Britain wiser to remain in European Union, Stanford scholar says
A British exit from the European Union would slow economic growth, reduce Europe's impact in world politics, and strengthen regimes such as Russia's that prefer a weaker, less united Europe, Stanford expert Christophe Crombez says.
The United Kingdom would lose more than it would gain if it left the European Union, a Stanford scholar said.
So would other European nations, and the real winners would be countries that seek to divide European unity, said Christophe Crombez, a consulting professor in Stanford’s Europe Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Britain is holding a referendum on June 23 to decide whether the country should leave or remain in the European Union.
“It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty,” said Crombez, who studies European Union politics, parliamentary systems, political economy and economic analysis of political institutions. He is an economist from Belgium.
The Stanford News Service recently interviewed Crombez on the upcoming vote, known as “Brexit.”
What is Brexit?
The term Brexit refers to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union allows member states to withdraw.
What are the arguments for and against Brexit?
The campaign for the UK to leave the EU uses the following main arguments: leaving would save UK taxpayers money, since the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget; the UK would no longer have to comply with EU laws it does not want, whereas currently it can be outvoted in EU institutions and forced to adopt laws it opposes; and it would allow the UK to better control migration, whereas EU citizens are currently free to move and work throughout the EU.
These three arguments can easily be refuted, however. The UK does indeed contribute to the EU budget, but the benefits it derives from being part of the EU market far outweigh the budgetary contributions. Moreover, (if Britain were to withdraw) the EU would require the UK to pay into its budget, if it wants to remain part of the EU’s internal market, as it has done with Switzerland and Norway.
Also, about half of UK exports are destined for the EU. If the UK were to leave, it would no doubt want to continue to trade with the EU. UK products would have to conform to EU rules for them to be sold in the EU. UK companies that want to export to the EU would thus continue to comply with EU rules. The difference would be that the UK would no longer be involved in setting those EU rules. Post-Brexit, the rules would thus be less to the UK’s liking than prior to it, and UK companies would comply to these less advantageous rules.
Finally, the EU would impose requirements on immigration and free movement of people on the UK in exchange for free trade with the EU, as it has with other countries in similar situations, such as Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, member states may no longer feel inclined to stop refugees from moving on to the UK if the UK were to leave, which may lead to higher rather than lower immigration.
In addition to these arguments, the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign (which supports the UK remaining in the EU) argues that Britain carries more weight in world politics as part of the EU than on its own, in trade negotiations as well as on security issues, and that a united Europe is better at dealing with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin and other authoritarian rulers, terrorist threats and international crime.
What do you think is the best decision for the United Kingdom to make on this vote?
I see no advantages to leaving the EU. It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty – consider the points above. The vote would have a negative impact on growth in the UK and the rest of the EU and, in fact, the world, and it would weaken the UK, the EU and the West in world politics.
What happens economically to Britain if the country leaves the European Union?
Trade and hence gross domestic product would be negatively affected, especially in the short term. Uncertainty would reduce investment and trade. The UK and the EU would be consumed with the negotiations on the break-up for years. This would prevent both the UK and EU from tackling more important economic and security issues. In the long term, the economy would readjust, but the result would be suboptimal.
What happens to the EU if Britain leaves?
The EU is less dependent on trade with the UK than vice versa. There would be an economic impact, but it would be less substantial. The effect would be more significant for a few countries that trade more with the UK, such as Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Brexit would, however, deliver a major blow to the idea of European unification. It would weaken the EU impact in world politics and strengthen such rulers as Putin and (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan in their dealings with the EU.
Could a British exit open up a Pandora’s Box of other EU countries exiting or spark other regional independence movements, like Catalonia?
That is quite possible. A number of other countries may want to hold referendums on the EU. Moreover, Brexit is likely to lead to a break-up of the UK. Scotland would likely hold another referendum and decide to leave the UK in order to stay in the EU. The same may be true for Northern Ireland in the long run. Scottish secession may then give other EU regions, such as Catalonia, further incentives to secede.

Cécile earned her Ph.D. in French Literature from the University of Reims in France in 2003 and joined the faculty at Stanford University that same year. Her research interests include the history and mythology of national and ethnic identities since the Renaissance, far right ideology and rhetoric, the relations between cultural, literary, and medical discourses on gender and the body in early modern Europe, poetry and poetics, narrative forms and their discontent, French cinema, and contemporary French literature. Cécile's most recent book, Marine Le Pen prise aux mots. Décryptage du nouveau discours frontiste [Marine Le Pen taken to her words. Decoding the new national front discourse], co-authored with Stephanie Wahnich, examines the rhetoric used by the National Front leader, Marine Le Pen, and compares it to that of her father and former National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Casual observation of far right politics in France suggests that there has been a significant change in the National Front program following the 2011 leadership change to Marine Le Pen from Jean-Marie Le Pen and his 2015 ouster from the party. Marine Le Pen has taken great efforts to distance herself from her father, who infamously and repeatedly characterized gas chambers as "a detail in the history of World War II." The party has also enjoyed increasing electoral support in recent years. Against this backdrop, the book examines two fundamental questions: what is Marine Le Pen actually saying, and why does her speech resonate with French society today? To answer these questions, Alduy and Wahnich have analyzed over 500 speeches given by Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen. This analysis reveals that there is significant continuity between the political agenda and ideological content of the Le Pens. In contrast with her father's blatantly radical speech, however, the younger Le Pen employs careful phraseology, replete with allusions, ambiguities, and double entendres, in order to "de-demonize" the party and make its platform appear more palatable to a modern French audience. In spite of programmatic continuity, this rhetorical rebranding appears to have facilitated greater electoral support for the National Front. Marine Le Pen prise aux mots has received significant media coverage, including a feature in
Camilla is an anthropologist who is interested in using network analysis to examine the social arrangements "mega-sites" - large settlements that originated with small, settled hunter-gatherer communities - during the Pre-Pottery Neolithic B (PPNB) and Pottery Neolithic periods. In her current research, Camilla is evaluating these social arrangements with new evidence from Çatalhöyük, a dense agglomeration of mudbrick houses occupied for 1,400 years and located in modern-day Turkey. Approximately the size of a town, Çatalhöyük lacks many of the characteristics of a modern town, including specialized areas, communal buildings, and centralized functions. Moreover, the spatial arrangement differs significantly from other PPNB settlements. In summer 2015, Camilla conducted field research, partially funded by The Europe Center, at the site of Çatalhöyük. During her four weeks at the site, she explored ways of modeling the site's networks by collecting data focused on patterns of similarity of material culture features. This data will be used to examine the site's internal organization as well as the arrangements of social relationships therein. In addition, she spent time studying some of the recently-excavated buildings, using architectural features to study ties among entities.
The Europe Center is pleased to introduce to you Lina Eriksson, a Fulbright Scholar who is visiting Stanford University from the Department of Government at Uppsala University and the Center for Natural Disaster Science (CNDS), Sweden. Lina holds an MA in Ethnic Conflicts and Conflict Resolutions, Asylum Immigration and Integration from University of Waterloo, Canada and an MSc in Political Sciences, Economics and International Development from Jönköping International Business School (JIBS), Sweden. She is broadly interested in the politics of natural disasters. In her dissertation, entitled Natural Disasters and National Politics, Lina examines the electoral effects of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and the 2005 Storm Gudrun on Swedish parliamentary elections. Part of this research, forthcoming in Electoral Studies, finds that the Swedish Social Democratic Party's poor crisis response to Storm Gudrun resulted in a significant decrease in support for the Social Democratic Party in the affected regions, leading to the largest change in partisan support in Swedish history. We invite you to visit our