International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Jonne Kamphorst

What explains education-based political divides? Jonne Kamphorst discusses how decreased interactions between higher and lower-educated citizens has widened the political divide between them

Across advanced democracies, education levels are predictive of immigration attitudes and voting for new left or far right parties. What explains education-based political divides? Existing scholarship holds that education causes progressive attitudes, or proposes that being higher educated and holding progressive attitudes can both be explained by socialization during someone’s childhood. This article puts forward an additional explanation. 

We argue that decreased interactions and relationship formation between higher and lower-educated citizens has widened the political divide between them. Using panel and survey data of strong ties, we demonstrate that higher (lower) educated ties make individuals more progressive (conservative). Education divides citizens by providing a distinct worldview for the higher-educated, which is reinforced in increasingly homogeneous education-based networks. Our findings suggest the further crystallization of a cleavage based on education, and highlight the importance of studying networks to understand political behavior.


Jonne Kamphorst is a Postdoctoral Scholar in Political Science at the European University Institute in Florence and a Senior Research Fellow at the Polarization and Social Change Lab at Stanford University. He completed his Ph.D. in Political Science at the EUI in 2023. Before starting his Doctoral Degree, Jonne was a Master’s student in Politics and Sociology at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics and obtained his Bachelor’s in Political Science from the University of Amsterdam. 

His research, positioned at the intersection between comparative politics and political behavior, explores the roots of political divides in advanced democracies and proposes strategies to bridge them. Two questions define his research agenda: 1) What are the origins of political divisions? And 2) how can democracy be strengthened by re-engaging citizens and building new coalitions of voters that bridge political divides? Jonne answers these questions leveraging quantitative scientific methods. His methodological expertise is in the design, conduct, and analysis of randomized field and survey experiments which he often employs in collaboration with political candidates and parties. He also uses quasi-experimental methods for causal inference. Jonne’s research has been accepted at or been revised and resubmitted to the Journal of Politics, American Political Science Review, and Comparative Political Studies, among other outlets.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by January 25, 2024.

Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

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Visiting Student Researcher at The Europe Center, 2022
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Jonne Kamphorst was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Europe Center in 2022. He has received his PhD in Political Science at the European University Institute in 2023 and is currently a Scholar at Stanford’s Politics and Social Change Lab and the Human-centered Artificial Intelligence institute. He will start as an Assistant Professor in Political Science and Quantitative Social Science Methods at Sciences Po in Paris in January 2026. Jonne’s work focuses on the politics and societies of advanced democracies and lies at the intersection of comparative politics and political behaviour. Two questions define his research agenda: 1) What are the origins of contemporary political divisions? And 2) how can democracy be strengthened by re-engaging voters and bridging political divides? He explores both these topics leveraging quantitative scientific methods that employ an experimental logic, specifically (field and survey) experiments, methods of causal inference, as well as novel computational methods leveraging large language models. His research has been published at PNAS, the American Political Science Review, and the Journal of Politics, among other outlets.

Date Label
Jonne Kamphorst, European University Institute
Seminars
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Pauline Jones REDS Seminar

What are the longer-term implications of Russia’s renewed aggression in Ukraine for relations with its Eurasian neighbors it has often referred to as the “near abroad?”

A recent and growing literature suggests that domestic public opinion will play a decisive role in their future foreign policy choices. Based on an original mass survey with an embedded experiment, this talk examines the changes in Kazakhstani public opinion toward maintaining economic and security relations with Russia through international alliances such as the Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO). These changes should be viewed in light of both Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 and the Russian-led CSTO’s intervention in the mass protests in Kazakhstan in January 2022. It argues that Kazakhstani public opinion has changed in significant ways — especially across ethnic lines — and that these changes are likely to impact Kazakhstan-Russian relations in general and the future of the CSTO in particular.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Pauline Jones is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan (UM) and the Edie N. Goldenberg Endowed Director for the Michigan in Washington Program. She is also Founder and Director of the Digital Islamic Studies Curriculum (DISC). Previously, she served as the Director of UM’s Islamic Studies Program (2011-14) and International Institute (2014-20). Her past work has contributed broadly to the study of institutional origin, change, and impact in Central Asia. She is currently engaged in multiple research projects: exploring how state regulation of Islam in Muslim-majority states affects citizens’ political attitudes and behavior; identifying the factors that affect compliance with health mitigation policies to combat the COVID-19 pandemic; examining the influence that evoking historical memory has on public support for foreign assistance; and developing a toolkit to assess the impact of mass protest and state narratives on domestic and foreign policy change in authoritarian regimes. She has published articles in several leading academic and policy journals, including the American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Current History, and Foreign Affairs. She is author (or co-author) of five books, most recently The Oxford Handbook on Politics in Muslim Societies (Oxford 2021).



REDS: RETHINKING EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY


The REDS Seminar Series aims to deepen the research agenda on the new challenges facing Europe, especially on its eastern flank, and to build intellectual and institutional bridges across Stanford University, fostering interdisciplinary approaches to current global challenges.

REDS is organized by The Europe Center and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Learn more about REDS and view past seminars here.

 

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CDDRL, TEC, Hoover, and CREEES logos
Kathryn Stoner

In-person: William J. Perry Conference Room (Encina Hall, 2nd floor, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford)

Virtual: Zoom (no registration required)

Pauline Jones University of Michigan
Seminars
Date Label
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Leonid Peisakhin
Exploring the determinants of assistance toward Syrian and Ukrainian refugees in Europe

Our understanding of what motivates helping behavior toward refugees is incomplete, and much literature on migrants focuses on economic concerns over job competition and perceived cultural threat. We explore the determinants of refugee assistance from a nationally-representative survey of 2,500 Poles, whom we asked whether they have helped Syrian and Ukrainian refugees and are willing to assist them in the future. To get around social desirability biases we implement a conjoint experiment on refugee characteristics that elicits true preferences toward different types of refugees. We find that empathy is the primary driver of helping behavior. Importantly, the same set of factors determine the willingness to help both Syrians and Ukrainians. Cultural distance is among these, which is why Ukrainians, who are perceived as more proximate culturally, are, on average, more likely to be helped. Through a survey experiment we try to increase empathy by activating the memory of family suffering. This intervention fails, suggesting that it is difficult to manipulate empathy and, through it, helping behavior. 


Dr. Leonid Peisakhin's research examines how political identities and persistent patterns of political behavior are created and manipulated by the state. He studies the longue-durée legacy of state-sponsored violence, and, as its corollary, the dynamics of post-conflict reconciliation, and the cultural legacies of historical political institutions.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by November 2, 2023.

Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

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Visiting Scholar at The Europe Center, 2023
Leonid Peisakhin Headshot

Leonid Peisakhin is Associate Professor of Political Science at New York University - Abu Dhabi. His research examines how political identities and persistent patterns of political behavior are created and manipulated by the state. He studies the longue-durée legacy of state-sponsored violence, and, as its corollary, the dynamics of post-conflict reconciliation, and the cultural legacies of historical political institutions. He is also interested in the influence of biased media and topics related to good governance. ​

At Stanford, Leonid Peisakhin will be working on completing ongoing book projects. In "Contested Nationhood: Imperial Legacies and Conflicting Political Identities in Ukraine", Peisakhin proposes that core group identities, defined as the primary source of behavioral queues, are most likely to persist because they are a crucial source of social meaning. The book project draws on a natural experiment of history that divided homogenous Ukrainian communities between Austrian and Russian empires and examines the roots of the competing notions of Ukrainian national identity and the consequences of the existence of these on present-day political life. In "Children of Violence: Victims in the Shadow of Violence" -- a joint project with Prof. Noam Lupu -- Peisakhin explores why different types of violence have different legacy effects.

Peisakhin's research combines multiple methods including experiments, surveys, ethnography, and archival research. He has done fieldwork in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and the bulk of his work is focused on Eastern Europe.

Leonid Peisakhin, New York University Abu Dhabi
Seminars
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Democracy Day Event

As part of Democracy Day events around campus, The Europe Center will host a discussion of the recent elections in Poland and in Slovakia. Both featured prominent populist politicians and parties who have eroded democracy, stoked nationalism and xenophobia, and violated informal norms of democracy. What do these elections mean for the future of democracy in the region? This panel brings together Anna Grzymala-Busse (director of The Europe Center) and Piotr Zagórski (Margarita Salas Fellow at the Autonomous University of Madrid). 


Anna Grzymała-Busse is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, director of The Europe Center, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. Grzymala-Busse's research focuses on state development and transformation, religion and politics, political parties, and post-communist politics. Her other areas of research interest include populism, democratic erosion, and informal institutions.

Piotr Zagórski is a Margarita Salas Fellow at the Autonomous University of Madrid, where he earned his PhD in Political Science. Currently he is a Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Euroasian Studies at UC Berkeley. He is a member of the Polish National Election Study at the SWPS University in Warsaw. His research interests include electoral behavior, historical legacies, and populist parties. He has published in Political Behavior, West European Politics, and East European Politics and Societies, and his research has been featured, among others, in El País, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Polityka.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by October 26, 2023.

Co-sponsored by Stanford Democracy Day

Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA  94305

 

(650) 723-4270
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Anna Grzymała-Busse is a professor in the Department of Political Science, the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the director of The Europe Center. Her research interests include political parties, state development and transformation, informal political institutions, religion and politics, and post-communist politics.

In her first book, Redeeming the Communist Past, she examined the paradox of the communist successor parties in East Central Europe: incompetent as authoritarian rulers of the communist party-state, several then succeeded as democratic competitors after the collapse of these communist regimes in 1989.

Rebuilding Leviathan, her second book project, investigated the role of political parties and party competition in the reconstruction of the post-communist state. Unless checked by a robust competition, democratic governing parties simultaneously rebuilt the state and ensured their own survival by building in enormous discretion into new state institutions.

Anna's third book, Nations Under God, examines why some churches have been able to wield enormous policy influence. Others have failed to do so, even in very religious countries. Where religious and national identities have historically fused, churches gained great moral authority, and subsequently covert and direct access to state institutions. It was this institutional access, rather than either partisan coalitions or electoral mobilization, that allowed some churches to become so powerful.

Anna's most recent book, Sacred Foundations: The Religious and Medieval Roots of the European State argues that the medieval church was a fundamental force in European state formation.

Other areas of interest include informal institutions, the impact of European Union membership on politics in newer member countries, and the role of temporality and causal mechanisms in social science explanations.

Director of The Europe Center
Piotr Zagórski, Autonomous University of Madrid
Seminars
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Marek Tamm

How is digital technology reshaping our relationships with the past? This presentation will elucidate how digital technology redefines our fundamental understanding of time, history, and memory, thus giving rise to a new concept known as "digital historicity."

Having spread extensively throughout the world in just a few decades, digital technology has significantly reshaped our relations to the past. This presentation argues that digital technology serves a purpose beyond being a new tool for historical research, commonly referred to as digital history. It also profoundly influences our fundamental relationship with time, history, and memory, thereby giving rise to a novel concept known as "digital historicity." This digital historicity is distinguished by several key aspects, notably datafication, algorithmization, virtualization, and gamification of our perception of the past.

This shift towards digital historicity moves us away from traditional inquiries into historical representation and towards a focus on sensory immersion, which redefines history as a real-time experience of the virtually recreated past. In our contemporary digital condition, the past is constantly being remixed, reimagined, and repurposed in unexpected ways, particularly evident in the digital gaming industry, which will be a central focus of this paper.


Marek Tamm is professor of cultural history in Tallinn University. He is also Head of Tallinn University Centre of Excellence in Intercultural Studies and member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. His primary research fields are cultural history of medieval Europe, historical theory, digital history, and cultural memory studies. His most recent book is The Fabric of Historical Time, co-written with Zoltán Boldizsár Simon (Cambridge University Press, 2023).

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by October 19, 2023.

Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

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Visiting Scholar at The Europe Center, 2023
Marek Tamm Headshot

Marek Tamm is professor of cultural history in Tallinn University, Estonia. He is also Head of Tallinn University Centre of Excellence in Intercultural Studies and member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. His primary research fields are cultural history of medieval Europe, historical theory, digital history, and cultural memory studies. He has recently published The Fabric of Historical Time (with Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, 2023), The Companion to Juri Lotman: A Semiotic Theory of Culture (ed. with Peeter Torop, 2022), A Cultural History of Memory in the Early Modern Age (ed. with Alessandro Arcangeli, 2020), Making Livonia: Actors and Networks in the Medieval Baltic Sea Region (ed. with Anu Mänd, 2019), Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to Presentism (ed. with Laurent Olivier, 2019) and Debating New Approaches to History (ed. with Peter Burke, 2018).

Marek Tamm, Tallinn University
Seminars
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Clara Ponsatí

Six years after the people of Catalonia exercised their right to self-determination, the Catalan challenge still keeps the Spanish institutions in a gridlock, posing a major challenge to the democratic principles of the European Union.

It has been six years since the people of Catalonia exercised their right to self-determination in a referendum of independence, despite Spain’s attempt at stopping it with riot police. Spain has so far blocked the implementation of the democratic decision of Catalans by means of a combination of human rights abuse and political manipulation, and thanks to the complicit approval of the EU institutions. Nevertheless, Catalan self-determination remains the main hurdle that chokes Spanish institutions, and hence poses a major challenge to the democratic principles and practices of the European Union. I will provide background and review the recent political developments and possible future developments of the Catalan case, contextualizing it in the discussions regarding the principle and practices of self-determination. 


Clara Ponsatí is a Member of the European Parliament since February 2020, where she serves in the Industry Technology Reserach and Energy and Economics and Monetary Affairs Committees. From July 2017 until November 2017 she served as Minister of Education in the Catalan Government under President Carles Puigdemont. Prior to entering politics, Ponsatí was an economics professor. She was Chair of Economics at the School of Economics and Finance at the University of St Andrews, where she served as head of the school from 2015 to 2017. Before joining St Andrews she was Research Professor at the Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) where she served as director from 2006 to 2012. 

Previously, Ponsatí taught at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. She has had visiting appointments at Georgetown University, the University of California at San Diego, and the University of Toronto. Professor Ponsatí is a specialist in Game Theory and Public Economics, with interest in negotiations, bargaining, and voting. She has worked extensively on strategy, collective decisions, taxes and redistribution, with a distinguished publication record. She has worked on fiscal federalism and has advised the Catalan government on budgetary and tax affairs. Her research explores the links between group formation and majoritarian institutions, to understand the causes and effects of meritocracy and egalitarianism in the performance and stability of democratic organizations.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by October 26, 2023.

Organized by Professor Joan Ramon Resina, Director of the Iberian Studies Program at The Europe Center.

Joan Ramon Resina

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

Professor Clara Ponsatí, Member of the European Parliament

Pigott Hall, Bldg 260, Room 224
Stanford, CA 94305-2014

(650)723-3800 (650) 725-9255
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Professor of Iberian and Latin American Cultures
Professor Comparative Literature
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Dr. Joan Ramon Resina, professor of Iberian and Latin American Cultures, and Comparative Literature, is also director of the Iberian Studies Program and research affiliate of The Europe Center. He specializes in European literature generally and on Spanish and Catalan culture in particular, with emphasis in the modern period.

His interests are amply comparative, with a strong cultural component, ranging from urban studies to the collective memory and issues of political and social scale, such as the relation between the local and the global. More generally, his interests include modern and contemporary European narrative, literary theory, history of ideas, film studies, and Iberian cultural and political history. Currently, he is editing a volume on the relation between economics and the humanities and working on a book on philosophy and the cinema of Luchino Visconti.

He is the author of seven books, most recently The Ghost in the Constitution: Historical Memory and Denial in Spanish Society. Liverpool University Press, 2017. He has edited eleven volumes and published extensively in specialized journals, such as PMLA, MLN, New Literary History, and Modern Language Quarterly, and has contributed to critical volumes. He was Editor of Diacritics and is on the board of various national and international journals. Awards received include the prestigious Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Fellowship, a Fulbright Scholarship, and fellowships at the Morphomata Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Cologne and the Stanford Humanities Center. He is the recipient of St. George’s Cross, a merit award from the Government of Catalonia.

Director of the Iberian Studies Program
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
Moderator
Seminars
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Daniel Treisman

 


Just how bad is the current danger of democratic backsliding in the US and around the world?

Influential voices contend that democracy is in decline worldwide and threatened in the US. Using a variety of measures, I show that the global proportion of democracies is, in fact, at or near an all-time high. The current rate of backsliding is not historically unusual and is well-explained by the income levels of existing democracies. Historical data yield extremely low estimated hazards of democratic breakdown in the US—considerably lower than in any democracy that has failed. Western governments are seen as threatened by a supposed decline in popular support for democracy and an erosion of elite norms. But the evidence for these claims is sparse. While deteriorating democratic quality in some countries is indeed a cause for concern, available evidence suggests that alarm about a global slide into autocracy is exaggerated.


Daniel Treisman is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles and Interim Director of UCLA’s Center for European and Russian Studies. A graduate of Oxford and Harvard, he has published six books and many articles in leading political science and economics journals, as well as numerous commentaries in public affairs journals and the press. His research focuses on Russian politics and economics as well as comparative political economy, including the analysis of democratization, the politics of authoritarian states, political decentralization, and corruption. 

A former co-editor of The American Political Science Review, he is a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and has consulted for the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and USAID. He has been a Guggenheim Fellow and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford), the Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna), and the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford), and he is currently an Andrew Carnegie Fellow. In 2023, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His latest book, co-authored with Sergei Guriev, "Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century" (Princeton University Press, 2022), has been translated into 13 languages and won the Prix Guido et Maruccia Zerilli-Marimo of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in Paris.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by November 23, 2023.


REDS: RETHINKING EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY


The REDS Seminar Series aims to deepen the research agenda on the new challenges facing Europe, especially on its eastern flank, and to build intellectual and institutional bridges across Stanford University, fostering interdisciplinary approaches to current global challenges.

REDS is organized by The Europe Center and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

 

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CDDRL, TEC, Hoover, and CREEES logos
Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles
Seminars
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Hilary Appel REDS

 


Given the rise of Euroscepticism, illiberalism, and economic nationalism expressed by populist leaders in Eastern Europe over the past decade, did the EU and NATO enlargement support or detract from establishing and sustaining a commitment to liberalism? How will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shape the trajectory of liberalism in the region?

EU and NATO accession gave momentum to Eastern Europe’s democratic and capitalist development, despite the many domestic political challenges associated with this dual transition. Given the subsequent rise of Euroscepticism, illiberalism, and economic nationalism expressed by populist leaders over the past decade, and given violations of democratic norms, did the specific process of enlargement support or detract from establishing and sustaining a commitment to liberalism and so-called European values? Moreover, how does the Ukraine war fit into a trajectory of liberal development in Eastern Europe? These are the questions addressed in this presentation.

Hilary Appel is Podlich Family Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. Professor Appel has published numerous books and articles on the politics of economic reform in Russia and Eastern Europe in leading scholarly journals like World Politics, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Review of International Political Economy, Post-Soviet Affairs, East European Politics and Societies, and others.

Her co-authored book with Mitchell A. Orenstein, From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Post-Communist Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2018), won the Silver Medal Laura Shannon Prize for Best Book in European Studies 2018-2019. Prof. Appel has received national fellowships from the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Fulbright Foundation, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, and the Institute for the Study of World Politics.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by October 5, 2023.


REDS: RETHINKING EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY


The REDS Seminar Series aims to deepen the research agenda on the new challenges facing Europe, especially on its eastern flank, and to build intellectual and institutional bridges across Stanford University, fostering interdisciplinary approaches to current global challenges.

REDS is organized by The Europe Center and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

 

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CDDRL, TEC, Hoover, and CREEES logos
Anna Grzymała-Busse

Encina Hall 2nd floor, William J. Perry Conference Room

Hilary Appel, Claremont McKenna College
Seminars
Authors
News Type
News
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From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.



Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)
Full Profile


Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Michael McFaul Headshot

Michael McFaul

Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Full Profile


Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

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Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
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The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

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Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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Understanding Russia and the War in Ukraine

For more commentary and analysis from FSI scholars about the war in Ukraine and events in Russia, follow the link to our resources page, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’

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Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
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Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer insight on what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may signal about Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

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