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Steven Pifer
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This article originally appeared at Brookings.

 

Ukraine is halfway through a presidential election: The first round took place on March 31, and the run-off is coming up on April 21. At the annual Kyiv Security Forum and in other conversations in Kyiv last week, I had the opportunity to catch up on the latest developments in Ukraine, and came away with five key observations.

UKRAINE AGAIN SCORES A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

Ukraine pulled off the March 31 election with no major hitch. Voting and ballot-counting proceeded smoothly. The Central Election Commission’s vote tallies corresponded with exit poll results and a non-governmental parallel count. The International Election Observer Mission (IEOM) released a preliminary assessment that noted some problems but termed the election competitive, reported that candidates campaigned freely, and said that the electorate had a broad choice.

The fact that Ukraine held a free, competitive presidential election should come as no surprise. The previous four presidential votes—the third round of the 2004 election (after the Supreme Court ordered a rerun of the run-off following the Orange Revolution), the general and run-off rounds of the 2010 election, and the 2014 election after the Maidan Revolution—all earned free, fair, and competitive assessments. Another indicator of a free and fair election: While he made it to the run-off, incumbent President Petro Poroshenko came in a distant second.

Sadly, Ukraine’s democratic experience remains a relative rarity in the post-Soviet space. Showing no sense of irony, Russian media cherry-picked criticisms from the IEOM’s assessment to disparage the overall election, yet that election contrasted markedly with the Russian presidential election in 2018. Indeed, in early March, few Ukrainians could say with certainty which two candidates would make it to the run-off; most Russians could have said with certainty who would win their 2018 presidential election as early as 2013.

BARRING A MIRACLE, IT WILL BE PRESIDENT ZELENSKY

TV comedian Volodymyr Zelensky won the first round, capturing 30.24 percent of the popular vote to Poroshenko’s 15.95 percent. Pre-election polls projected a Zelensky win (the question was who would face him in the run-off). His rise since announcing his candidacy in late December is striking. Six or eight months ago, pundits projected a run-off between Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who came in third.

Poroshenko received more bad news on April 11, with the release of the first polls regarding the run-off. One showed Zelensky ahead 51 percent to 21 percent, with an even bigger lead of 61 percent to 24 percent among those likely to vote. A second poll of those likely to vote gave Zelensky a yet wider margin: 71 percent to 24 percent. Those numbers pose a daunting challenge for the incumbent, who appears competitive only in western Ukraine.

Poroshenko deserves credit for overseeing some impressive reforms, and he has had to cope with a low-intensity war with Russia. Reforms, however, slowed after 2016. Voters felt that Poroshenko had not done enough to fight corruption or challenge the outsized political and economic influence of the country’s oligarchs. He also suffered from an under-performing economy. The electorate wanted change.

It is difficult to see how Poroshenko can turn things around in the short time before Sunday’s run-off, though a few still believe he has a chance. They argue the electorate emotionally cast a protest vote but now must ask who really should lead the country: Poroshenko or a political neophyte.

The president’s campaign has gone negative, seeking to portray the run-off as a choice between Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin. That appears to be having little impact. On the evening of April 11, the president crashed a TV talk show on a pro-Zelensky network and had a brief, bitter telephone exchange with his rival. The episode carried a whiff of desperation. Poroshenko says he wants to debate Zelensky, but the two cannot agree on details. Zelensky did not show up at Poroshenko’s proposed debate on April 14, and the president says he will not turn up at Zelensky’s proposed venue on April 19.

WHO IS ZELENSKY?

Ukrainians and Western diplomats are trying to figure out what a Zelensky presidency would mean. One senior Ukrainian official’s comment—the comedian “is talented and smart, but how will he govern if he wins?”—reflects the views of many.

On television, Zelensky plays a common man thrust unexpectedly into the presidency, where he wages war against the ills that trouble Ukraine. The show is called Sluha Narodu (Servant of the People). During the campaign, Zelensky gave few interviews, held no campaign rallies, and did not lay out positions in any detail, instead letting his television persona define his image.

Zelensky has described in generalities a readiness to negotiate with Putin but with the goal of recovering all Russian-occupied territories; support for joining the European Union and NATO; and a desire to end corruption and fully liberalize the economy. His supporters—who include several noted reformers—describe a Russia-wary, pro-Western candidate who will put fighting corruption at the top of his agenda. Some suggest Zelensky would take a hard line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its conditions. That could prove tricky. Ukraine needs financing, and no bank matches IMF rates.

Other Ukrainians hold a darker view of a Zelensky presidency. They express concern about his links to Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who owns the network that broadcasts Sluha Narodu. Kolomoisky now resides in Israel after his bank, the largest in Ukraine, was taken over by Ukraine’s central bank following charges of financial improprieties. Critics question Zelensky’s lack of political experience, his ability to deal with Putin, and his commitment to a pro-Western course.

Zelensky reportedly this week will name key members of his team, including the foreign and defense ministers, chief of the general staff, head of the Security Service of Ukraine and procurator general. That could provide indications as to his planned direction.

A debate would provide Zelensky the venue to further define his prospective presidency and allow the country’s voters an opportunity to compare and contrast the positions of the run-off candidates. But a debate likely is not in the cards. Zelensky easily bested his opponents in the first round by avoiding specifics; why change a winning strategy now?

THE RUSSIANS—THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK?

Many expected the Russians, who used force to seize and illegally annex Crimea in 2014 and then fostered a simmering conflict in the eastern region of Donbas, to interfere in Ukraine’s election. They undoubtedly did—but with little apparent effect.

Ukrainian officials say Russian hackers had probed the Central Election Commission’s systems but without success. One noted that the Russians seemed more focused on general destabilization of the country rather than the election.

The Kremlin has made clear it wants Poroshenko to be a one-term president. Beyond that, however, Russian officials have taken care not to endorse a particular candidate, perhaps understanding that a “Russian favorite” tag would not prove helpful. Yuriy Boyko, head of the Opposition Bloc—the closest thing in Ukraine to a pro-Russian party—visited Moscow on the eve of the election and returned with a plan to obtain cheaper gas. That might have helped him in the eastern part of the country, from where most of his votes came. He did better than expected but still finished fourth.

The fact that part of Donbas remains occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces severely hampers the election prospects for someone such as Boyko. The population there, which historically has favored close relations with Russia, could not vote. Nor could the population of Crimea, the only part of Ukraine in which ethnic Russians constitute a majority.

IT’S NOT OVER UNTIL IT’S OVER

Ukrainians will know their next president late on April 21, though the official vote may take a week to report. The winner will be inaugurated no later than 30 days after the Central Election Commission announces the official result. But another national ballot looms on October 27: the Rada (parliament) elections.

The majority coalition that emerges after the new Rada is seated will select the prime minister. Zelensky, if he becomes president, will need to build his political party—named, not coincidentally, Sluha Narodu—to secure a large bloc in the Rada. That matters, as executive power in Ukraine is bifurcated, with the prime minister choosing most of the cabinet. Other parties could see defections from their ranks if Sluha Narodu builds steam, but speculation has already begun about the kind of opposition might emerge.

Some see a possibility that Zelensky might try to force snap elections in order to translate a big win on April 21 into a quick Rada win for Sluha Narodu. However, that does not appear legally possible. The Rada cannot be dismissed within six months of the end of its term. That clock starts ticking in late May, and procedural rules would not allow a newly inaugurated president time to call an early election before the six-month period began.

Politics in Ukraine have never been easy or straightforward, and they have at several points taken radical turns. The country may be entering one such period now. How Zelensky—assuming he wins on Sunday—takes on presidential responsibilities and manages the complex politics that follow will matter greatly for Ukraine’s ability to continue its reform path, deepen integration with Europe, secure peace, and regain occupied territories…all despite Russian efforts to return it to Moscow’s orbit.

 

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The paper that Mark Kayser will be presenting is co-authored by Matthias Orlowski (Humboldt University, Berlin) and Jochen Rehmert (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin).

Synopsis:  Policies are made with one eye cast to the future. As policy is most strongly influenced from within government, coalition inclusion prospects would seem predictive of the behavior of office- or policy-seeking parties. But, oddly, coalition models are poorly designed for empirical prediction. Most theoretical models rely predominantly on seat shares and ideological distance while empirical work tells us that other variables such as coalition history and anti-system parties matter as much; most empirical models predict coalition composition rather than individual parties’ coalition probabilities; neither calculate bargaining leverage between elections and neither test their predictions out of sample. We do. Combining empirical coalition formation models and a large set of political polls, we estimate coalition inclusion probabilities for parties in a sample of 20 parliamentary democracies at a monthly frequency over four decades. The probability of entering or remaining in an alternative government – i.e., bargaining leverage – serves as a strong predictor of party behavior, markedly superior to polls or expected seat shares. We demonstrate our measure’s utility with applications to no-confidence motions and financial policy reform.

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Photo of Mark Kayser, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.

Mark Kayser teaches applied quantitative methods and comparative politics at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. His research generally centers on elections and political economy.  Current major projects focus on partisan responses to economic crisis, the electoral effects of media reporting of the economy, and the effect of electoral competitiveness on government responsiveness. Before coming to the Hertie School of Governance, he served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester.  He has also held a postdoctoral Prize Research Fellowship at Nuffield College, Oxford and will spend the 2018-19 academic year as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford. He is the co-author of a book on the effect of electoral systems on regulation and price levels (Cambridge University Press, 2011) and the author or co-author of articles in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Political Analysis and other leading journals. He is a recipient of the 2013 GESIS/Klingemann research award, the 2007 best paper award from the APSA Section on European Politics and Society, the Senior Editor for Political Economy of the Oxford Research Encyclopdia and a member of several editorial boards.
Mark Kayser Professor of Applied Methods and Comparative Politics Speaker Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
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Visiting Student Researcher at The Europe Center, 2018-2019
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Diane Bolet is a Visiting Student Researcher in comparative politics and European studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is researching local factors behind voting behaviour and on far-right votes in particular. She investigates the effects of local immigration, voluntary associations and social networks on far-right electoral support in Europe. Her research interests include voting behavior, electoral geography and quantitative methods.

 

Diane holds a dual master degree in European Studies from Sciences Po and LSE (with Distinction). Prior to that, she completed a first-class honors Bachelor of Arts in International Politics at King's College, London.

 

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Fairleigh S. Dickinson, Jr. Professor in Public Policy.
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Paul M. Sniderman is the Fairleigh S. Dickinson, Jr. Professor in Public Policy.

Sniderman’s current research focuses on the institutional organization of political choice; multiculturalism and inclusion of Muslims in Western Europe; and the politics of race in the United States.

Most recently, he authored The Democratic Faith and co-authored Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy: Islam, Western Europe and the Danish Cartoon Crisis (with Michael Bang Petersen, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager).

He has published many other books, including The Reputational Premium: A Theory of Party Identification and Policy Reasoning, Reasoning and Choice, The Scar of Race, Reaching beyond Race, The Outsider, and Black Pride and Black Prejudice, in addition to a plethora of articles. He initiated the use of computer-assisted interviewing to combine randomized experiments and general population survey research.

A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, he has been awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize, 1992; the Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award, 1994; an award for the Outstanding Book on the Subject of Human Rights from the Gustavus Meyers Center, 1994; the Gladys M. Kammerer Award, 1998; the Pi Sigma Alpha Award; and the Ralph J. Bunche Award, 2003.

Sniderman received his B.A. degree (philosophy) from the University of Toronto and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California, Berkeley.

 

Affiliated faculty of The Europe Center
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Using new data on roll-call voting of US state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. In so-called “moderate” districts that switch hands between parties, legislative behavior is shaped by the fact that voters are often quite heterogeneous: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural areas. We root this intuition in a formal model that associates intradistrict ideological heterogeneity with uncertainty about the ideological location of the median voter. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of polarized legislators and a mass public that appears to contain many moderates.

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What happens to authoritarian ruling parties when they accept democracy and reinvent their organizations, symbols, and programs to comply with the norms of free political competition? The consequences of such reinvention have been neglected empirically, yet they are critical for our understanding both of the costs and benefits of party transformation and for the health of democratic party competition. Using a novel data set comprising 81 countries over 1945–2015, and a structured comparison of two prominent cases of authoritarian reinvention, this article makes three contributions. First, it distinguishes among the different strategies available to authoritarian ruling parties after the collapse of their monopoly regimes, including exit, dissolution, and reinvention. Second, it finds that the cruel paradox is that the biggest boosters and builders of party democracy—the reinvented authoritarian successor parties—eventually suffer the most electorally. Third, this paradoxical fate follows from their initial decisions to reinvent and transform themselves
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Anna Grzymała-Busse
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For a democracy, a necessary condition is openness to new political ideas. New ideas are often carried by new political parties. New parties are confronted with all kinds of reactions by established actors. What electoral effects do political, legal and media reactions have? Joost will present empirical evidence from experimental and non-experimental studies (in 15 countries since 1944) on reactions to various new parties, including anti-immigration parties.

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Joost van Spanje is associate professor in the University of Amsterdam communication science department. This department ranks second worldwide (2017 QS Rankings by subject). Joost previously conducted research at the University of Oxford, the EUI in Florence, and New York University. His current research team investigates legal action against anti-immigration parties in 21 European countries since 1965, and its effects on citizens. Joost currently also studies how news media in established democracies cover new political parties. He has published 27 ISI-ranked journal articles as well as the monograph "Controlling the Electoral Marketplace: How Established Parties Ward Off Competition" (2017).

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Joost van Spanje Associate Professor Guest speaker Communication Science Department, University of Amsterdam
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James E. Alt is the Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government. His current interests are in comparative political economy; the interaction of voters, political parties, budget and other political institutions, financial markets, and fiscal policies in industrial democracies. His recent research analyzes institutional transparency, accountability and corruption, and fiscal policy outcomes in OECD countries and US states. He is author, co-author, or editor of The Politics of Economic Decline (Cambridge University Press, 1979, reissued 2009), Political Economics (University of California Press, 1983), Cabinet Studies (Macmillan, 1975), Advances in Quantitative Methods (Elsevier, 1980), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1990), Competition and Cooperation (Russell Sage, 1999) and Positive Changes in Political Science (Michigan, 2007). He has published numerous articles in scholarly journals, including "Partisan Dealignment in Britain 1964-1974" in the British Journal of Political Science, "Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment" in the American Political Science Review, "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Deficits: Evidence from the States," in the American Political Science Review, "Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States," in the American Political Science Review, and “Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits,” in the Journal of Politics. He is the founding director of the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, now the Institute for Quantitative Social Science. He is or has been a member of the editorial boards of the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Political Studies, and other journals, and has been a member of the Political Science Panel of the National Science Foundation. He was a Guggenheim Fellow 1997-98 and a Senior Research Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford from 2007-2011. Alt is an International Fellow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2004.

This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by the Munro Lectureship Fund and The Europe Center.

James Alt Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government speaker Harvard University
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