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On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

Daniel Keleman presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on April 16, 2026.
Daniel Keleman presented his research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026. | Emil Kamalov

Hanna Folsz then took a closer, domestic look at the Tisza Party and how they triumphed over Orbán. As Kelemen discussed, Orbán's new electoral rules strongly favored large parties with rural bases, the characteristics of the Fidesz party. The Fidesz Party also controlled the media and enjoyed advantages in party financing. However, the Tisza Party, led by Peter Magyar, dominated the 2026 election, despite the electoral system being stacked against opposition parties. 

Economic woes, corruption, and scandals surrounding Fidesz created broad voter discontent and set the stage for the Tisza Party’s victory. Tisza worked to create a broad coalition through extensive group-level campaigning, messaging that focused on competent economic governance and anti-corruption, and the idea of reclaiming patriotism. Magyar also extensively campaigned, holding rallies all over Hungary in localities of all sizes. The district candidates within the Tisza Party campaigned in a similar manner. 

The Tisza Party focused its policy proposals on extensive welfare, public services improvement, the elimination of corruption, strengthening relationships with the EU and neighbors, and largely avoided divisive topics. The Party also distanced itself from the discredited and divisive established opposition parties, and they did not coordinate with past opposition parties. 

Folsz outlined the lessons Hungary’s electoral outcome shows for democratic resistance against autocratization. The Hungarian case demonstrated the importance of connecting with voters and building credibility by campaigning a lot and across the country, including in rural constituencies. The Tisza Party also smartly presented a vision for a better future with concrete proposals, rooted in citizens’ core concerns– in this case, the economy and corruption, and distanced themselves from divisive opposition politicians and parties. The Tisza Party focused its messaging on unity and reclaiming patriotism from the far right.

Hanna Folsz presented her research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026.
Hanna Folsz presented her research in a REDS seminar on April 16, 2026. | Hesham Sallam

The 2026 Hungarian election offered a rare example of democratic recovery in a system widely considered entrenched, raising important lessons for opposition movements confronting democratic erosion.

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Peter Magyar, lead candidate of the Tisza party, speaks to supporters after the Tisza party won the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026 in Budapest, Hungary.
Peter Magyar, lead candidate of the Tisza party, speaks to supporters after the Tisza party won the parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, in Budapest, Hungary.
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Scholars Daniel Keleman and Hanna Folsz examine the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party and the implications for Hungary and Europe.

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  • At a REDS Seminar hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center seminar on April 16, 2026, Daniel Kelemen and Hanna Folsz discussed Hungary’s 2026 election and Viktor Orbán’s defeat by Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party.
  • They analyzed how Tisza overcame media control, electoral rules, and institutional advantages favoring Fidesz through broad-based campaigning.
  • The case highlights how opposition movements can challenge entrenched regimes and offers lessons for democratic recovery amid backsliding.
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In a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar held on April 9, 2026,  and co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Konstantin Sonin, a John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, presented his research on “The Reverse Cargo Cult: Why Authoritarian Governments Lie to Their People,” offering a theoretical explanation for why regimes such as the Soviet Union would knowingly tell citizens visibly false statements. According to Sonin’s research, authoritarian propaganda is much more complex than simple misinformation or manipulation, as it is often designed not to convince people of a single claim, but to shape how they evaluate information more broadly. 

Sonin begins with a personal anecdote, reflecting on his own experience participating in Soviet elections where there was only one candidate on the ballot, despite the process being presented as a meaningful choice. Using this example, he questions why regimes like the Soviet Union invest so heavily in clearly staged elections or exaggerated portrayals of Western life, even when citizens recognize these distortions. From this, he introduces the idea that such actions are not meant to persuade citizens of a specific falsehood, but instead to influence how they interpret all incoming information. Drawing on the metaphor of a “reverse cargo cult,” he suggests that just as some communities misinterpret the source of Western goods, citizens in authoritarian systems may come to believe that institutions in other countries are equally performative or deceptive. In this sense, narratives about foreign countries become an integral tool for reinforcing domestic political stability. 

He further explores how citizens evaluate elections and the decision to replace an incumbent under uncertainty about both competence and trustworthiness. He recognizes that in these regimes, citizens are not entirely naïve and may often recognize when a leader is lying. However, Sonin shows that even obvious lies can be effective. When a domestic leader lies about conditions that citizens already know to be bad, it signals not only that the leader is untrustworthy but also raises the perceived likelihood that foreign leaders are similarly dishonest. As a result, citizens downgrade their expectations of potential replacements, concluding that alternatives may not be any better. This dynamic ultimately reduces the incentive to replace the incumbent. 

As his theory suggests, negative information about conditions abroad, or even skepticism toward foreign success, can benefit authoritarian leaders. For example, Sonin points to Soviet reactions to the American National Exhibition in Moscow, where displays of a typical American home were dismissed by officials as unrealistic or misleading. This kind of framing encouraged citizens to question whether life in the United States was truly better, reinforcing the idea that shortcomings at home were not unique. As a result, domestic failures appear less exceptional, helping explain why authoritarian propaganda frequently emphasizes criticism of other countries and why such narratives often reinforce one another. 

Sonin concludes by emphasizing that lying in this context is not primarily about persuading citizens of a particular false claim, but about shaping their broader beliefs about the reliability of information. By weakening trust in information overall, leaders can make bad conditions at home seem like the safer or more reliable option compared to the uncertainty of change.

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Hannah Chapman presented her research in a CDDRL and TEC sponsored REDS Seminar on March 12, 2026.
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The Information Paradox: Citizen Appeals and Authoritarian Governance in Russia

Associate Professor Hannah Chapman explores how the rise of crises affects authoritarian regimes’ ability to gather information from their citizens in the context of Russia.
The Information Paradox: Citizen Appeals and Authoritarian Governance in Russia
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Konstantin Sonin presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on April 9, 2026.
Konstantin Sonin presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on April 9, 2026.
Stacey Clifton
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Professor Konstantin Sonin explores the power of misinformation in shaping public perception and political decision-making in a recent Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar.

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  • At a REDS Seminar hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center seminar on April 9, 2026, Konstantin Sonin presented research on authoritarian propaganda.
  • Sonin argued propaganda in regimes like the Soviet Union shapes how citizens process information, not belief in specific claims.
  • The findings suggest authoritarian messaging reinforces control by shaping public reasoning, even when citizens recognize statements as false.
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Zeynep Somer-Topcu

Whose preferences do political candidates in majoritarian systems represent on social media? Using the candidates' tweets during election campaigns in the UK, we examine whether candidates target copartisans, independents, or general preferences

We investigate how political candidates in the UK use Twitter to emphasize policy issues during election campaigns, and to what extent the issue priorities of
different voter groups affect their social media behavior. Drawing on approximately 750,000 tweets from nearly 5,000 candidates during the one-month campaign period before the 2015, 2017, and 2019 general elections in the UK, we examine the alignment between candidates’ online issue emphasis and the Most Important Issue (MII) responses of average voters, co-partisans, and independents at both the regional and national levels. 

We find that candidates’ Twitter activity most closely aligns with their co-partisans’ issue preferences. Candidates also represent the issues of general voters and independents but put less effort on those compared to the copartisans. Voters’ social media use, on the other hand, does not condition candidates’ online strategies.


Zeynep Somer-Topcu is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. She is also one of the chief editors at the British Journal of Political Science, Vice-President of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), and the Chair of the Diversity Committee of the European Political Science Society (EPSS), among her other services. Her research interests are at the intersection of political parties and voter behavior in advanced democracies. Her recent book, Glass Ceilings, Glass Cliffs, and Quicksands: Gendered Party Leadership in Parliamentary Systems (coauthored with Andrea Aldrich), published by Cambridge University Press, examines the life-cycle of women party leaders from candidacy to their election to and termination from party leadership. She is currently working on a series of projects examining party campaign rhetoric and voter perceptions of party issue positions. Her research sheds light on why political parties adopt certain electoral strategies and on the electoral and behavioral consequences of these strategies.

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Zeynep Somer-Topcu, University of Texas at Austin
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Christophe Crombez Event Nov 2024

The European Parliament elections that took place last June, recent legislative elections in France and other EU member states, and regional elections in Germany, have led to big gains for far-right parties throughout Europe. In this talk we discuss the recent election results and their implications for democracy in Europe. Will we witness a rightward shift in EU and member state policies, in such policy areas as immigration and the environment? Will the rise of the far right enable it to slow down or even bring to a halt EU policy-making and further integration? Will more member states follow Hungary's path and move away from democracy toward authoritarianism? 


Christophe Crombez is a political economist who specializes in European Union (EU) politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions and their impact on policies, EU institutional reform, lobbying, party politics, and parliamentary government.

Crombez is Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (since 1999). He is also Professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven in Belgium (since 1994). Crombez obtained a B.A. in Applied Economics, Finance, from KU Leuven, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University.

*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact Shannon Johnson at sj1874@stanford.edu. Requests should be made by September 29, 2024.

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, Second Floor, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

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Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center
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Christophe Crombez is a political economist who specializes in European Union (EU) politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions and their impact on policies, EU institutional reform, lobbying, party politics, and parliamentary government.

Crombez is Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (since 1999). He teaches Introduction to European Studies and The Future of the EU in Stanford’s International Relations Program, and is responsible for the Minor in European Studies and the Undergraduate Internship Program in Europe.

Furthermore, Crombez is Professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven in Belgium (since 1994). His teaching responsibilities in Leuven include Political Business Strategy and Applied Game Theory. He is Vice-Chair for Research at the Department for Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation.

Crombez has also held visiting positions at the following universities and research institutes: the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, in Florence, Italy, in Spring 2008; the Department of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy, in Spring 2004; the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, in Winter 2003; the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, Illinois, in Spring 1998; the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in Summer 1998; the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in Spring 1997; the University of Antwerp, Belgium, in Spring 1996; and Leti University in St. Petersburg, Russia, in Fall 1995.

Crombez obtained a B.A. in Applied Economics, Finance, from KU Leuven in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University in 1994.

Christophe Crombez, Stanford University, KU Leuven
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Eric Zemmour utilise les mots comme des armes. Et d'abord contre la langue elle-même. Sous sa plume, le sens se brouille, les concepts politiques s'inversent, l'ironie et le grotesque attaquent comme un acide les valeurs humanistes. La torsion des mots et de l'histoire y est la norme. L'obsession raciale omniprésente. Pourtant ses fictions fascinent...Pourquoi ?

 
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Une arme de destruction sémantique (French Edition)

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Cécile Alduy
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On August 9, 2020 citizens in the Republic of Belarus went to the polls to vote for their next president. The incumbent was Alexander Lukashenko, a 67-year-old military officer who has kept an iron grip on the presidency for the entire 26 years Bealrus has held elections. But the challenger was an unexpected, new face. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is a 38-year-old English teacher, mother and pro-democracy activist who stepped into a campaign following her husband's arrest and imprisonment in May 2020 for political dissension. In four short months, she galvanized the nation with a message of democracy, freedom and fair elections that reached across opposition factions and gained enough momentum to become a serious contender for the presidency.

On election day, projections estimated an initial win for Tsikhanouskaya at 60%. But when the country's Central Elections Commission announced the election results, Lukashenko carried 80% of the vote, and Tsikhanouskaya a mere 10%. Given the long history of election engineering in Belarus, the results were expected. But what happened next was not. Outraged by the fraud, Tsikhanouskaya's supporters poured into city centers in Brest and Minsk by the tens of thousands, instigating the largest public protests in the history of post-Soviet Belarus. Caught off-guard, the regime hit back with a ruthless wave of violence and political imprisonments, prompting the European Union, NATO and other countries to impose sanctions and condemn Lukashenko as an illegitimate leader.

While Tsikhanouskaya's presidential campaign ended last August, her role as a democratic leader in Eastern Europe has not. In the year since the election, she has traveled the globe to meet with lawmakers, policy experts and heads of state to speak out against the ongoing repression of Lukashenko's regime and advocate for support of Belarus by the international community. The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) was honored to host Tsikhanouskaya and her delegation at Stanford for a roundtable discussion on the challenges that lay ahead in preparing Belarus for a democratic transition. Director Michael McFaul hosted the discussion, which brought together scholars from across FSI, the Hoover Institute and the Belarusian expatriate community. The full recording is below.

Rather than holding a typical press conference, Tsikhanouskaya's visit at FSI gave members of the Belarusian delegation an opportunity to engage in back-and-forth dialogue with an interdisciplinary panel of experts on governance, history and policy. Tsikhanouskaya and her senior advisors shared their perspectives on the challenges they are facing to build and maintain pro-democracy efforts, while Stanford scholars offered insights from their extensive research and scholarship.

Presidents, Protests and Precedent in Belarus


As leader of the delegation, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya gave an overview of the brutality of Lukashenko's regime and the lawlessness that has enveloped the country. But she also reaffirmed the commitment of everyday Belarusians to defending their independence and continuing the work of building new systems to push back against the dictatorship, and encouraged the support of the international democratic community.

"Belarusians are doing their homework. But we also understand that we need the assistance and help of other democratic countries," said Tsikhanouskaya. "That support is vital, because our struggle relates not just to Belarusians, but to all countries who share these common values."

Speaking to the work that Belarusians have already undertaken, Franak Viačorka, a senior advisor to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, described how citizens are creating new means of protesting and organizing. Though they learned some tactics from recent protests in Hong Kong and classic theories by political scientists like Gene Sharp, organizers in Belarus quickly realized that they needed to innovate in order to keep ahead of Lukashenko's crack-downs. Today the opposition is a tech-driven movement that spreads awareness and support quickly through digital spaces and underground channels while avoiding large in-person gatherings that attract government brutality.

By Tanya Bayeva's assessment, these methods of organizing have been effective in capturing widespread support amongst people. A member of the Belarusian diaspora, Bayeva described the sense of empowerment she felt in coming together in a common cause with like-minded people.

"By coming out like this, people have started realizing that it is up to us, the people, and our individual willpower to make a difference," said Bayeva. "We are realizing that the king has no clothes, and that working together we can forward the process of democratization."

But there is still plenty of work ahead. In order to facilitate a more peaceful future transition to a democratic system, there will need to be frameworks in place to bridge the divide between old systems and new. Valery Kavaleuski, the representative on foreign affairs in Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's delegation, is focusing extensively on these issues, such as reconciliation processes and plans for future investments between Belarus and the European Union.

"These are political moves that reinforce hope among Belarusians and tells that that they are not alone and that when the change comes, they will have friends by their side to overcome the challenges of the transition period," said Kavaleuski.

Advice from Stanford Scholars: Focus on Processes and People


Responding to the Belarusian delegation's questions and comments, the faculty from FSI and the broader Stanford community offered insights and considerations from a variety of perspectives and disciplines on 'next steps' for the pro-democracy movement.

Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at FSI and Mosbacher Director at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), cautioned against the impulse to immediately take down the state and bureaucratic systems of the existing regime. While dismantling the mechanisms from the old state may feel emotionally satisfying, examples from history such as post-Nazi Germany and post-invasion Iraq illustrate the crippling effect on efficiency, functionality and the ability of the new order to govern in a vacuum of bureaucratic expertise.

FSI's Deputy Director, Kathryn Stoner, gave similar advice in regard to drafting and implementing a new constitution and conventions.

"People care to a great degree [about a new constitution], but not to months and months of debate and politicians yelling at one another. People can't eat constitutions," said Stoner. "You have to demonstrate that your system is going to be better than what was. When things have not gone well in transitioning countries, it's been because people don't see concrete change. So have a constitutional convention, but make it fast."

Amr Hamzawy, a senior research scholar for the Middle East Initiative at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, also pointed to the importance of engaging the public and building alliances within both the old and new political systems. Based on his observations of the failed Egyptian and Tunisian efforts at democratic transition, he cautioned against discussions of impunity, arguing that while politically and morally symbolic, this practice often backfires and alienates important factions of the state apparatus which are vital for the function and success of a new government.

Hamzawy similarly encouraged carefully blending nationalism and populism to keep divisions within the public sector in check. Imbuing such narratives with pro-democracy rhetoric, he believes, can create a powerful tool for unifying the population around the new government and emerging national identity.  

The advice from the Europe Center's director, Anna Grzymala-Busse, succinctly brought together many of the points made by the faculty panel: "No post-transitional government can achieve all the promises they've made right away," said Grzymala-Busse. "So make the transition about processes rather than specific outcomes, about ensuring the losers are heard along with the winners, and about making sure all people can participate."

Additional participants in the roundtable discussion not noted above include Hanna Liubakova, a journalist and non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, Dmytro Kushneruk, the Consul General of Ukraine in San Francisco, and Stanford scholars Larry Diamond, David Holloway, Norman Naimark, Erik Jensen, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and John Dunlop.

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Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya discusses the future of democracy in Belarus with a roundtable of Stanford scholars.
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Michael McFaul, Franak Viačorka, and Francis Fukuyama participate in a roundtable discussion on democracy in Belarus.
Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
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Democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her delegation joined an interdisciplinary panel of Stanford scholars and members of the Belarusian community to discuss the future of democracy in Belarus.

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Based on past and current ethnographic research in the Parisian metropolitan region, I discuss how racial and ethnic minorities understand and respond to their racialization in a context in which race and ethnicity are not legitimate or acknowledged, and how a suspect citizenship is created. I will discuss how racial and ethnic minorities are “citizen outsiders” as evident of France’s “racial project” (Omi and Winant 1994), which marks distinctions outside of explicit categorization. I explore not only how race marks individuals outside of formal categories, but also how people respond to these distinctions in terms of a racism-related issue, here, police violence and brutality against racial and ethnic minorities. I will also discuss how activists frame their growing social problem given the constraints of French Republican ideology.

Jean Beaman
Jean Beaman is Associate Professor of Sociology, with affiliations with Political Science, Feminist Studies, Global Studies, and the Center for Black Studies Research, at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Previously, she was faculty at Purdue University and held visiting fellowships at Duke University and the European University Institute (Florence, Italy). Her research is ethnographic in nature and focuses on race/ethnicity, racism, international migration, and state-sponsored violence in both France and the United States. She is author of Citizen Outsider: Children of North African Immigrants in France (University of California Press, 2017), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. Her current book project is on suspect citizenship and belonging, anti-racist mobilization, and activism against police violence in France. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Northwestern University. She is also an Editor of H-Net Black Europe, an Associate Editor of the journal, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, and Corresponding Editor for the journal Metropolitics/Metropolitiques.

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Jean Beaman speaker University of California, Santa Barbara
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly gained dominance of liberal democracy as a political regime was accompanied by a new dominance of liberal democracy as a descriptive language. Concepts of political science, sociology, and economics which had been developed for the analysis of Western-type polities were applied to the various phenomena in the newly liberated countries. Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics from Central European University (CEU DI) argue that the language of liberal democracies blurs the understanding of the current state of post-communism as it leads to conceptual stretching and brings in a host of hidden presumptions.

Magyar and Madlovics present at Stanford their most recent book, The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes (CEU Press, 2020). It is a comprehensive attempt to break with the traditional analysis, proposing a systematic renewal of our descriptive vocabulary. The authors have created categories as well as a whole new grammar for the region’s political, economic, and social phenomena. Focusing on Central Europe, the post-Soviet countries, and China, their study provides concepts and theories to analyze the actors, institutions, and dynamics of post-communist democracies, autocracies, and dictatorships.

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Bálint Magyar

Bálint Magyar is a Research Fellow at CEU Democracy Institute (since 2020), holding University Doctoral degree in Political Economy (1980) from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. He has published and edited numerous books on post-communist mafia states since 2013. He was an Open Society Fellow for carrying out comparative studies in this field (2015-2016), Hans Speier Visiting Professor at New School (2017), Senior Fellow at CEU Institute for Advanced Study (2018-2019), and Research Fellow at Financial Research Institute (2010-2020). Formerly, he was an activist of the Hungarian anti-communist dissident movement, founder of the liberal party of Hungary (SZDSZ, 1988), Member of Hungarian Parliament (1990-2010), and Minister of Education (1996-1998, 2002-2006).

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Bálint Madlovics

Bálint Madlovics is a political scientist, economist, and sociologist, currently working as a Research Assistant at CEU Democracy Institute (since 2020). He holds an MA in Political Science (2018) from Central European University in Budapest, a BA in Applied Economics (2016) from Corvinus University of Budapest, and a BA in Sociology (2021) from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. He contributed a chapter to one of Bálint Magyar’s volumes on the post-communist mafia state of Hungary, and has co-authored past and upcoming publications since 2015. He was a Research fellow of Financial Research Institute in Budapest (2018-2019).

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Bálint Magyar CEU Democracy Institute
Bálint Madlovics CEU Democracy Institute
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During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. For example, after the Swedish parliamentary election in 2018, it took 134 days to install a new government, which is especially surprising since all previous Swedish governments since the 1930s have formed within four weeks. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity (resulting, for example, from a high degree of party-system fragmentation). We draw on such theories, but we also highlight a feature that hasn’t received much attention in the previous literature on bargaining duration: “pre-electoral commitments.” We consider such commitments both in terms of positive statements made by parties about alliances with other parties and in terms of negative statements about parties that are considered “pariahs.” Pre-electoral commitments can reduce complexity in a bargaining situation by ruling out certain potential governments as viable alternatives, but they can also increase complexity in cases where the outcome of the election is different from what the parties expected: parties then have to worry about the electoral and intra-party costs that are associated with breaking commitments made before the election. We evaluate our hypotheses using a nested research design, combining a large-n study of approximately 400 government-formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945-2018) with an in-depth case study that is based on 37 interviews with leading Swedish politicians concerning the government-formation process in 2018–2019. This allows us to analyze the effects of pre-electoral commitments on bargaining duration and the causal mechanisms that explain these effects.

 

Jan TeorellJan Teorell, Professor of Political Science and holder of the Lars Johan Hierta professorial chair, received his PhD in 1998 from the Department of Government, Uppsala University, on a dissertation on intra-party democracy. In 2004-2006, he served as Project Coordinator at the Quality of Government Institute, Göteborg University, responsible for creating the Quality of Government Dataset (www.qog.pol.gu.se), which won the Lijphart, Przeworski, Verba Award for Best Dataset by the APSA Comparative Politics Section at the 2009 Annual Meetings (together with Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg), and the Varieties of Democracy dataset (www.v-dem.net), which won the same award in 2016 (together with a large international research team). His research interests include political methodology, history, Swedish and comparative politics, comparative democratization, corruption, and state making.

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Jan Teorell Stockholm University
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In many countries around the world, women's enfranchisement marked the single largest expansion in the eligible electorate. In Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and Germany, the electorate more than doubled once women could vote, while in countries that rolled out women's suffrage gradually, such as the UK and Norway, even the second smaller reforms saw the electorate grow by more than a third. The sheer size of the expansion had the potential to transform electoral politics, a prospect that provoked optimism and fear alike: for those who fought for women’s suffrage, the victory brought legitimacy and new beginnings; yet for those who fought against, the reform heralded instability. Did women's suffrage transform electoral politics for good or for bad? Did it increase electoral instability? Did women favor particular parties?

Prominent theories of post-suffrage politics suggest either that women would vote conservatively, or that women's voting power would be vitiated by their reluctance to turn out. Leveraging fine grained municipal level data from Sweden, which includes turnout figures separated by sex, to examine the impact of women's suffrage on electoral politics, we argue that the geography of the gender gap, both in terms of turnout and vote choice, jointly determine the impact of women's votes. Using three methods to estimate the gender vote gap, we find that in cities, women were slightly more likely to vote for the left than men. Although women turned out at lower rates than men overall, their concentration in cities produced a national gender vote gap for the left. These findings, which highlight how diversity among women and electoral geography produce electoral outcomes, complicate longstanding theories about the "traditional" gender voting gap.

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Dawn Teele

Dr. Dawn Teele holds a B.A. in Economics from Reed College, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University. Prior to joining the faculty at Penn she was a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. Dr. Teele's research has been published in a variety of outlets in political science, including the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and Politics & Society. She is editor of a volume on social science methodology, Field Experiments and Their Critics  (Yale University Press 2014), and co-editor of Good Reasons to Run: Women and Political Candidacy (Temple University Press 2020). In 2018, Princeton University Press published her book Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women’s Vote which won the Luebbert Prize for the best book in Comparative Politics from the American Political Science Association.

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Dawn Langan Teele University of Pennsylvania
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