Assistant Professor of Political Science Bryn Rosenfeld explored a compelling question: Why do people in authoritarian regimes take bold political actions — such as protesting, voting for the opposition, or criticizing the government — despite the threat of severe consequences? Her research highlights the role of emotions, particularly anger, in motivating these high-risk decisions and provides fresh insights into the dynamics of dissent under repressive regimes.

Rosenfeld challenged the common assumption that high-risk political activism requires strong organizational ties, such as membership in activist groups or networks. While this holds true in some cases, she argued that recent civic uprisings in authoritarian regimes often involve ordinary individuals — novices with no prior links to organized activism. These participants act despite the threat of repression, presenting a puzzle for traditional theories of political participation.

Central to Rosenfeld's argument is the critical role of emotions in shaping political behavior. Authoritarian regimes often use repression as a tool to silence dissent, but her findings show that this strategy frequently backfires by triggering anger. When people experience acts of repression — such as arrests or violence during protests — they often view these actions as deeply unjust, fueling their anger. This anger reduces fear of risks, shifts focus from personal consequences to collective grievances, and creates a sense of urgency to act. As a result, anger motivates bold political actions like protesting or voting against the regime. In contrast, fear amplifies the perception of danger, discourages action, and reinforces passivity. Rosenfeld’s work demonstrates how anger can transform repression into a catalyst for resistance, showing that attempts to suppress dissent often inspire even greater mobilization.

Her research is grounded in extensive data collected between 2021 and 2023 in Russia, a period marked by significant political upheaval, including the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, widespread protests, and the invasion of Ukraine. Through surveys and experiments, she measured participants’ emotions, risk attitudes, and political intentions in response to different scenarios. Participants exposed to information about repression reported higher levels of anger, which translated into a greater willingness to protest or take other political risks. For example, participants in the repression treatment group showed significantly higher risk acceptance scores than those in the control group, highlighting anger’s pivotal role in driving political action.

Rosenfeld’s findings have far-reaching implications. They challenge the assumption that repression is an effective tool for silencing dissent, showing instead that it often fuels resistance by mobilizing anger and encouraging the acceptance of risk. Her work also explains why ordinary citizens — those without activist ties — sometimes take extraordinary risks to stand up to authoritarian regimes. By focusing on the interplay of emotions and risk, Rosenfeld underscores the paradox of repression: rather than quelling dissent, it can inspire ordinary people to take extraordinary risks in the pursuit of justice. Anger, often seen as a destructive force, emerges in her work as a powerful driver of political change.

Is Ukraine too corrupt to be a part of the European Union? In a recent Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar talk co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Maria Popova, McGill University Associate Professor of Political Science, assessed how serious the issue of Ukrainian corruption really is. While some observers have claimed that Ukraine’s corruption renders it unprepared for EU accession, Popova’s research suggests otherwise. Contrasting Ukraine to recent EU entrants — Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia — she finds that corruption indices are not very helpful in drawing reliable conclusions.

In all four said countries, corruption is touted as the most salient issue, with strikingly similar scandals occurring across them. Over the last ten years, Ukraine has developed an extensive anti-corruption infrastructure, forming institutions for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of corruption cases, as well as for asset recovery. These institutions have produced mixed results, and issues of political competition between institutions have tainted their wider reputation, with the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption receiving the most positive feedback. Innovative e-procurement systems like ProZorro have been internationally praised. Ukraine is unique in that its anti-corruption infrastructure came well before attempting EU accession. 

Bulgaria, on the other hand, established its anti-corruption agencies ten years after becoming an EU member. These institutions have since become politically compromised; so much so that anti-corruption reformists recently forced their abolition. 

In Romania, institutions were created around the time of accession and have been successful in holding corrupt oligarchs accountable. Similarly, Croatia’s anti-corruption reforms proceeded during accession negotiations.

Although the four countries adopted similar anti-corruption institutional reforms, today Ukraine tracks as significantly more corrupt than the EU members across measures of regime, public sector, executive, and political corruption, even though it is cleaner than Romania was when it started accession negotiations, more corrupt than Bulgaria was, and equally corrupt as Croatia at its start of negotiations. Why? Popova argued that the indices are fundamentally non-comparative and thus need to be taken with a grain of salt. The score for each country is determined by experts that focus exclusively on that country, who consider variation in corruption over time only. Moreover, the abstract conceptual definition of corruption is applied to their narrow case knowledge and experience and thus reflects local, rather than generalizable conceptualization. 

While index scores correlate with local perceptions, this, too, may just reflect a narrative on the ground. If the local narrative is that the country is highly corrupt, the population will likely perceive it to be, with no sense of its real magnitude. 

When analyzing Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions, Popova finds that Ukraine is better prepared for EU accession than is widely assumed.

What has driven Russia’s violence in and against Ukraine from the 19th century to the contemporary era? In a recent Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) Seminar talk co-hosted by The Europe Center and CDDRL, Eugene Finkel, the Kenneth H. Keller Associate Professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, argued that Russia’s recurrent attacks against Ukraine can be traced to issues of identity and security. Finkel draws on what he described as a two-hundred-year-long quest by Russia to dominate Ukraine, as detailed in his upcoming book Intent to Destroy (due for release in November 2024 by Basic Books).

Reflecting on the role of Russian identity in driving the country’s attempts to capture Ukraine, Finkel pointed out that many Russians think of Ukrainians as a subbranch of the Russian people.  These stark views on identity, he noted, are partly the product of the struggle between the Russian Empire and the Polish Independence movement. In an effort to avoid Polish influence, Russia began emphasizing unity between the Russian and Ukrainian people.

Security is another key driver of Russia’s aggression. There are large geographical features that block off Ukraine from the rest of Europe, but no such dividing features exist between Ukraine and Russia. As such, any force that enters Ukraine can easily invade Russia. Historical repetition of this route has made Ukraine seemingly imperative to Russian national security.

Regime security also plays an important role. Many of the democratic ideas reaching Russia were diffused through Ukraine. Abiding by the logic of Russians and Ukrainians as one people, if Ukraine can be democratic, so can Russia. Thus, an independent democratic Ukraine poses a serious ideological threat to the regime. 

Finkel argues that identity and security have always been the driving factors of Russia’s aggression. To illustrate this continuity of this trend, he draws upon a case study from the early 20th century, namely the Russian occupation of Galicia and Bukovyna. As rising Ukrainian activism threatened the Russian empire, the regime responded with propaganda peddling the notion that Ukraine had been created to destroy Russia from within – a stark parallel to propaganda today. Russia also waged a war to “liberate” the Ukrainians, believing that annexing Galicia would allow Russia to reestablish its rightful boundaries.

The conflict resulted in violence and plunder against civilians, targeting of Ukrainian community leaders, banning Ukrainian publications, and switching the education system – actions closely mimicking those of Russia today. 

In 2022, Russia’s “divide and repress” strategy failed. Ukraine witnessed the emergence of a nation – Ukrainian identity became more pronounced. Russia’s initial plan was to repress Ukraine’s elites, not conduct mass executions. But as the war progressed and Ukrainians turned from brother to traitor, the violence escalated. 

This obsession begs the question – when will Russia’s quest to dominate Ukraine end? Or rather, how? Given the central role of identity in driving this quest, Finkel believes that the only realistic path for ending this longstanding trend is changing the education system – a path that Russia seems to be moving further away from.

How will Russia’s renewed aggression in Ukraine affect Moscow’s relations with its Eurasian neighbors? In a recent REDS Seminar series talk, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), University of Michigan Professor of Political Science Pauline Jones addressed this broader question in a collaborative study (with Indiana University Professor Regina Smyth) examining Kazakhstan’s public attitudes toward the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). A Russian-forged security organization composed of Eurasian countries, the CSTO is aimed at collective defense, although its mandate has recently expanded to include the mitigation of internal conflicts.

Kazakhstan’s significance as a case study, Jones explained, is partly derived from its status as a regional hegemon and the largest non-Russian member state of the CSTO. Although some argue that Kazakhstan’s membership in CSTO contributes to interethnic harmony among its dominant ethnic Kazakh population and large ethnic Russian minority, mounting protests against the war in Ukraine, as well as an influx of Russians fleeing Putin’s war, have put pressure on Kazakhstan to leave the organization. Jones’s study of Kazakhstan’s public opinion on the CSTO suggests that popular sentiments matter in shaping foreign policy and that unpopular decisions can undermine support for the ruling party. 

Jones’s study relied on both direct questions and a list experiment to gauge Kazakhstani public attitudes toward the CSTO. The question asked interviewees whether they approved of Kazakhstan’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The list experiment offered participants a list of policies and asked them how many they agreed with. The treatment group’s list of policies included Kazakhstan’s engagement in the CSTO, whereas that of the control group did not.

Jones’ talk highlighted three main provisional findings. First, popular support for the CSTO is weak. Second, it is divided both across and within ethnic groups, with demographic variables being primary correlates of attitudes. Finally, attitudinal beliefs about Russia seem to reinforce these divides. 

Data analysis revealed two primary biases at play. The first is a fear bias, or the reluctance to adopt positions that run contrary to that of the regime. The other is a community preference bias, or an individual’s reluctance to express preferences inconsistent with prevalent views within their own ethnic community. The community preference bias seemed to be stronger, especially for ethnic Kazakhs. That is, ethnic Kazakh respondents were more likely to say that they do not support the CSTO, even when they do, likely out of fear of misaligning with the prevalent view within their own community. 

Attitudinal variables also played a role, albeit less so than the demographic ones. Trust in Putin and positive attitudes toward Russia were associated with greater support for the CSTO. In contrast, among those who saw the Ukraine war as the most salient issue facing the nation, support for the CSTO was weaker. 

These findings suggest that, in the future, Kazakhstan’s government may face pressure from public opinion to change its policy vis-à-vis the CSTO, and Russia, more generally.

How serious is the threat to democracy in the United States and around the world? In a CDDRL/TEC REDS Seminar talk, Daniel Treisman argued that claims of a global democratic decline and authoritarian backsliding are exaggerated and lack empirical evidence.

Treisman, who is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, questioned the assertion that the proportion of democracies in the world has been decreasing, showing, that, according to Polity data, it stands at an all-time high. At worst, the proportion has been plateauing, according to V-Dem ratings. Indeed, V-Dem’s liberal democracy rating and Freedom House’s “free state” rating have downscored a number of countries in recent years. Yet, Treisman indicated, inconsistencies across the two lists of downgraded countries suggest that the evidence is unclear and the assessments behind these trends are subjective. Although the momentum of democratization has slowed down in recent times, Treisman added, we have not entered a period of total decline. 

How much of the recent trend in democratic breakdown was expected? Treisman’s analysis shows that a country’s level of economic development and democratic history were strong predictors of decline, which is consistent with prior theoretical expectations. Most countries that democratized during the third wave were poorer than the average democracies worldwide. They were also – by definition – newer. These two factors made them prone to backsliding, and according to the model, the breakdowns that we have observed can be attributed to these two factors.

Treisman also challenged proliferating claims that the United States faces a serious risk of a democratic breakdown. Based on its income level and long democratic experience, the odds of breakdown are extremely low. That said, erosion in the quality of democracy is still quite plausible. 

Finally, Triesman questioned the notion that falling public support for democracy and erosion of elite norms have been driving observed incidents of democratic decline. Popular support for democracy seemed relatively high in backsliding democracies. Given how difficult it is to quantify shifts in elite norms, there has yet to be clear cross-national evidence showing an association between elite norms and democratic backsliding.

While Treisman believes there is no evidence to justify extreme alarmism around the issue of global democratic decline, the possibility of chaos and unfairness at the margins of established democracies warrants much attention and vigilance.

How have EU (European Union) accession and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) enlargement affected commitments to liberalism in EU countries? Claremont McKenna College Professor of Government Hilary Appel presented findings from her research on this question at a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, cosponsored by CDDRL, The Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution.

Appel’s talk addressed the rise of Euroscepticism, illiberalism, and economic nationalism, as expressed by populist leaders in Eastern Europe over the last decade. Whereas many assume these trends have emerged in response to EU accession and NATO enlargement, her research suggests otherwise.

As NATO and the EU extended conditional membership invitations to Eastern European countries in the 1990s, many saw these steps as opportunities for advancing liberal governance. Appel highlighted the intrusive nature of the conditions imposed on these countries in that context. Specifically, that they were required to cede policy autonomy, rewrite laws to meet EU standards, and submit to bureaucratic monitoring. 

Some have argued that the invasive nature of this process has generated domestic backlash in these countries and, as a result, a declining commitment to liberal policy, as evidenced by the growing Eurosceptic and illiberal rhetoric of populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Appel’s research pushes back on this argument.

Her talk cited public opinion data showing that peaks in Euroscepticism occurred primarily in the 2010s and not during either EU accession processes. Furthermore, she added, anti-liberal sentiment does not seem to run deep in public opinion polls, even though many populist leaders continue to use Brussels as a “punching bag” for policy failures.

The rise of populism, according to Appel, coincided with a climate in which the EU was ineffective in penalizing member states for violating previously agreed upon conditions and norms. The initial success of some populist leaders who openly rejected liberal policies and values, she explains, has demonstrated that there was no real consequence for subverting EU guidelines. Thus, other politicians followed suit, embracing populist rhetoric and policies. Put simply, the assumption that EU accession would constrain leaders of new member states (and lock them in a path of liberalization) proved misguided. 

Using the war in Ukraine as a lens for assessing the strength of EU and NATO alliances, Appel finds that alliance in Europe is stronger than expected, and the war has led to a renewed appreciation of NATO. That said, the war has not necessarily caused the electorate to turn away from Eurosceptic leaders. The war has also shifted EU priorities to the extent that condemnation of illiberalism has been put on the back burner for countries like Poland largely due to their instrumental support in aiding Ukrainian refugees.